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PREFACE
Recent years have witnessed a revival of
interest in Coleridge, the man and his work. The man him- 
self has occasioned such psychological studies as Fausset's 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Charpentier's The Sublime Somnam- 
bulist, and Potter*s Coleridge and S.T.C. A glimpse into his 
work from the standpoint of literature has been afforded by 
the brilliant study of Lowes in The Road to Xanadu, and nore 
recently by Richards in Coleridge on Imagination. Cole- 
ridge's creative work in philosophy has been reviewed by Miss 
Snyder in her Coleridge on Logic and Learning, by Muirhead in 
his Coleridge as Philosopher, and by \Vellek in his Immanuel 
Kant in England - to mention only works in English. Finally, 
on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of Coleridge's 
death, there appeared a memorial volume containing studies by 
several hands.
There is to be noted, however, one significant 
lack among all these recent studies. With the exception of a 
short section in Dr. Muirhead's book, no study of Coleridge's 
religious philosophy has appeared. Nor is this all. In the 
main, where the recent critics have touched on Coleridge's 
religious beliefs, they have done so with little sympathy for 
his profession of Christian faith. There has been a tendency to 
treat it either as secondary in importance, or to explain it as
IV.
an expression of the "superficial" rather than of the "true" 
Coleridge; but, as a recent reviewer has pointed out, Cole- 
ridge's Christian faith cannot be set aside so easily. Cole- 
ridge was a philosopher with a love of speculative truth. He 
was also a sincere Christian. His attempt to combine the two 
may have ended in failure; but no analysis which ignores or 
eliminates the one or the other can be said to be true to his 
thought.
The following study, undertaken at the suggest- 
ion of Professor H.R.Mackintosh, is an attempt to remedy this 
two-fold defect in Coleridgean criticism. It aims at an ade- 
quate exposition of Coleridge's religious philosophy. Tne 
chief sources of that philosophy, and the influences that de- 
termined the development of Coleridge's mind, are discussed 
first. The main body of the thesis is then devoted to the ex- 
position of his views. While the emphasis is expository, 
certain points of criticism are indicated.
It is to be noted that this thesis does not
claim to be exhaustive on all phases of Coleridge's religious 
thought. Coleridge was the most learned man of his age, and 
the roots of his reading and thought go deep into every field 
of human knowledge. A detailed, exhaustive study of the whole 
range of his mind in this field is impossible within the 
limits of this thesis. For example, Coleridge's ethical 
theory, although closely allied to his religious philosophy,
1. The Times Literary Supplement, August 9, 1934, p.551.
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is not dealt with separately. it is felt, in the first place, 
that Muirhead treats of this adequately; and secondly, that 
sufficient is said of the "self" in connection with Cole- 
ridge's epistemology and doctrine of immortality, and of 
society in connection v/ith his theory of Church and State, to 
show the trend of his thought on ethical problems, namely that 
the man makes the motives and not the motives the man, and 
that ethics must be based ultimately on religion. Again, the 
writer does not propose to discuss Coleridge's relation to 
such movements as Quakerism and Swedenborgianism, nor to an- 
alyze his indebtedness to each of the thinkers with whom and 
with whose v/ritings he was acquainted.
In view of the importance of certain manuscript 
remains, it has been found necessary to quote from them at 
length. This method, while adding somewhat to the length of 
the study, is not without advantage. It enables Coleridge to 
speak for himself.
A word is necessary with regard to the spelling. 
In accordance with the fashion of the age, Coleridge uses cap- 
itals lavishly. In quotation, Coleridge's system of spelling 
has been retained, but not elsewhere. Again, certain words 
are spelled differently in different places, e.g., judgment and 
judgement. With the exception of certain additions and changes 
in punctuation, the passages quoted from the manuscript remains 
are as they stand.
The writer wishes to acknowledge his debt of 
appreciation; first, to the Reverend G.H.B.Coleridge, vicar of
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Leatherhead, Surrey, and great-grandson of S.T.Coleridge, for 
the extended use of the manuscripts in his possession; second, 
to the Henry E. Huntingdon Library of San Marino, California, 
for permission to consult the manuscript in its keeping; and 
third, to Professor Alice D. Snyder of Vassar College, Pough- 
keepsie, New York, for the use of her photostat copy of the 
Huntingdon Manuscript. In addition, he desires to express his 
thanks to Dr. Hunter of the New College Library, Edinburgh, 
and to the librarians of the University Library and of the 
National Library, Edinburgh, of the British Museum and of Dr. 
Williams' Library, London, and of McGill University, Montreal, 
for their especial assistance.
Finally, he wishes to record his deep gratitude 
to his advisors, Professor H.R.Mackintosh and Professor Hugh 
Watt, for their assistance and gracious encouragment during 
his period of study in Edinburgh.
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Coleridge in Relation to the Thought of his Time*
"The exact day on which a man is born is a 
matter of no importance:" writes Dr. Carnegie Simpson, "the 
important thing is a man»s period."1 Regarded from this view- 
point, it may be said that Samuel Taylor Coleridge was singu- 
larly fortunate. Born in 1772, his "period" is the transition 
period from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century. 
The transition which then took place has been described as 
representing "one of the most profound spiritual transformations 
which human thought has undergone."^ In that brief period at 
the turn of the century, the clamping shackles of the eighteenth 
century on the whole spirit of man were destined to be over- 
thrown. It was an age of great events - and great men. And, as 
is always the case with great men, they were playing in the dual 
role of creature and creator. The eighteenth century left a 
legacy - and Coleridge was a beneficiary. It left also a
1. Carnegie Simpson: The Life of Principal Rainy, I, p.39. 
2» Storr: The Development of English Theology, p
2.
problem - to the solution of which he was to devote the major 
part of his life.
What then was this legacy of the eighteenth 
century? It was a century which had made articulate its mind 
in the formal poetry of Pope and Dryden, and in the philosophy 
of Locke. A sensationalist psychology and a firm belief in 
undeviating natural law dominated the world of thought. Thought 
and religion, it is true, were in close alliance, but this 
alliance meant that religion was watered-down to "common sense. n 
Religion was regarded as a conservative bulwark of morality? and 
morality was construed in the utilitarian spirit of Paley. Any- 
thing in the nature of personal enthusiasm was frowned upon as a 
deviation from the orderly walk of life. Proud in its self- 
complacency, Deism had exiled God gracefully but firmly from the 
universe, and man was sure that the control of things was safely 
in his own hands. But withal, the spirit of man was hedged in 
everywhere by petty rules of his own making. It was the age of 
the finite.
"What was highest in it, tt says Dr. Muirhead concisely, 
"the impulse to pass beyond itself and enter, through 
knowledge, feeling and action, into union with what is 
greater and more enduring than itself, was everywhere 
checked by the view which the prevalent principles 
seemed to be forcing upon it. Instead of spiritualiz- 
ing nature, philosophy had naturalized spirit." 1
But as the century drew to a close, new forces 
were already in motion to break down this house of man's 
building. Geographical horizons were enlarging, as adventurers 
and traders brought news of new lands beyond the seas. The
1. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.26.
researches of historians were uncovering the wealth of fact and 
thought lying buried in the caverns of the past. No longer was 
a static view of human nature tenable.^ The protest against 
cold rationalism was heard as feeling found her voice. In 
Thomson and Cowper were heard the first notes which were to 
swell into the full chorus of the Romantic Revival. Man, him­ 
self, emerged with a new dignity beneath the preaching of 
Wesley and Whitefield, and the poetry of Burns and Wordsworth. 
The ferment of ideas arising out of the revolutionary thought 
of Rousseau, with the ensuing revolution in France, and the 
rise of democracy in America, turned thought along a new 
channel - towards the idea of government, not by agreement, but 
by the corporate will of the nation. To these factors must be 
added the new discoveries of science which led directly to the 
Industrial Revolution with its resultant wealth and resultant 
social problem. All this was true of England. On the Contin­ 
ent, moreover, the edifice of the Aufklarung had begun to 
totter as the foundations of a new philosophy of idealism were 
being laid by Kant and his successors, Fichte and Schelling; 
and of a new theology by Schleiermacher.
In all this welter of movements and ideas, was 
there not some underlying unity? Romanticism was bringing back 
the sense of the Infinite as the chief value in human life. 
History was giving man the perspective of the years, and science
• •• •»«••••••• •»*»••« • ••••••» •^•••••^^^•fc •»•!
1. Storr: op.cit., p.4o, regards this growing feeling for 
history as the most important factor.
had begun to view things in their inter-relations. Philosophy 
had analyzed man into his component parts. Could it now re­ 
build him into a unity at once dynamic and creative? Could it 
rebuild the universe into a universe of purpose? Man was find­ 
ing a new kinship with man. Could he find a new kinship with 
the Soul of the universe? This dual problem - the intellectual 
problem of integrating all the lines of man's experience and 
thought, and the practical one of discovering to man a spiritual 
home in the enlarged universe - was the one demanding answer. 
What was needed was not only a philosophy and a religion, but 
a synthesis that would be at once both a philosophy and a 
religion. Perhaps more than any other man of his age, Cole­ 
ridge saw the problem - saw it, because he found localized 
within his own person the factors of the problem. As a recent 
writer has said, he was "one of the few men of his generation 
who really grasped the significance of the great intellectual 
and social metamorphosis which the Western world was undergoing.^
Throughout long years Coleridge sought his goal, 
his pace now slowed with the dead weight of depression and sick­ 
ness, now quickened under the stimulus of friendship and the
1. Vide Muirhead: op. cit., p»30; and Coleridge: Studies by 
Several Hands on the Hundredth Anniversary of HIS Death,
pp
Cf. Aynard: La Vie fl*un Poete, p. 355, who takes the oppo­ 
site view that Coleridge was so dominated by the past 
that he failed to grasp the significance of the changes 
going on around him. How far wrong Aynard is, will be 
seen by reading Muirhead and Cobban.
2. Cobban: Edmund 33urke and the Revolt against the Eighteenth 
Century, p.l/S^
inspiration of some author. At the end he had prepared vast 
stores of material and even outlines had been sketched. 1 
Recent criticism has inclined to acknowledge a larger measure 
of success, than a former age accredited to him, in his self- 
imposed task of bringing within the bounds of one system all 
human knowledge and experience.
Even his severest critics have never questioned 
the capacity of his mind. Perhaps his greatest service was that 
of inspirer. His was a seminal mind. As early as 1^^, Mill, 
by no means in agreement philosophically with Coleridge, wrote, 
"Bentham excepted, no Englishman of recent date has left his 
impress so deeply on the opinions and mental tendencies of those 
among us who attempt to enlighten their practice by philosophi­ 
cal meditation."-' Writing of his age, Mill says further, "No one 
has contributed more to shape the opinions of those among its 
younger men, who can be said to have opinions at all." In a 
dual capacity as interpreter of the German transoendentalists 
and redisooverer of the native British Platonist philosophy,
Coleridge became the founder of nineteenth-century British
k 
idealism.
Even more fruitful, perhaps, has been Coleridge's 
influence within more strictly theological circles. Principal 
Tulloch writes of Coleridge's influence, as that of "a new power."*
1. Snyder: Coleridge on Logic and Learning, pp.
2. Vide Muir&ead; coieridge as Philosopher, p. 15 and passim. 
Vide Snyder: op. cit., vii ana passim.
3. Mill: London and Westminster Review, Maroh 1$4Q, Reprinted 
in Dissertations ana Discussions, Vol» 1, p«393«
4. Vide Muirheaa: op. cit., p*59 ana passim.
5. Tullooh: Movements of Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century, p. 7. —————————————
Archdeacon Storr ranks Coleridge and Newman as the two great­ 
est personalities of the early nineteenth century in theology, 
but adds significantly, "Newman was a somewhat lonely being, 
the course of whose later life moves outside the Anglican tra­ 
dition."1 The springs of later Christian Socialism in England
2 are to be found in Coleridge, while Hare, Maurice, Kingsley,
and men of the Broad Church School have each left their personal 
tribute to him. In America, Coleridge's writings received even 
a warmer welcome«^ To President Marsh of Vermont and to Horace 
Bushnell, Coleridge came as a ray of heavenly light. The 
influence of Coleridge is clearly seen in the developed thought 
of Bushnell. What were the views that had such widespread in­ 
fluence? An answer to this question requires first some account 
of their author.
1. Storr: op. cit., pp.6-7•
2. (Vide Schanok: Die Sooialpolitisohen Ansohauungen Coleridges
una sein jEJinfiussauf earlyle. 
Brunner: *T.G• ais vorlauirer aer hrTstlioh-Sooialen
;lisohe Sxudien, 1921-55 > 
3. Vide Coleridge: studies Dy Seve"ral Hands etc., pp.201-221
CHAPTER II
The Development of Coleridge's Mind
The pathetic story of Coleridge's life has been 
told many times. Coleridge wore his heart on his sleeve, and 
his biographers have found ready to hand sufficient material 
for their varying opinions of his character and habits. -1- It 
is not necessary to enter into all the details of his life for 
a complete understanding of his views. What is required, how­ 
ever, is a sketch of his life which reveals the nature of his 
mind and the factors which went to influence it during its 
growth to maturity. 
I. "The born Platonist."
Samuel 'i'aylor Coleridge was born in the little 
Devonshire village of Ottery St. Mary on October 21, 1772, the 
youngest child of a family of thirteen. His father, the Reverend 
John Coleridge (1719-1781) was the eccentric vicar of the Parish 
of Ottery St. Mary and Master of the tfree Grammar School in 
Ottery. In a saying which has achieved some notoriety, Coleridge
1, Vide: Fausset: Samuel 'iaylor Coleridge.
Charpentier: The Sublime Somnambulist. 
Potter: Coleridge and S.T.G.
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once maintained that "every man is born an Aristotelian, or 
a Platonist." ! In the widest sense of the term, he himself 
was born a Platonist. The Bible was his first textbook, and 
at the age of three, he "could read a chapter." 2 Protected as 
the youngest child by his mother, he found his greatest pleas­ 
ure, not in physical play, but in reading. Robinson Crusoe and 
the Arabian Nights were early favourites. Of his voracious 
reading of imaginative literature, he wrote,
"I know no other way of giving the mind a love of the 
Great and the Whole. Those who have been led to the 
same truths step by step, through the constant testi­ 
mony of their senses, seem to me to want a sense which 
I possess. They contemplate nothing but parts, and all 
parts are necessarily little* And the universe to them 
is but a mass of little things." 3
He described himself accurately in later life, "My mind," he 
wrote, "has been habituated to the Vast, and I never regarded 
my senses in any way as the criteria of my belief. I regulat­ 
ed all my creeds by my conceptions, not by sight, even at that 
age." 4 He became a dreamer.
"I was driven," he says, "from life in motion to life 
in thought and sensation.............AlasJ I had all
the simplicity, all the docility of the little child, 
but none of the child's habits. I never thought as a 
child, never had the language of a child." 5
On the death of his father in 1781, the precoc­ 
ious boy was sent to Christ's Hospital School through the kind­ 
ness of friends. Here he stayed for eight years, studying under
!• Table Talk. July 2, 1830, p. 99.
2. Turnbull: Biographia Epistolaris, p. 9.
3. Ibid: pp. 17,18.
4. Ibid: p. 17.
5. Ibid: p. 15.
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the severe eye of Bowyer, and acquiring Charles Lamb for his 
friend. His reading continued as his chief pleasure. His inter­ 
est in philosophical and theological discussion early manifested 
itself. "At a very premature age, even before my fifteenth year," 
he writes, "I had bewildered myself in metaphysics, and in theol­ 
ogical controversy." The necr-Platonic poems of Synesius were the 
subject of an early attempt at translation. 2 A reading of Vol­ 
taire's Philosophical dictionary caused him to "sport Infidel" 
for a period, but as he said himself, "my infidel vanity never 
touched my heart*" 3 His alleged atheism drew forth a flogging 
from the head-master, Bowyer, "the only just flogging" he ever 
received. 4 his love of exposition of the theories and specula­ 
tions discovered in his reading, was here given its first impetus 
towards that development which was to make him the "Seer of High- 
gate," "rich in monologue," at the close of his life. The delight­ 
ful picture given by Lamb of his friend^ "expounding the mysteries
Rof lamblichus and Plotinus," may be somewhat overdrawn. Never­ 
theless, it reveals this fact - Coleridge was by nature and by
6 destiny a preacher.
II, Cambridge and Bristol - "Necessitarian and Unitarian."
In 1791, Coleridge entered Jesus College, Cambridge;
but left in 1794 without taking his degree. It was during this
1. Biographia Literaria; p. 7
2. Ibid: p. 121n.
3. Gillman: Life of S.T. Coleridge, p. 23.
Cf. Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, p. 69. 
4o Gillman: op. cit., p. 24.
Cf. Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, p. 69.
5. Lamb: Essays of Ella. "Christ's Hospital jj'ive and Thirty 
Years Ago," pp. 27-28.
6. Cf. Potter: Coleridge and S.T.C. pp. 94-96.
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period of his Cambridge studies that Coleridge's intellectual 
development began in earnest. He entered Cambridge an orthodox 
Anglican, a member of the Established Church, with a view to 
taking orders. 1 He left it a necessitarian in philosophy, and a 
Unitarian in theology. His friendship with Southey dates from 
the period of his first vacation, a friendship which was to lead 
him into the turmoil of the pantisocratic scheme, and into a 
marriage which was to prove so utterly uncongenial. To his 
early university days is to be dated his first meddling with 
opium, 2 His first year at Cambridge gave promise of classical 
attainments. 3 His real interests, however, were in other fields. 
Classical learning, for Coleridge, could never be an end in it­ 
self.
It is to be noted that at this period a revival
of interest in Platonism was being stimulated through the pub­ 
lications of Thomas Taylor. It is therefore probable 4 that at
this time Coleridge made the acquaintance of the Cambridge
5 Platonists, to whose writings he was forever indebted.
Another attraction was to claim the attention of 
the ardent young scholar. Coleridge was a student in the college
c
of David Hartley. Hartley was not only a philosopher, he was
1. Turnbull: op. cit., Vol. II, p. 301 - Letter of March 1833.2. Griggs: Unpublished Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
Vol. I, p. 3.
3« He was selected as a Craven Scholarship candidate.4« A search by the writer through the reading registers of Jesus College, October 30, 1934, failed to reveal Coleridge's name as borrower. At any rate, it is certain that by May, 1795, Coleridge was reading Cudworth. (Kaufman: Modern Philology, XXI, p. 3.)
5. Vide Howard: Coleridge 1 s Idealism and passim.
6. David Hartley (1705-1751) Author of Obeervations on Man.
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sincerely religious - holding Unitarian beliefs, hartley's 
logical consistency appealed to Coleridge's mind. Moreover, 
Hartley's Unitarianism offered a solution to the moral diffi­ 
culties which Coleridge felt in contemporary orthodox theology. 
Unable at this period of his life to question the validity of 
Hartley's premises, and stimulated by the society of ^rend, 1 
Coleridge joyously gave Hartley his allegiance. His native 
Platonism was for the time driven underground. His allegiance 
was marked. In 1794, he described him in his Religious Musings 
as
"he of mortal kind
Wisest, he first who marked the ideal tribes 2 
Up the fine fibres through the sentient brain."
Religious Musings is significant. It indicates 
the trend of his thinking in this formative period. The title 
of this first major poem indicates that already religion was 
the dominating interest in his life. His theology is thoroughly 
Unitarian. Priestley 3 follows Hartley in the poem as "patriot, 
saint and sage." 4 Gingerich rightly observes, "The principles 
of Unity and Necessity fairly jostle each other in rivalry for 
the first place in the reader's attention." 5 In 1794, Coleridge 
wrote to Southey, "I am a complete necessitarian, and I under­ 
stand the subject as well almost as Hartley himself, but I go
1. William Frend (1757-1841) Mathematician and Reformer. Expelled 
from Cambridge in 1793, for radical views in politics and 
religion.
2. The Poems of Coleridge: p. 1£3.
3. Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) Chemist and Unitarian theologian
4. Poems. p. 123.
5. Gingerich: From Necessity to Transcendentalism in Coleridge. 
(Publications of the Modern Language Association of America 
Vol. XXXV, p. 4.)
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farther than Hartley, and believe the corporeality of thought. 
namely, that it is motion." 1 In 1796, Coleridge's adherence 
was still to Hartley. He bestowed on his first son the name of 
David Hartley. So much for necessity.
In a letter to Thelwall, dated December 17, 1796,
Coleridge wrote,
"Now the religion which Christ taught is simply, first, 
that there is an omnipresent Father of infinite power, 
wisdom, and goodness, in whom we all of us move and 
have our being; and, secondly, that when we appear to 
men to die we do not utterly perish, but after this 
life shall continue to enjoy or suffer the consequences 
and natural effects of the habits we have formed here, 
whether good or evil. This is the Christian religion, 
and all of the Christian religion." 2
Here, then, is the other pole of unity. There is no hint of 
the orthodox doctrine of sin. God is love. Coleridge is a 
convinced optimist. With these twin conceptions of unity and 
necessity, Coleridge felt that he had a living message for his 
age, and in 1795, he undertook with enthusiasm a series of 
religious lectures in Bristol at the age of twenty-three. ^
His reading at this time shows a wide range of 
interest. Not only so, but it reveals the seed-ground of later 
discord. The Platonist, Cudworth, stands side by side with the 
materialist Hartley; the orthodox jeremy Taylor alongside the 
Unitarian, Priestly. Works of Paley and .Berkeley also may be 
noted in the varied list of poetry, theology, philosophy and 
history. 4 In the letter to Thelwall already mentioned, Coleridge
1. E.H. Coleridge: Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Vol. I. 
p. 113.
2. Ibid: Vol. I, p.199.
3. Cottle: Early Recollections I. pp. 27-28., Vide Appendix A.
4. Kaufman: Modern Philology, XXI, 3, pp. 317-320.
13.
speaks of Taylor "the English pagan" as among his "darling 
studies." This was Thomas Taylor of Cambridge. In the post­ 
script to the letter Coleridge commissioned Thelwall to purchase 
for him a number of neo-Platonic works. lamblichus, Proclus, 
Porphyrius, Julian and Plotinus are named* It is significant 
that Thelwall executed his commission. At this period then, 
neo-Platonism was exerting a considerable influence on Coleridge's 
thought. Lowes, indeed, remarks on the neo-Platonic elements in 
"The Ancient Mariner."2 Beneath the calm surface of his Unitarian 
determinism, deep was calling unto deep*
On October 4, 1794, Coleridge married Sarah Fricker, 
and settled at Clevedon, near Bristol. Marriage and the break-up 
of the pantisocratic dream, forced upon Coleridge the realities 
of life, and in 1796 he started a weekly journal, The Watchman. 
with the motto, "That ye all might know the truth and that the 
truth may make you free." In his capacity as editor, Coleridge 
reyealed himself as a Christian socialist.3 After 10 numbers The 
Watchman failed, on May 13.
On frequent occasions Coleridge appeared in a
Unitarian pulpit as a volunteer preacher. His political sermons 
in Mr. Jardine's Chapel at Bath were disappointing; but Hazlitt 
has left on record that Coleridge could at times preach with 
power and eloquence. 4 For a period after the failure of The 
Watchman Coleridge seriously considered becoming a regular
!• Letters, Vol. I, p.182 and note.
2. Lowes: The Koad to Aanadu. pp.229-241.
3. Vide E.H. Coleridge in Coleridge; Studies by several hands etc.p.12. '————————-——— ' 
4 » The Liberal, II, #3, 1823, pp.25-26.
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Unitarian minister. However, a life less regular in its demands 
was more to the poet's liking, and the promise of an annuity of 
£150 from the Wedgwood Brothers was sufficient to obviate this 
possibility.
In 1796 Coleridge settled at Nether Stowey, and 
his acquaintance with Wordsworth, who was at Alfoxden, began. 
The results of this meeting with Wordsworth are historic. In 
1798 appeared The Lyrical Ballads, marking a new era in the 
realm of literature. 2
Coleridge was now at the height of his poetic
power. The poems of this period reflect not only a more human­ 
ized, but a simplified, religious outlook. The poems of 1797- 
98 are born of personal experience rather than of abstract 
speculation. Religion is still paramount; but is not so obtrus­ 
ive. Unity and necessity still find expression in his verse. In 
the greatest poem of his life, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner. 
Gingerich tells us that Coleridge has given "in a rarefied, 
etherialized form the exhalations and aroma of his personal ex­ 
perience of Necessity and Unity, 'the blossom and fragrancy' of 
all his earlier religious meditations." 3 Gingerich points out 
that the religious motive in Coleridge's poems gradually becomes 
less prominent, until in Jhristabel it has disappeared entirely;
1. Griggs: Coleridge and the Wedgwood Annuity, (Review of 
English Studies.Vol. VI #21, Jan. 1930.)
2. Vide Knight: Coleridge and V/ordsworth in the West Country.
3. Gingerich: From Necessity to Transcendentalism in Coleridge, 
(Publ. Mod. Lang. Ass, of A. Vol. XXXV. 1. p. 19.)
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and argues on this basis that "in this direction, then, the 
evolution of Coleridge's mind has gone as far as possible." He
adds significantly that "those who suppose that if his poetical 
powers had remained unimpaired Coleridge would have continued 
writing Ancient Mariners and Ghristabels imagine a vain thing. ftl 
This opinion must be endorsed. A crisis, deep-rooted and grad­ 
ual in development, had occurred in his spiritual make-up.
Before considering the causes which precipitated 
this crisis, it will be well to keep in mind other details of 
his life. Simultaneously with the production of his marvellous 
verse, under the expansive influence of Wordsworth and his 
sister, Coleridge was devoting his "thoughts and studies to the 
foundations of religion and morals." 2 His passion was philosophy 
and religion. 3 Early in 1796, on the failure of The Y/atchman. 
Coleridge was outlining a plan of education, starting with man 
as an animal, and rising through man as an intellectual being, 
to its climax of man as a religious being. Coleridge proposed 
to discuss "the ancient metaphysics, the system of Locke and 
Hartley - of the Scotch philosophers - and the new Kantean 
system." In the section on religion he proposed to include "an
historic summary of all religions and the arguments for and
4 
against natural and revealed religion." This letter to Poole
is of interest as marking Coleridge's first mention of Kant.
op.cit.,
1. Gingerich: AVol. XXXV, 1, p. 28.
2. Biographia Literaria: p. 95.
3. Cf. Coleridge: Studies by Several Hands etc.. p.23.
4. Turnbull: op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 78,79. Letter to Poole, May 
6, 1796.
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The journey to Germany, which he proposed also In this letter 
was not to take place, however, for some years.
Meanwhile Hartley's influence was giving place 
to that of Berkeley, in honour of whom Coleridge named his 
second child, born May 14, 1798. 1 His transfer of loyalty to 
Berkeley, if transfer it may be called, was of no great signi­ 
ficance philosophically, when one recalls that Berkeley, him­ 
self, underwent a change from his earlier empiricism, to his 
later idealism. It was to the earlier Berkeley that Coleridge 
gave his allegiance. Coleridge, then, was still under the in­ 
fluence of the Lockean tradition.
His close intercourse with Wordsworth is of
more than historic literary interest. His observation of his
I 
friend 1 s divine faculty was paralleled by the welling-up of
his own creative springs. Here was not only a new thing in 
poetry - a fact to be observed - it demanded new thought. 2 
Now it was that he found himself all afloat. He had "success­ 
ively studied in the schools of Locke, Berkeley, Leibnitz, and 
Hartley;"3 but now doubts rushed in, and broke upon him. "The 
fontal truths of natural religion and the books of Revelation
alike contributed to the flood; and it was long ere my ark
4 touched on an Ararat and rested." This Ararat he found in
1. Turnbull: op. cit., Vol.1, p. 162.
2. Shawcross: Introduction to Biographia Literaria. p. xxii. 
Shawcross points out that, if Coleridge's memory is to 
be trusted, the problem had begun to shape Itself eight­ 
een months before he met Wordsworth. It took the form 
of the distinction between fancy and imagination. (Biog. 
Lit., p. 42.)
3. Biographia Literaria: p.66.
4. Ibid, p. 95.
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Spinoza. "For a very long time indeed," he says, "I could 
not reconcile personality with infinity; and my head was 
with Spinoza, though my whole heart remained with Paul and 
John." 1 The Ararat thus proved but a temporary resting- 
place. Crabb Kobinson quotes Coleridge as saying in 1812, 
with reference to Spinoza, "This book is a gospel to me,"
c
adding later, "His philosophy is nevertheless false." And 
in 1825, Coleridge still felt that the pantheism of Spinoza 
was better than the "modern Deism, which is but the hypocrisy
2of materialism." The intellectual love of an impersonal 
deity, however, could never satisfy one with Coleridge's in­ 
sight. Spinoza's starting-point was wrong. His error, Coler­ 
idge notes, consisted
"not so much in what he affirms, as In what he has 
omitted to affirm or rather denied:........ that
he saw God in the ground only and exclusively, in 
his Might alone and his essential Wisdom, and not 
likewise in his moral, intellectual, existential, 
and personal Godhead."4
Before he had yet read Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason Coleridge tells us that he became convinced that relig­ 
ion could not be "wholly independent of the will," and "must
K
have a moral origin." Although he still remained a zealous 
Unitarian with respect to revealed religion, he had swung 
sufficiently to consider the idea of the Trinity, "a fair 
scholastic inference from the being of God as a creative
1. Biographia Literaria: p.95.
2. Robinson; Diary. Keminiscence.s. and Correspondence. Vol.1, 
pp. 399-401.
3. Ibid: Vol. II, p. 297.
4. British Museum MS., i^gerton 2801, .polio I. (Watermark 1817)
5. Biographia Literaria: p.96.
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intelligence."1 It had, however, no "practical or moral bear­ 
ing."2 What was needed, he says, was "a more thorough revol­ 
ution in my philosophic principles, and a deeper insight into 
my own heart. w *
The years immediately ahead were to see that
revolution take place, and that deeper insight obtained. From 
the throes of mental and spiritual turmoil Coleridge emerged, 
chastened in spirit, and with his philosophy set definitely in 
the transcendentalist channel. 
III. The Spiritual Revolution.
In Dejection: An Ode, written in April 1802, 4 
Coleridge describes how his "shaping spirit of imagination" 
has failed him, and his creative joy has fled. Henceforth, he 
is resolved
"to be still and patient, all I can; 
And haply by abstruse research to steal
From my own nature all the natural man - 
This was my sole resource, my only plan: 
Till that which suits a part infects the whole. 
And now is almost grown the habit of my soul."5
This loss of creative power has been attributed 
to various causes. Literary critics largely have followed 
Wordsworth in fixing the blame on his metaphysical studies. 
Wordsworth held that if Coleridge had not gone to Germany, "he 
would have been the greatest, the most abiding poet of his
1. Biographia Literaria: p. 97.
2. Ibid: p. 98.
3. Ibid: p. 98.
4. Dejection: An Ode, Poems: 13?.362-68,
5. Ibid: p.367.
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age."1 But Coleridge was a metaphysician before he went to 
Germany, and Gingerich is more nearly correct when he writes
r,
of a "strong, natural tendency in Coleridge toward the abstract," 
and that "in the long run his original natural impulse to ab­ 
straction was stronger in him than the impulse to concrete poet­ 
ical representation."3
This may account for the decline in Coleridge's 
poetic productivity. It does not of itself account for the 
loss of inner joy. Muirhead4 follows De Quincey in attributing 
the cause to opium, to which Coleridge was addicted. De Quincey
was of the opinion that it "killed Coleridge as a poet. "The
5 harp of Quantock' was silenced forever by the torment of opium."
De Quincey continues to claim that Coleridge's metaphysical in­ 
stincts were "stung by misery" into "more spasmodic life." The 
adjective spasmodic draws attention to that trait in his char­ 
acter for which Coleridge has been censured severely - his 
apparent inability to bring his projected works to completion. 
Of this, De Quincey wrote that "all opium-eaters are tainted 
with the infirmity of leaving works unfinished." Be this as 
it may, De Quincey is undoubtedly right in saying that "poetry 
can flourish only in the atmosphere of happiness."7 This
1. 7/ordsworth: Prose Works III, p. 469.
2. Gingerich: From Necessity to Transcendentalism in Coleridge. 
	(Publ.Mod. Lang. Ass. of A~. Vol. XXXV,1, p.26. )
3. Ibid: p. 27.
4. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p. 44.
5. De Quincey: Works. Vol. XI, p. 105.
6. Ibid: Vol. XI, p. 107.
7. Ibid: p. 106.
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judgment is supported by Coleridge himself. "When a man is 
unhappy he writes damned bad poetry, 1 find," he wrote dis­ 
tractedly to Southey.1 His unerring psychological insight into 
the workings of his own nature goes straight to the heart of 
the problem.
Unfortunately Le Q,uincey's bias prevented him
from doing justice to all the facts. In attributing Coleridge's 
unhappiness solely to opium he and his followers have failed to 
take account of the deeper and more subtle factors involved*
Coleridge found himself unhappy in his marriage. 
In a letter to Southey, dated October 21, 1801, 2 Coleridge first 
refers to his domestic unhappiness. Such a declaration to 
Southey indicates a long period of tension. Sensitive to a 
degree, his creative powers withered under the blight of this 
spiritual discord. Born for love, his soul could not live in an 
atmosphere where love was denied him. He craved fellowship. 
Lack of spiritual harmony brought dejection as its inevitable
r*
consequence. Moreover, there is discernible in his character 
an element of instability. This trait is revealed in his Cam­ 
bridge days. No one knew better than Coleridge the joy-sapping 
qualities of an indecisive will. Underlying this, ar.d contrib­ 
utory in no small measure to it, was his physical condition.
1. Letters, Vol. I, p. 92.
2. Unpublished Letters, Vol. I, pp. 182-183.
3. In drawing attention to this domestic discord, it is not 
necessary to discuss here the causes underlying it. It 
may be observed, however, that his domestic problem was 
not made easier by his growing regard for Sarah Hutchin- 
son. Vide Haysor: Coleridge and Asra. (Studies in Phil­ 
ology, XXVI, p. 3. July 1929).Raysor hints at the
thwarting of his love for Sarah Hutchinson as the immed­ iate occasion of Dejection: An Ode. immea
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Never robust, an early all-night exposure undermined his health, 
and led to rheumatic fever and a serious heart ailment. Sick­ 
ness and pain dogged him throughout his life - furnishing the 
cause and occasion of his opium-habit.
With all these factors in mind, therefore, it is 
not to be wondered that Coleridge could write as he did:-
A grief without a pang, void, dark, and drear, 
A stifled, drowsy, unimpassioned grief, 
\7hich finds no natural outlet, no relief, 
In word, or sigh, or tear -
The beauties of nature could no longer arouse him.
My genial spirits fail;
And what can these avail 
To lift the smothering weight from off my breast?
It were a vain endeavour,
Though I should gaze for ever 
On that green light that lingers in the west: 
I may not hope from outward forms to win 
Ihe passion and the life, whose fountains are within.'3
Dejection; An Ode, from which these lines are taken, marks a 
milestone in Coleridge's spiritual pilgrimage. Its importance 
cannot be overestimated. 4
jb'rom this point until his final settlement at
Highgate in 1816 Coleridge "wandered rudderless.'1 A brief res­ 
pite was afforded him in the friendly home of the Wordsworths 
at Grasmere. Coleridge's spiritual depression found temporary
1. Vide Watson: Coleridge at Highgate. pp. 19-40.
Cf. The Poems of Samuel Taylpr Coleridge; p. 297.
2. jDejeation: An Ode. Poems; p. 364. (1802)
3. Ibid: p. 365.
4. Cf. Gingerich: From Necessity to Transcendentalism in Coler­ idge, (Publ. Mod. Lang. Ass. of A. Vol. XXXV, 1, p. 30.") Cf. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p. 45, where !Air­ 
head mistakingly quotes the poem TO. William Wordsworth, 
written 1807.
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alleviation. 1 He was thus able to project and carry into 
publication his famous Journal, The friend. 2 Upon the cessa­ 
tion of The friend Coleridge sank further into the morass of 
spiritual depression. A quarrel with Wordsworth, arising out 
of his opium habit, cut him adrift from his one sure anchorage. 3 
In 1814, Coleridge reached the depth of despair over his addic­ 
tion to opium, 4 and determined to place himself under medical 
supervision. "I have learned," Coleridge wrote during this year,
"what a sin is, against an infinite imperishable being, such as 
is the soul of man!"5
"Conceive," he wrote to Wade, "a spirit in hell, employed 
in tracing out for others the road to.that heaven, from 
which his crimes exclude him!......... In the one crime
of OPIUM, what crime have 1 not made myself guilty of!
- Ingratitude to my Maker! and to my benefactors - 
injustice! and unnatural cruelty to my poor children!
- self-contempt for my repeeted promise - breach, nay, 
too often, actual falsehood!"G
lo Cottle, Coleridge wrote that he had had "more than a glimpse 
of what is meant by death and outer darkness, and the worm that 
dieth not.
1. Raysor: Studies in Philology, XXVI, 3. July 1929. Points 
to the presence of Sarah Hutchinson in the house.
2. The friend proved too cumbersome to be popular and after 
28 numbers, dating from June 1, 1809 to March 15, 1810, 
it ceased publication.
3. Turnbull: op. cit., II, pp. 66-73.
4. Ibid: pp. 116-139.
5. Letters. II, p.619. May 27, 1814.
6. Letters, II, pp.623-4. Letter of June 26, 1314. It was 
in this letter that Coleridge gave instructions "that a 
full and unqualified narration" of his "wretchedness" 
should be made public, that "some little good may be 
effected by the direful example." Acting on the strength 
of this, Cottle published the letter, thus precipitating 
the whole controversy over Coleridge's use of opium.
7. Letters. II, p.619.
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Kecourse to prayer was a natural instinct of 
his soul. His own testimony is that no spiritual effort 
appeared to benefit him so much as the one prayer repeated, 
often for hours, "I believe! Lord, help my unbelief! Give me 
faith.......faith in my Redeemer. 1 The fatal drug had Coler­ 
idge's body thoroughly enslaved. His spirit never ceased to 
protest against this slavery.
With his settlement with the Gillman's at High- 
gate in 1816, came a gradual return to better health and a 
happier spiritual condition. The 'Nightmare Life-in-Death' 
slipped away and his days were spent in peace. 3ut the scar 
remained. "Oh!" he wrote in 1830, "That in the outset of life 
I could have felt as well as known the consequences of Sin and 
error, before their tyranny had commenced."2 The prayers 
written in his daybook towards the close of his life reveal his 
sense of need of a God "that heareth prayer," and who forgives 
sins.
Of the part played by Coleridge's own experience 
in the shaping of his final philosophy too little has been made. 
This deep and tragic experience is the background against which 
the more purely intellectual influences must be considered. 
IV. The Philosophical and Theological Re-volution.
Pari passu with this descent into the sloughs of 
spiritual despondency went a steady advance towards the heights 
of a theistic philosophy. Nor is it to be forgotten that during
1. Letters. II, p. 620. Letter of May 27, 1814.
2. MS. C. p.143. Entry of January 7, 1830.
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the time when his soul travelled
"Alone on a wide, wide sea,"
his mental acumen continued at a high level, .liven of the dark­ 
est hour it can be said that his work shows "no diminution of 
intellectual, but rather sustained mental vigour."^ How that 
mental vigour was stimulated and enriched by his studies is the 
question awaiting answer.
In the early autumn of 1798 the trip to Germany,
proposed earlier, took place. Coleridge had as travelling com-
p panions William and Dorothy Wordsworth. The creative days of
Quantock were, however, behind them. The trip had a different 
meaning to the two poets. This difference is brought out 
strikingly by Herford. "For Coleridge," he writes, "the German 
tour was a pilgrimage; for the Wordsworths it was simply a 
change of latitude."3 From Ratzeburg, where he went first, 
Coleridge moved on to Gbttingen. From February 12, 1799, he 
was a student at the university, attending Blumenbach's lectures 
on physiology and pursuing his studies in German literature, 
particularly Lessing. An introduction to New Testament crit­ 
icism was afforded him by a fellow-student's notes on Eichhorn's
A
lectures; but there is no evidence that he attended Bouterwek's
5 lectures on Kant.
In view of this the question immediately emerges - 
did Coleridge study any German philosophy during this period
1. Turnbull: op. cit., II, p. 136.
2. Vide the account given in Satyrane's Letters and Chapter X 
of the Biographia Literaria. Biog. Lit, pp.98-101,238-273.
3. Herford: The Age of Wordsworth» p.153.
4. Biographia Literaria. p.99.
5. Cf. Charpentier: op.cit. p.185.
25.
of residence in Germany? The evidence is somewhat confusing. 
On the one hand, it is difficult to think of Coleridge, with 
his natural metaphysical bent, missing the opportunity afford­ 
ed him of first-hand study of German philosophy and especially 
of Kant, in whom he had already shown an interest.
In support of this strong presupposition is the 
story related by a fellow-student - years later, it is true - 
of Coleridge's amusement at a young German lady thinking him 
incapable of understanding Kant. 2 In addition, in a copy of 
Kant's Logic. Coleridge himself wrote later that he had pur­ 
chased in Germany in 1799 a thin octavo "under the name of Kant's 
Logic." This book he claims to have lost. 3 Nidecker, however,
A
points out that no book bearing this title appeared before 1800. 
Coleridge's memory is certainly at fault here. It is highly 
probable that Coleridge did purchase some of Fant's works while 
in Germany and that these were included in the "thirty pounds 
worth of books," mentioned in May, 1799. 5
On the other hand, there is no reference to Kant 
in his writing of this period, nor does the partial list of his 
reading at Gottingen reveal any interest in the Fantian philo­ 
sophy • Moreover, the letters written on his return to England
1. Letters? I, p.203. Letter of December 17, 1796 - at this 
time he had regarded Mendelssohn as the most profound 
German philosopher, with the possible exception of "the 
most unintelligible Immanuel Kant.11
2. Carlyon: Early Years and Late Reflections. I, p.162.
3. British Museum Copy.note; printed Eidecker: Kevue de 
lltterature comparee, VII, p.136.
4. Ibid: p.136,
5. Turnbull: op.cit., I t p.181. Letter of May 21 1799.
6. Snyder: Books Borrowed by 92J:gri^fe . from_ ttle library o 
University of GQttingen. 1799. (Modern Philology v'ol. 
p.3; February 1928. ) 
Of. Mdecker: Revue de litterature comparee. 711 p. 132.
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are, to Leslie Stephen at least, sufficient proof that Col­ 
eridge up to 1801 had read very little of Kant. Nor is any 
help afforded by the notes penned by Coleridge on his first per­ 
usal of Kant, 2 Unfortunately, these notes are undated.
In the light of this apparently conflicting evid­ 
ence, it is not surprising that the critics have reached differ­ 
ent conclusions. Muirhead, noting the difficulty of the question, 
does not venture an opinion; 3 but Charpentier is emphatic that 
Coleridge never got beyond Leibnitz and Lessing, and that he 
"seemed never to have caught an echo of the revolution taking 
place in men f s minds."4 Wellek, on the other hand, takes the 
view that Coleridge began at Gottingen a preliminary reading of 
Kant, although the deeper study was postponed until his return 
to England. 5 This conclusion of Wellek, we feel, is close to the 
truth.
In July, 1799, Coleridge returned to iitogland, for­ 
tified for the deeper study of metaphysics by "thirty pounds 
worth of books," and with his mind already contemplating his
1. Letters: p. 351n.
2. Kritik der reinen Vernunft: Ottery St. Mary Marginalia I. 
Printed Nidecker: Revue de litterature comparee. VII, 
pp.529-530.
3. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.50.
4. Charpentier: op.cit., pp.186-187.
5. Wellek: Immanuel Kant in England. p.69.V/ellek makes
however, a mistake in citing as evidence of Coleridge*s 
reading of Kant in Germany the account in Satyrane's 
Letters of the visit to Klopstock. It was Wordsworth, 
not Coleridge, who discussed with Klopstock the philos­ 
ophy and influence of Kant. Coleridge was not present 
at the time, but made use of Wordsworth's notes for the 
purpose of the Letters. The notes are printed in Knight: 
Life of William Wordsworth. I, pp.171-177. 
Cf. Shawcross: Biographia Literaria. II, pp.175-179.
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Magnum Opus. 1 In July, 1800, after a period of brilliant jour­ 
nalism with the Morning Post, 2 Coleridge settled at Keswick for 
a close study of metaphysical and religious questions. The 
crisis was at hand.
In September, 1800, Coleridge wrote to Godwin
declaring that his mind had "been busied with speculations."3 The 
question Coleridge asks Godwin in this letter, "Is Logic the 
Essence of thinking?" has as its immediate context the relation 
of language to thought, but it indicates the trend of his think­ 
ing. Throughout the winter Coleridge continued his study, which
included a reading of Plato.4 In December and January he was
5 occupied, among other things, with Kant's idea of space. On
February 13th, 1801, he wrote to Poole that he had been reading
and meditating over Locke, Descartes, Hobbes, Leibnitz and Kant.
On March 16th, 1801, he wrote again to Poole,
"If I do not greatly delude myself, I have not only 
completely extricated the notions of time and space. 
but have overthrown the doctrine of association, as 
taught by Hartley, and with it all the irreligious 
metaphysics of modern infidels - especially the 
doctrine of necessity." 7
1. Turnbull: op.cit., I, p.181,Letter of May 21, 1799.
For a list of the more important references to the Magnum 
Opus, vide Snyder: Coleridge on Logic and Learning, p.8 note; 
vide also Unpublished Letters, II, p.464.
2» Vide Essays on His Own Times.
3. Unpublished Letters, I, p.155.
4. Letters. I,p.406.
5. Anima Poetae: p.12. Note of Dec. 1800 or Jan. 1801.
6. Unpublished Letters: I, pp. 172-173. N.B. This letter and the 
notebook entry provide sufficient answer to Leslie Stephen's 
remark regarding the absence of Kant in Coleridge's reading. 
Cf. Letters: I, p.351n.
7. Letters: I. p.348.
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A week later he wrote to Poole that "deep thinking is attainable 
only by a man of deep feeling, and that all truth is a species 
of revelation. Newton, Coleridge argues,
"was a mere materialist. Mind, in his system, is always 
passive, - a lazy Looker-on on an external world. If the 
mind be not passive, if it be indeed made in God's Image, 
and that, too, in the sublimest sense, the Image of the 
Creator, there is ground for suspicion that any system 
built on the passiveness of the mind must be false, as a 
system."2
Some months previous, while in Germany, Coleridge 
had given the first hint of the impending change in philosophical 
attitude. In a poem written on May 17th, 1799, while he was still 
in the Hartz forest he wrote:-
rt For I had found
That outward forms, the loftiest, still receive 
Their finer influence from the Life within; - 3
That towards which Coleridge had been working through the imagin­ 
ative intuition of his poetic nature, had now become, in the light 
of his deeper study, a matter of philosophical necessity. As the 
language of these letters shows, there was also a deep religious 
interest at stake in the whole matter. Coleridge came to see the 
conflict of principles involved in the clash between a philosophy 
of materialism and the fact of a creative poetic spirit and the 
inconsistency between the logic of necessity and the needs of the 
human spirit, religious at its deepest level. The seeds of dis­ 
cord sown in his Bristol reading had begun to sprout, and in late 
February or early March, 1801, they bore fruit. With this de­ 
nunciation of materialism, Coleridge may be said to be embarked
1. Letters; I, pp.351-352
2. Ibid. I. p.352.
3. Poems,: pp.315-316.
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fully on his career as a transcendentalist, and as a theistic 
philosopher.
The first result of the new outlook was the aban­ 
donment of his Unitarian views. A letter to George Coleridge of 
July 1, 1801, reveals Coleridge's mind.
"I have read carefully," he states, "the original of 
the New Testament, and have convinced myself that the 
Socinian and Arian hypotheses are utterly untenable; 
but what to put in their places I found nowhere dis­ 
tinctly revealed that I should dare to impose my 
opinion as an article of Faith on others: "1
Coleridge had by now broken definitely with Unitarianism.
"My U'aith," he adds, "is simply this - that there is 
an original corruption in our nature, from which and 
from the consequences of which, we may be redeemed by 
Christ - not, as the Socinians say, by his pure morals, 
or excellent example merely - but in a mysterious 
manner as an effect of his Crucifixion. And this I 
believe, not because I understand it; but because I 
feel that it is not only suitable to, but needful for 
my nature, and because I find it clearly revealed. 
Whatever the New Testament says I believe - according 
to my best judgement of the meaning of the sacred writer. 
Thus 1 have stated to you the whole of the change, which 
has taken place in me."^
The blithe optimism which had previously ignored sin had now 
given place, under the demands of his own personal needs, to a 
more realistic view of human nature. By 1800 the subjects 
which interested him, in the depths of his nature, were "the 
Hebrew and Christian Theology, and the Theology of Plato."3 His 
Christian Platonism was once more in the ascendant. 
V* The German Influence.
It remains to examine more closely the nature 
of Coleridge's study during this critical period of reconstruction.
1. Unpublished Letters; I, pp.202.
2. Tbid: I, pp.2C2-203.
3» Letters; I, p.406.September 10,1802.
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Bearing in mind constantly the deep poetic and religious nature 
of the man f it is, at the same time, necessary to consider also 
the direct philosophic influences at work within the seething 
ferment of his mind. It is at once apparent that the part played 
by Kant and his fellow transcendentalists is of supreme importance 
To argue with Howard that Coleridge's mind would have developed 
very much as it did had he never read German philosophy* is to 
take a superficial view of the matter. That the Cambridge Platon- 
ists - Gudworth, Whichcote and More - exercised a tremendous 
influence on his thought is undoubtedly true, but the Kantian 
stamp is apparent in all his later writings. It was into the 
Kantian mould that the Platonist content was poured.
Writing some fifteen years later^ in the Biograph- 
ia Literaria. Coleridge relates how Kant's writings took possess­ 
ion of him "as with a giant's hand."
"The writings of the illustrious sage of 
Kbnigsberg, the founder of the Critical Philosophy, 
more than any other work, at once invigorated and 
disciplined my understanding. The originality, the 
depth, and the compression of the thoughts; the 
novelty and subtlety, yet solidity and importance, 
of the distinctions; the adamantine chain of the 
logic; and I will venture to add......the clear­ 
ness and evidence of the Critique of the Pure Reason; 
of the Judgment; of the Metaphysical Elements of 
Natural Philosophy, and of his Religion within the 
bounds of Pure Reason, took possession of me as with 
a giant's hand." 3
This passage in the Biograpfaia Literaria makes it 
certain that it was this reading of the "world-shattering" Kant 
that drew aside the curtain and discovered to Coleridge the new
1, Howard: Coleridge's Idealism, p.24.
E. In February and March 1801, Coleridge studied Kant deeply.
Vide supra p,88. 
3. Biographia Literaria. p.70.
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players of reason and understanding on the stage of his mind. 
That other hands had set the stage is also certain. Plato 
and Plotinus, Proclus and Gemistius Pletho, Giordana Bruno, 
Jacob Behmen, De Thoyras, George Fox, and William Law have 
their places over against Locke, Berkeley, Leibnitz, Hartley, 
Condillac, Hume, 1 Descartes and Hobbes. 2 With regard to the 
mystics, Coleridge wrote that their writings "acted in no 
slight degree to prevent my mind from being imprisioned within 
the outline of any single dogmatic system. They contributed to 
keep alive the heart in the head."3
From Kant, Coleridge moved on to Fichte. He 
read Fichte in 1801. 4 Fichte not only added the keystone to 
the idealistic arch, he gave the first mortal blow to Coleridge's 
Spinozism by "commencing with an act, instead of a thing or 
substance."5 But Fiohte's philosophy, to Coleridge's mind,
"degenerated into a crude egoismus. a boastful and 
hyperstoic hostility to Nature, as lifeless, godless, 
and altogether unholy: while his religion consisted 
in the assumption of a mere ordo ordinans, which we 
were permitted exoteric^ to call God; and his ethics 
in an ascetic, and almost monkish, mortification of 
the natural passions and desires."6
Elsewhere, Coleridge writes in similar vein.
"Fichte in his moral system is but a caricature of 
Kant's, or rather, he is a Zeno, with the cowl, rope, 
and sackcloth of a Carthusian monk. His metaphysics 
have gone by; but he hath merit of having prepared 
the ground for, and laid the first stone of, the 
dynamic philosophy by the substitution of Act for Thing." 7
1. Biographia Literaria. pp.66-70.
2. Unpublished Letters. I, pp.172-173. Letter to Poole, February 
13,1801.
3. Biographia Literaria. pp.69-70.
4. Unpublished Letters. I, p.183, Letter to Southey, October 21 
1801.
5. Biographia Literaria. p.71.
6. Ibid: p.72.
7. Letters. II, p.682. Dec. 13, 1817.
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And so he passed to Schelling, attributing to
him, "the completion, and the most important victories" of the 
revolution in philosophy. 1 Here, however, Coleridge's words 
must be carefully noted.
"In Schelling f s Natur-Philosophic. and the System des 
transoendentalen Idealismus." he writes, "I first 
found a genial coincidence with much that I had toiled 
out for myself, and a powerful assistance in what I had 
yet to do."2
From 1815 to 1817 Coleridge was Schelling's disciple. It was 
this close affinity with Schelling for a period, and his desire 
to render the system intelligible to his countrymen,^ that led 
Coleridge to risk his reputation for literary honesty in adopt­ 
ing whole portions of Schelling*s writings as the basis for his 
own theory of the nature of poetry, and has led to the repeated 
charge of plagiarism with regard to his whole philosophy. Coler­ 
idge himself was aware of this charge and went out of his way to 
affirm that "all the main and fundamental ideas were born and 
matured in my mind before I had ever seen a single page of the 
German Philosopher."^ He attributes the coincidence to their
"equal obligations to the polar logic and dynamic philosophy of
5 Giordano Bruno" and "the same affectionate reverence for the
labours of Behmen, and other mystics."^
His debt to Schelling, and his claim of independ-
!• Blographia Literaria. p. 74.
2. Ibid: p. 72.
3. Ibid: p.74.
4. Ibid: p.72.
5. Coleridge read Bruno in 1801. Anima Poetae. pp.16-17; Vide 
Snyder: Coleridge on Giordano Bruno. (Modern Language Notes 
Vol. XLII. 7, Nov. 1927.J
6. Biographia Literaria, p.73, Vide Snyder: Coleridge on Bohme 
(Publ. Mod. Lang. Ass. of Amer. Vol. XLV. 2, June 1930.)
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ence from him, Coleridge thus made public. The question remains: 
when did Coleridge break with Schelling ? s philosophy? A note in 
Jacob Behmen's Aurora,-^ dated August 27th, 1818, expresses Coler­ 
idge's disillusionment with pantheism as found in Behmen. Coler­ 
idge finds that Behmen approaches perilously near to pantheism in 
two ways; first, in the "occasional substitution of the Accidents 
of his own peculiar acts of association......for the laws and
processes of the creaturely Spirit in universo," and second, "the 
confusion of the creaturely Spirit in the great moments of its 
renascence......for the deific energies in Deity itself." Coler­ 
idge finds the first error "is radically the same as that of 
Spinoza," and both errors "the same as that of Schelling and his 
followers." Coleridge continues to relate how earlier he was 
himself
"intoxicated with the vernal fragrance and effluvia from 
the flowers and first fruits of Pantheism, unaware of 
its bitter root, pacifying my religious feelings meantime 
by the dim Listinction, that tho 1 God was = the World, 
the World was not = God - as if God were a Whole composed 
of Parts, of which the World was one!"
It seems certain, then, that sometime between 
1817 (the date of the publication of the Biographia Literaria) 
and August 1818, Coleridge came to see the pantheistic implica­ 
tions of Schelling f s philosophy. It was impossible for him to 
Accept such implications with its blotting oat of all moral and 
religious distinctions. Again, the actual emergence of the con­ 
viction with regard to Schelling was preceded by a period of 
"incubation." If Crabb Robinson is to be trusted, Coleridge was
1. Op.cit. pp.125-7; Otter:/ St. Iviary Marginalia II, pp.184-188.
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criticising Schelling's system as early as 1810. More import­ 
ant is a letter to Frere of July 16, 1816, which reveals Coler­ 
idge as a humourist, the butt of his humour being the'fPhysiosophy 
of the Schellingians."2 In December 1817, Coleridge admits he is 
"unsatisfied with his conclusions" and does not consider him "al­ 
together a trustworthy philosopher."3
Three other German thinkers remain to be mentioned - 
Jacobi, Hegel, and Schleiermacher. It is difficult to estimate 
precisely the extent of Jacobi f s influence on Coleridge's thought. 
AS early as 1852, Shedd drew attention to the relationship of 
Coleridge to Jacobi, 4 but it has remained for later critics to 
examine the question in more detail. Dr. Winkelmann's conclusion 
is that "Coleridge*s relation to Jacobi was not only of longer 
duration but must have been incomparably deeper than that to 
Schelling." 5 Dr. Wellek goes beyond this in his assertion that 
Coleridge made "a reconstruction of Kant for the purposes of a 
philosophy of faith."6 This extreme conclusion of Wellek cannot, 
however, be accepted, what is clear is that by 1818, Coleridge 
was in sufficient sympathy with Jacobi to accept his definition of
o
reason as the organ of spiritual vision. It was Jacobi f s insist­ 
ence on the immediacy of knowledge which awoke the warm response 
in Coleridge. But here they parted company. Holding as he did to
1. Robinson: op.cit. I, p.305. Note of Nov.15,1810.
2. Unpublished Letters II. p.172.
3. Letters. II, p.683.
4« Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Introductory Essay, 
	pp.26-27.
5. Winkelmann: Coleridge und die kantische Philosophic, p.145.
6. Wellek: op.cit., p.132.
7. The J'riend. Kssay V, First Landing Place, p. 102.
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the unity of consciousness, Coleridge could never be satisfied 
with Jaoobi's placing of faith above and beyond reason. It is 
the recognition of this that prompts Dr. Muirhead, in the most 
recent examination of this whole question, to argue that Coler­ 
idge was "in a true sense metaphysical rather than mystical. w 
His article refutes conclusively the claims of Wellek. Its 
general conclusions may be endorsed.
Of Hegel, Coleridge knew very little. True, he 
was acquainted with Hegel's Logic. 2 but by the time he came to 
read Hegel, his own philosophy had been firmly settled. His 
interest in Hegel lay chiefly in the confirmation which Hegel 
afforded him of the value of his own polar logic.
Again, Coleridge's acquaintance with Schleier- 
macher may be said to be slight. Certainly no reference to the 
great German theologian appears in Coleridge's puolished works. 
That he knew Schleiermacher's Reden is seen from an entry in
A
the Semina Rerum dated early in 1826. He values the Reden as a 
sound work on morals, but criticises it as offering no solution 
to the religious problem of redemption. Schleiermacher's ±Jssay 
on Luke, a volume of sermons, 5 and his "Ueber den sogenn&nnten
o
ersten Brief des Paulos an den Timotheos". were known to him; 
but there is no evidence that he read the Crlaubenslehre. In view
1. Coleridge: Studies by Several Hands, etc. p.197.
2. Cf. Marinalia in Hegel: Wissenschaft der Logik. 1812 and 
1816, printed in Snyder; Coleridge on Logicahd Learning. 
pp. 162-165.
3. Cf. Muirhead: Coleridge: Studies by Several Hands etc.. p.197 
4* MS. C., p.48.
5. Unpublished Letters, II, p.393.
6. British Museum Copy.
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of Coleridge's intimate knowledge of most contemporary German 
thought this lack, in the case of Schleiermacher, is striking. 
There can be, therefore, no question of influence.
One problem remains - the question of Coleridge's 
ultimate debt to German thinkers. Alongside his acknowledged 
indebtedness Coleridge himself constantly reiterated his claim 
of independence from the German philosophers. As early as 1802 
he wrote, W I have read a great deal of German; but I do dearly, 
dearly, dearly love my own countrymen of old times, and those of 
my contemporaries who write in their spirit." Of more interest 
is a notebook entry of 1804.
"In the preface of my metaphysical works, I should say - 
'Once for all, read Kant, tfichte, &c. f and then you will 
trace, or, if you are on the hunt, track me. 1 Why, then, 
not acknowledge your obligations step by step? Because 
I could not do so in a multitude of glaring resemblances 
without a lie, for they had been mine, formed and full- 
formed, before I had ever heard of these writers, because 
to have fixed on the particular instances in which 1 have 
really been indebted to these writers would have been 
hard, if possible, to me who read for truth and self- 
satisfaction, and not to make a book, and who always 
rejoiced and was jubilant when I found my own ideas well 
expressed by others - and, lastly, let me say, because 
(I am proud, perhaps, but) I seem to know that much of the 
matter remains my own, and that the soul is mine. I fear 
not him for a critic who can confound a fellow-thinker 
with a compiler? 2
The bearing of this note on the whole question of German 
indebtedness is obvious. Moreover, in its revelation of 
the working of Coleridge's mind, its importance cannot be 
overestimated. in the light of this, his claim of inde­ 
pendence, uttered in 1825, is understandable.
1. Letters, I, p.373. Letter of July 13, 1802. 
Cf. Appendix A. of The Friend, p. 414.
2. Anima Poetae, p.106.
37.
nl can not only honestly assert," he writes, "but 1 can 
satisfactorily prove by reference to writings (Letters, 
Marginal Notes, and those in books that have never been 
in my possession since I first left England for Hamburgh, 
etc.) that all the elements, the differentials, as the 
algebraists say, of my present opinions existed for me 
before I had even seen a book of German Metaphysics, 
later than Wolf and Leibnitz, or could have read it, if 
I had." 1
Coleridge must be taken at his word. His debt to Kant was in 
essence a formal one. Kant supplied him with the framework 
of reason and understanding into which Coleridge fitted the 
content of his own philosophy. Wilde has grasped the situation 
clearly. He uses the phrase "Platonism illuminated by Kant" to 
summarize Coleridge's development. 2 .b'ichte and Schelling by 
their emphasis on the dynamic in man, strengthened and confirmed 
him in what he had "toiled out for himself." 
VI. The J'inal Stage;- Christian Theist.
It was this constant toiling out for himself
which led him on, ever checking his philosphy by his experience, 
and his experience by his religious conscience. In 1808 Southey
wrote of him that "Hartley was ousted by Berkeley, Berkeley by
3 Spinoza, and Spinoza by Plato." But still the track led on, on
through the seventeenth century British divines, on through the 
"Hebrew and Christian theology" to the point where he could 
speak of the circle as nearing completion.
"The metaphysical disquisition at the end of the first 
volume of the Biographia Literaria is unformed and im­ 
mature;- it contains the fragments of the truth, but it 
is not fully thought out. It is wonderful to myself to 
think how infinitely more profound my views now are,and
1. Letters, II, p.735. Cf. Letters. II, pp. 681-682.
2. Wilde: The Development of Coleridge's Mind> (The Philose- 
phical Heview Vol. XXVIII, #2, March 1919.)
3. Quoted by uampbell: Samuel Taylor Coleridge. p.!65n.
38.
yet how much clearer they are withal. The circle is 
completing; the idea is coining round to, and to be, 
the common sense."!
By 1806 the main guideposts to this philosophy 
of spiritual realism had been erected. In a letter of October 
13, 1806, Coleridge works out in a detailed, though characteris­ 
tically involved fashion, the positions which form the basis of 
all his later writings. God and the soul, reason and under­ 
standing, death and immortality, are all considered in turn. 2 
It was with these questions that Coleridge was concerned for the 
remainder of his days. AS early as the period of The Friend it 
became clear that he was seeking to prove that "true philosophy 
rather leads to Christianity" than contains anything preclusive 
of it. Gradually this aim came to dominate his mind as the 
Biographia Literaria of 1817, the Lay Sermons of 1816 and 1817, 
and The Friend of 1818 clearly show. Finally, in the Aids to 
Reflection of 1825 the position is reached that "the Christian
A
Faith is the Perfection of Human Intelligence." This attempt 
to integrate philosophy and religion into one complete unity was 
the dominant passion of his later days. Literature, politics, 
science, philosophy, theology - all continued to pour their 
streams into the measureless caverns of his mind. It is imposs­ 
ible to trace completely his "oceanic" reading, although it is 
evident that his favourite field was the theological literature 
of the Stuart Period - Hooker, <;eremy Taylor, Baxter, Bunyan,
1. Table Talk, p.293. June 28, 1834.
2. Unpublished Letters, I, pp.352-360.
3. Letters. II, p.539. December 31, 1808.
4. Aids, xvi.
39.
Leighton and Fuller. But one thing is certain. His mind con­ 
tinued "growing to the last," and all his reading furnished 
material for the proposed Opus Maximum.^- In this Opus Maximum 
Coleridge sought a view of the universe that would satisfy the 
demands of his philosophic mind for unity, and would provide 
the answer to that inward craving for fellowship with the Divine. 
At the time of his death in 1834, the work had not been com­ 
pleted. Sufficient material is available, however, to indicate 
the main outlines of this comprehensive system towards the com­ 
pletion of which he strove to the end.
1. Vide Snyder: Coleridge on Logic and Learning, p.8, for a
list of the more important references to this work. 
Vide Unpublished Letters» II, 464, for a supplementary list.
CHAPTER III.
Religion and Christianity
I. Philosophy and Religion
"There is a sense", writes Dr. Muirhead, "in
which Coleridge's whole philosophy was a Philosophy of Religion." 
This judgment confirms what Coleridge wrote concerning himself 
in 1798. At the height of his powers as a poet and with his 
mind already deeply engrossed in metaphysical studies, he wrote:-
"To the cause of Religion I solemnly devote all my best 
faculties; and if I wish to acquire knowledge as a 
philosopher and fame as a poet, I pray for grace that I 
may continue to feel what I now feel, that my greatest 
reason for wishing the one and the other, is that I may 
be enabled by my knowledge to defend Religion ably, and 
by my reputation to draw attention to the defence of it." 2
The evidence of his writings, published and unpublished, is 
corroborative. Through all the myriad interests of his omni­ 
vorous mind, from the first great poem of his life to the last 
letter penned on his death-oed, the religious "motif" may be 
traced. Religion, it may be said with certainty, was the 
dominant passion of his life.
Moreover, the history of his spiritual pilgrim­ 
age reveals to what extent he was a genuinely religious man.
1. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.217. Letter of Jan. 1798,
2. Unpublished Letters, I, p.94.
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This history is summed up admirably in Muirhead's words:-
nWhat drove Coleridge from Unitarian Deism to Spinoza's 
1 intellectual love of God 1 , thence to Schelling's 
'intellectual vision* of Him, and forward from that 
again, was the failure of one and all to satisfy the 
demand of the heart for fellowship with God."1
Wilde recognizes this also, as he writes, "It is never imper­ 
sonal curiosity that draws him on, but always a hunger for an 
ever greater satisfaction of his spiritual needs." 2
fellowship with God is the touchstone to which 
all schemes of philosophy must be brought. And fellowship with 
God is religion. Coleridge's main criticism of deism is that 
it fails at this very point.
"The utter rejection of all present and living 
communion with the Universal Spirit impoverishes 
Deism itself, and renders it as cheerless as Atheism, 
from which indeed it would differ only by an obscure 
impersonation of what the Atheist receives ,, 
unpersonified, under the name of £'ate or Nature."
Speculative reason may try to bridge the chasm between the 
finite and the infinite, but religion alone can "overbridge" 
the gulf. It can do this in that
"it unites in its purposes the desiderata of the 
speculative and the practical being; that its acts, 
including its events, are truths and objects of 
philosophic insight, and vice versa that the truths, 
in which it consists, are to be considered as acts 
and manifestations of that being who is at once the 
Power and the Truth, the Power and the All-powerful, 
the Truth and the True."4
1. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.219,
2. Wilde: The Development of Coleridge's Thought. (The





"In my system I have ever regarded all three parts, 
viz. of Theognosy, u>s \\c?\ TC»* i)(po>/vov j O f 
Physiogony; and of Anthropology: - not as Religion 
but as the Antecedent Grounds and Conditions of 
Religion.......In other words, Religion includes
Philosophy; but Philosophy does not include Religion."1
This is the constant theme of Coleridge. It is, 
therefore, of interest to compare further the relation between 
philosophy and religion as formulated in his published writings. 
In the Appendix to the Lay Sermon of 1816 Coleridge holds that 
"Reason and religion differ only as a twofold application of the 
same power."2 In this particular case reason is "the knowledge 
of the laws of the whole considered as one." In contrast to the 
understanding, which concerns itself with "particulars" in time 
and space, it is "the science of the universal." Religion, on 
the other hand, is
"the consideration of the particular and individual (in 
which respect it takes up and identifies with itself 
the excellence of the understanding) but, of the indiv­ 
idual, as it exists and has its being in the universal 
(in which respect it is one with the pure reason.)"
Coleridge's passing reference to "reason, religion and the will" 
in man as a symbol of Tri-unity4 would seem to indicate, at first 
sight, that Coleridge grounds religion in the emotions. Further 
reading, however, corrects this first impression. Religion is a 
total act of the soul. "Even so doth religion finitely express
1.. MS.C.,p.115. Cf. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.217. 
(Muirhead quotes freely.)




the unity of the Infinite Spirit by being a total act of the
soul." In religion, Coleridge holds, "there is no abstract-
2 ion."
In 1817, the Biographia Literaria closed with a 
personal apologia:-
"This has been my object, and this alone can be my 
defence......the unquenched desire I mean, not without
the consciousness of having earnestly endeavoured to 
kindle young minds, and to guard them against the 
temptations of scorners, by showing that the scheme of 
Christianity, as taught in the liturgy and homilies of 
our Church, though not discoverable by human reason, 
is yet in accordance with it; that link follows link 
by necessary consequence; that religion passes out of 
the ken of reason only where the eye of reason has 
reached its own horizon; and that Faith is then but its 
continuation: even as the day softens away into the 
sweet twilight, and twilight, hushed and breathless, 
steals into the darkness."3
In the Aids of 1825 Coleridge becomes more
specific as he affirms "that the Christian Faith is the Perfec­ 
tion of Human Intelligence."4 Prudence, morality and religion 
are distinct. Religion contains and supposes the first two, 
but is "more and higher than Morality."5
Faith is seen as the "blossoming and the fructi­ 
fying process" of reason. 6 He holds that there is "a difference 
in kind between religious truths and the deductions of specu­ 
lative science......The former are not only equally rational
1. Biographia Literaria, p.354.
2. Ibid: p.354.
3. Ibid: pp.301-302.
4. Aids, Introduction xvi.
5. Ibid: Introduction xvii. The Church is ruined, or brought 
to the verge of ruin, by preaching morality, i.e. first 
Platonic, then Stoic and lastly Epicurean Lthics." 
Cf. Southey: Life of Lesley. Note on I, p.190.
6. Aids. p.!73n.
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with the latter, but......they alone appeal to reason in the
fulness and living reality of their power."^ Any attempt 
therefore to explain the mysteries of the Christian religion ~ 
sin and redemption - by bringing them into "comprehensible 
notions," "does by its very success furnish presumptive proof 
of its failure." 2
The mysteries of faith are not "notions" but 
reason, "Reason in its highest form of Self-affirmation."3 
Understood thus, Coleridge hopes to show "the perfect rational­ 
ity" of the Christian Doctrines and "their freedom from all
just objection when examined by their proper organs, the Reason
4 and Conscience of Man."
It is easily understandable from these passages, 
how both rationalist and orthodox could find a basis for their 
criticism. To the one, it has meant simply that Coleridge 
abandoned "reason" for the "incredibilities" of the Christian 
faith; and that he indulged in verbal legerdemain in order to 
justify his position. Carlyle's famous indictment of Coleridge 
as one who "knew the suDlime secret of believing by 'the reason 1 
what f the understanding 7 had been obliged to fling out as in­ 
credible" 5 has found echo in all subsequent criticism from the 
rationalist side. "A pernicious teaching of double truth 
pervades Coleridge's acquiescence in all the doctrines of the
1. Aids, p. 205.
2. Ibid: p. 185n.
3. Ibid: xviii.
4. Ibid: p. 102.
5. Carlyle: Life of John Sterling, p.231.
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Anglican Church,"! writes Dr. Wellek. "We do not exaggerate," 
he continues, "saying that Coleridge sometimes teaches the old 
adage: credo quia absurdum est." 2 Coleridge, he concludes, 
became in the end "a defender of orthodoxy, of resignation, a 
prophet of the end and failure of Reason."3
On the other hand, Coleridge f s speculative
methods made him suspect in the eyes of contemprary orthodoxy. 
Typical is the judgment of John Henry Newman. Although he 
recognized Coleridge's contribution to a "higher philosophy," 
Newman wrote of him as one who "indulged a liberty of specula­ 
tion, which no Christian can tolerate, and advocated conclusions 
which were often heathen rather than Christian."^
The difficulty arises in the fact that both
speculative idealism and religious faith lie side by side in 
CJoleridge's mind. This fact has been interpreted variously. 
Applying the Kantian measuring-rod, Dr. Rene Wellek finds that 
Coleridge does not fit the measure, hie argues, therefore, that 
Coleridge deserted from the ranks of critical philosophy to a 
philosophy of faith. 5 Coleridge, Dr. Wellek holds, came finally 
"to accept the dualism of speculation and life, of the head and 
the heart......He made a philosophy of this dualism of the head
and the heart. 6
1. Wellek: op.cit.,p.129.
2. Ibid: op.cit., p.129.
3. Ibid: op cit., p.135.
4. British Critic, April 1839, Vide Newman: Essays: Critical 
	and Historical. I, pp.268-269.
5. Wellek: op.cit., p.132.
6. Ibid: p.134.
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Coleridge's own words, however, must not be for­ 
gotten. At a time when his earlier philosophy had proved it­ 
self inadequate he wrote,
"I have been myself sorely afflicted, and have......
found no comfort, till it pleased the Unimaginable 
High and Lofty One to make my Heart more tender in 
regard of religious feelings. My philosophical refine­ 
ments, and metaphysical Theories lay by me in the hour 
of anpTiish, as toys by the bedside of a child deadly 
sick."l
These words, written in 17S6 , are prophetically true of the 
whole course of his later thought. Any metaphysical theory 
which failed to do justice to the deep spiritual needs of his 
nature thereby proved itself inadequate. As he himself put it 
later, "A metaphysical solution, that does not instantly tell 
you something in the heart is grievously to be suspected as 
apocryphal."
But this does not mean that Coleridge came to 
accept a dualism of the "head and the heart" as the basis of 
his philosophy. Rather he saw that the demands of each must 
receive recognition in a larger synthesis. To this he strove. 
"Indeed," he writes, "it is by rebuilding the Doctrine of Real­ 
ism on sure foundations that I hope to effect wnat Raymond of
3 Sabunde so nobly attempted." If the change in terminology be
not confusing, we may borrow from Smuts and say that Coleridge 
was a "spiritual holist." Recognizing this, Lr. Muirhead
1. Unpublished Letters. I, p.64. Letter of Leceiaber 1796.
2. Letters, I, p.428. Letter of August 7, 1803.
3. Note at end of Vol. 8 (2nd half) of Tennemann: Geschichte 
der Philosophie. British Museum Copy.
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dissents from Lr. Wellek f s somewhat damaging criticism. He 
holds that whatever may be the defects of Coleridge's phil­ 
osophy in detail, "it is in a true sense metaphysical rather 
than mystical." 1 In this particular case, it must be noted, 
Muirhead f s use of the term metaphysical indicates ajudgment 
in favour of Coleridge's larger synthesis of the idealism of 
the head, and the realism of the heart. 2 In this light, 
Muirhead f s judgment may be endorsed.
It has been said of the writings of Jirnst
Troeltsch: "Religious faith and mental freedom meet and struggle 
on every page. He will not abandon either,"2 Something very 
similar may be said of Coleridge. He will not abandon either 
philosophy or religious faith. In the last analysis there can 
be no ultimate dualism between the two. 4 Coleridge's aim, as 
Tulloch recognized, is to integrate the two, "to restore the 
broken harmony between reason and religion."5 And this, as 
Hort suggested early, is traceable to the Platonic doctrine of 
the ultimate identity of knowledge and moral excellence. 6
1. Muirhead: Studies by Several Hands, p.197.
2. Cf. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.58, where the 
development of Coleridge's mind is summed up-"In the 
course of the second decade of the new century Coleridge 
had passed from the pantheism not only of Spinoza but of 
Schelling, and was working in the direction of a view which 
should be a synthesis of the realism which it represented 
with the idealism of Kant."
3. H.R.Mackintosh: Nineteenth Century Dogmatic. Lecture of 
]Teb. 2, 1935, New College, Edinburgh.
4. Cf. Aids, p.42.
5. Tulloch: op.cit., p.14.
6. Cambridge Essays, p.325.
48.
Coleridge stand out in this respect against both his contem­ 
poraries, Schleiermacher and Hegel. Unlike Schleiermacher, 
he refuses to vindicate Christianity by cutting it adrift from 
philosophy. Unlike Hegel, he holds firmly to Christian faith. 
On the one hand he refuses to set Christianity apart; on the 
other hand he refuses to dissolve it in the "acids of philo­ 
sophy." Philosophy is necessary. Alone it is insufficient. 
Though knowledge may be unified by reason, Coleridge had learned 
through bitter trial that it is not enough. Not only must ex­ 
perience be integrated; it must also be mastered. Mastery of 
life is attained in "the binding" (religio) of man's will to a 
Will that is greater than itself.
Philosophy, even though it shall have become "the 
habit of referring to the Invisible as to a Supreme Will, reveal­ 
ing Itself in Keason and pouring forth in Life," is not enough.
"This is a constituent of Religion;" Coleridge writes, 
"but something is still wanting. To be Religion, it 
must be the Reference of an intelligent responsible Will 
.Finite to an Absolute Will I and the Heferant must refer 
as a Will, and a Life, i.e. a Person, to a living I AM. 
We may feel from, and about a thing, an event, a quality 
- we can feel for whatever is sentient - but we feel 
toward a Person only. The Personal in me is the ground 
and condition of Religion: and the Personal alone is the 
Object."1
This is well said. Religion, to Coleridge, is 
basically a personal relationship and must be construed in 
personal terms. It reveals to us his fundamental religious 
realism in another aspect.
1. MS.C., pp.125-126. Cf. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher. 
p. 36, where the passage is quoted freely.
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II. Religion and Revelation*
Philosophy, he never tires of saying, points 
beyond itself to religion. At the commencement of his long 
friendship with Green, Coleridge feels that philosophy
"is either nothing, a mere generic term - or that it must 
end in revealed religion......! see beforehand that
there can be no philosophy without religion; but that
there may be religion without any Philosophy except
what is involved and contained in the being a Christian."1
Moreover, this letter indicates that his mind is turning on the 
the question of natural and revealed religion. By the period 
of the Aids this question is still to the fore. Coleridge 
decides in favour of revelation, as he states that
"the whole Scheme of the Christian r'aith, including all 
the Articles of belief common to the Greek and Latin, 
the Homan and the Protestant Churches, with the threefold 
proof, that it is ideally, morally, and historically 
true, will be found exhibited and vindicated in a 
proportionally larger work, the principal labour of my 
life since manhood, and which I am now preparing for 
the press under the title, 'Assertion of Religion, as 
necessarily involving Revelation; and of Christianity, 
as the only Revelation of permanent and universal 
validity.'"2
The "Assertion of Religion" here referred to is 
but another name for his unfinished Opus Maximum. 5 The work, as 
such, does not concern us immediately, ./hat is of import is 
the assertion made both here and in the manuscript Opus: 4' first, 
that religion necessarily involves revelation; and second, that 
Christianity is "the only Revelation of permanent and universal
1. Unpublished Letters, II, pp.237-238. April 1, 1818.
2. Aids, p.103.
3. Cf. Snyder: Coleridge on Logic etc, p.87.
4. MS.B.2, p.85.
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validity." With regard to the first point, Muirhead has point­ 
ed out that in the Aids there is some ambiguity in the use of 
the term revelation. It is therefore of interest to find in 
the Semina Herum a long note in which Coleridge gives some 
meaning to the term. 2
The discussion is based on the passage already 
quoted: "The Personal in me is the ground and condition of 
Religion: and the Personal a] one is the Ob ject, »»3Coleridge 
holds that this personal communion is reflected in hope, love, 
fear from love, and veneration. These constitute religious 
feeling and radiate from a self to the object which has will as 
its ground and source.
"Religion requires the sense of my Self, in order to 
the desire to pass out of the Self - it must affirm 
itself as potential in order that I may deny it as 
actual. It must be offered in order to be refused - 
must be possessed in order to be sacrificed."4
On this basis he asks "Does a Keligion imply or necessarily 
require a Revelation in an historical form, as a part at least 
and necessary accompaniment of the Religion? Does it require 
a revelation at all - even an internal Revelation?" 5
The answer is that religion if it is to meet
the test of the definition cannot be purely subjective, for a 
merely subjective illumination, though supernatural, has its 
evidence exclusively for the mind so illumined. If it were
1. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.245.





wholly suojective, then religion would be like mathematics.
It would then be solely a science, resting on scientific grounds
and scientifically communicable. It would not be religion.
"A religion not objective, the Object of which subsists 
only in the Subject, even tho 1 it should be common 
to all human Subjects, is no Religion, as a square 
Circle is no Circle, out a contradiction of terms."1
Again, turning to his familiar doctrine of ideas, he holds that 
an idea differs from a theorem or sensuous intuition in imply­ 
ing always an inherent or correspondent object. It follows from 
this "that even tho' we should -derive a scheme of Religion from 
the Reason, as the Source of Ideas, yet that Reason must be 
regarded as a Revelation^* 2
The further question, however, arises: whether a 
scheme of faith on which religious feelings can be grounded can 
be conceived derivable from a subjective Revelation alone; in 
other words, "whether a Religion merely rational, or as wholly 
derived from this inward Light can be imagined?"3 It is true 
that this "subjective illumination", or spiritual discernment 
of the truth of the Ideas, and faith in their reality, is the 
substance of religion. But subjective illumination is only one 
pole. It requires an appropriate experience, "an exciting 
cause" to call it forth.
"The Reason itself, or whatever other name 
may be chosen to express the distinctive marks of 
Humanity, and the ground of Man's susceptibility of 
the Spiritual Light, or enlightening Spirit, the 





Recipient of the Lucific Word so sublimely affirmed by 
the Evangelist, has to be called from the merely 
potential Being into act and actual existence, vho 1 
we should reject the opinion,that the Mind at our 
coming into the world is a a blank Sheet of Paper; we 
must at all events admit that whatever characters may 
have been impressed on the sheet, are written in 
Sympathetic Ink. and need an exciting cause to render 
them apparent. r'l
The development of the individual, morally and intellectually, 
under the stimuli of exciting causes, is true also of the race.
On this basis Coleridge feels that he has dem­ 
onstrated a priori t
"that Reason itself rejects the hypothesis of a Religion 
excluding all but a Subjective illumination of the 
Reason common to all men and to the manifestation of 
which no determinate lime or Occasion can be affixed; 
but that (what we can only call) Miracle and outward 
Revelation enter into the very Idea of Religion, as the 
indispensable Conditions of its* actual existence in Man." 2
This is all that Reason can attempt to show
a priori. It remains for history and judgment to decide on the 
character and credibility of those schemes that claim to be 
vouchsafed by divine revelation.3 The importance of this 
concept to his own mind is seen by the place assigned to it in 
the 1828 sketch of the Opus Maximum* Part Third, Introduction 
AA of this scheme reads:- "Proof a priori of a Revelation......
1. MS.C., p.128.
2. Ibid: pp.128-129.
3. Ibid: N.B. In this connection a passage from the Opus
Maximum is of interest: "The probability of an event is 
a part of its historic evidence and constitutes its 
proof presumptive or evidence a priori:and the degree 
of the evidence a posteriori requisite to the satisfac­ 
tory conviction of the actual occurence of an event 
stands in an inverse ratio to the strength or weakness 
of the evidence a priori." (MS.B.2, p.22. Snyder: 
Coleridge on Logic, etc. pp.134-135.)
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& that Religion implies Revelation or Religion and Revelation 
are synonymous Terms and Revealed Religion a Pleonasm." This 
we may take to be Coleridge's general line of approach to the 
whole question of religion and revelation, religion is not 
simply an affair of man. Nor is it to be regarded simply as 
subjective illumination. Religion is a bi-polar relationship, 
whether regarded from the standpoint of the personal subjects 
involved - God and man - or from the standpoint of the ideas 
of religion held by man and their "exciting cause." That is 
to say, Revelation enters into the very idea of religion. It 
is part of his general theistic view. Galloway has defined 
revelation as "an apprehension of truth which rests, directly 
or indirectly, on the activity of God" 2 - a definition which 
comes close to expressing what is the heart of Coleridge's view.
This view is linked closely with his general 
Platonic outlook. The historic facts of religion are the 
symbols of the ideas of religion. Hence,
"A Religion, that is, a true religion, must consist of 
ideas and facts both: not of ideas alone without facts, 
for then it would be mere Philosophy; - nor of facts 
alone without ideas, of which those facts are the symbols, 
or out of which they arise, or upon which they are 
grounded: for then it would be mere History."3
In short, religion "is distinguished from philosophy on one
1. MS.C., p.133 seq. (Snyder: Coleridge on Logic, etc. p.b. 
Mention is made both here and on p.129 of the Semina 
Rerum of the "Gillmano-recipe or Pharmacopoeian Memorandum 
Book' which Coleridge used as a notebook and in which this 
question is claimed to be developed. It is doubtful if 
the notebook is now extant.) 
Cf. Aids, p.120.
2. Galloway: Philosophy of Keligion. p.582.
3. Table Talk, p.144.
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hand and history on the other by being both in one."-1-
This last definition is basic to Coleridge. It 
enters into the very "stuff" of his religious philosophy, it 




If, then, reason asserts a priori the necessity 
of a revelation, the only question that remains is whether any
particular religion can be regarded as an ultimate revelation.
^A manuscript fragment in the British Museum indicates Coler­ 
idge^ method of approach to the problem. It is based on the 
position already discussed, namely, that religion implies 
revelation. Continuing, Coleridge holds:-
"There can be but one Religion, but there may be many 
schemes of Doctrines so called.
The one Religion may be revealed gradually, 
at different times, to different races - and in this 
sense of the words there may be said to be many Revela­ 
tions possible or we cannot deny the possibility of 
many Revelations. By what test are we to determine the 
one Religion? By what criteria may we distinguish the 
legitimate claimants to Revelation from the false. The 
most obvious, and at the same time the most feasible 
plan would be: from the whole number of known claimants 
to select some one and to commence with the examination 
of this. If, as is at least possible, we should find 
in the scheme itself, aided by the history and the 
admitted results of its* introduction satisfactory proofs 
of this being a Revelation we may be certain of the
lo MS.B.3, pp.204, 132-153.
2. Ibid.
3. Egerton 2801, folio 202.
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falsehood of all that can be shewn to contradict it 
and shall have at least a negative test or standard in 
our possession."!
Elsewhere, referring to the necessity of revela­ 
tion, he asks, "Is the Christian such a Religion?" 2 If this be 
doubtful, then "is there any other Religion, known or conceiv­ 
able, which might be substituted for Christianity?"3 But of 
the known positive religions of mankind Coleridge holds, "as a 
position too evident to need any proof," that "there is none 
which rejecting Christianity we should not reject a fortiori." 41
In line with this is the caveat uttered in the 
Aids: "Beware," he writes, "of Arguments against Christianity, 
which cannot stop there, and consequently ought not to have 
commenced there."5
There can be no doubt as to the position Coler­ 
idge held. The Aids of 1825 commence with the explicit affirmation 
that 'the Christian Faith is the Perfection of Human Intellig­ 
ence."^ Moreover, the "Assertion of Religion," announced in
the Aids, states explicitly that Christianity is "the only
n 
Revelation of permanent and universal validity." Throughout
the Aids religion is practically synonymous with Christianity. 
Christianity alone reflects the true character of religion, and





6. Ibid; Introduction xvi.
7. Ibid: p.103.
56.
in this sense is "the only true religion. "-*- 
B, ;Evidences.
"The principal Labour" of Coleridge's life was to 
establish this position. Christianity, he hoped to show, is 
"ideally, morally and historically true." 2 But his method of 
proof differed totally from that of ijaley and the writers on 
"Evidences," upon whom he never wearied of pouring scorn:
"Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. 
Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can, 
to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may 
safely trust it to its own Evidence, - remembering 
only the express declaration of Christ himself: No man 
cometh to me, unless tlie Father leadeth him."5
The so-called "proof from miracles" is therefore no proof of 
divine testimony in the strict sense. "I believe in the 
miracles of Christ because I believe in Christ, not vice versa. 
They are not the foundation of my faith, but the result and 
condition of it."4 The only "evidence" of Christianity is 
Christianity itself. It carries its proof inherent in its very 
nature.
"The truth revealed through Christ has its evidence 
in itself, and the proof of its divine authority in 
its fitness to our nature and needs; - the clearness 
and cogency of this proof being proportionate to the 
degree of self-knowledge in each individual hearer." 53
He holds to a religious pragmatism. Christianity is a living 
movement rather than a mere series of articles or a traditional
1. MS.C. Printed Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.36. 
2o Aids, p.103.
3. Ibid: p.272. Cf. Table Talk, p.155.




creed. "Christianity," he writes, "is not a Theory, or a 
Speculation; but a Life; - not a Philosophy of Life, but a 
Life and a living Process." Its proof and test is experiment­ 
al - "Try it."1
In addition to this moral and individual proof, 
however, there is an "historical" one*
"Christianity has likewise its historical evidences, 
and these as strong as is compatible with the nature 
of history, and with the aims and objects of a religious 
dispensation. And to all these Christianity itself, 
as an existing Power in the world, and Christendom as 
an existing Fact, with the no less evident fact of a 
progressive expansion, give a force of moral demon- 2 
stration that almost supersedes particular testimony."
In Coleridge's hands, Christianity thus vindicates itself as 
ideally, morally and historically true. 
C. Judaism plus Greece.
Why then, he asks in an unpublished note,
"is philosophy ever to be set up as the rival, rather 
than as the friend and natural companion of Christianity? 
What is Christianity but a divine and pre-eminent 
philosophy, a stream in whose depths the elephant may 
swim, and in whose practical and saving truths the 
lamb may ford?"3
Like all science and all philosophy the Christian 
philosophy is grounded on assumptions, or "assertions", "the 
proof of which no man can give to another, yet every man may 
find for himself."4 These assertions are three in number and 
have reference to three ultimate facts, namely, the reality of
1. Aids, p.134.
2. Confessions, p.319. Cf. Aids, p.134.
3. Stillingfleet: Origenes Sacrae. p.320. British Museum copy.
4. Aids, p.90.
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the law of conscience, the existence of a responsible will, 
and the existence of evil* "The first is a Fact of Conscious­ 
ness; the second a Fact of Reason necessarily concluded from 
the first; and the third a Fact of History interpreted by 
both."1
These are the "radical data" - to use Tulloch's 
phrase2 - of Coleridge's religious philosophy. Apart from 
them there is no religion. The function of the Christian faith 
is to build up the spiritual life out of these internal real* 
ities. It does this by remedying the evil, educating the 
conscience and strengthening the will. Christianity is thus a 
religion of redemption*^ It has two poles or "moments" - sin 
and redemption.^
From this aspect, then, Christianity is more 
than philosophy. Regarded also from the other standpoint of 
his general definition of religion as history plus philosophy, 
Christianity is more than philosophy alone. It is "Judaism
and Greece."5
"Religion is," he writes, "Ideas contemplated as Facts. 
Remove the symbolic character, the speculative Truth 
that is represented, and the Religion becomes mere 
History, real or imagined. 'There is a God 1 is a 
philosophic Dogma; but of itself not a Religion. But 
that God manifested himself to Abraham or Moses, and 
sent them to make known that he made the World, and 
formed Man out of the Ground, and breathed into him a 
living Soul » this is Religion. Hence Religion necessarily 
consists of Traditions."6
1. Aids, p. 91.
2. Tulloch: op.cit., p.16





"Christianity consists of two ingredients. The first
is History......That which is above Time, and indifferent
to all times - that which has no appropriate exponent in 
any one particular thing, Act, incident or Image ~ most 
certainly does not present itself to our minds, as 
historical. What then? Reflect a moment and ask your­ 
self whether any other answer can be returned (than) 
that it is an Idea or Eternal Truth. This, we say, is 
the only true Idea of God or this is the Idea which the 
Christian Revelation teaches us to entertain of the God­ 
head. This then is the other Element. The facts of 
Religion in order to be religious facts or subjects of 
religious Belief must be grounded on Ideas and severally 
and collectively united with Ideas."!
This union of idea and fact is affirmed supreme­ 
ly in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation.
"God manifest in the Flesh. The Idea and the Fact, the 
Event, of the Theanthropy, that the Eternal became 
historical and the focal center of all History - this 
is the inmost Soul, the individualizing Principle, of 
the Christian Religion." 2
It is no accident that his favourite New Testament writers 
are St. John and St. Paul. They are "Christianity itself."3 
In keeping with this Coleridge asserts that his aim is "to 
bring back our faith and affections to the simplicity of the 
Gospel Facts, by restoring the facts of the Gospel to their 
union with the Ideas or Spiritual Truths therein embodied or 
thereby revealed."^
Hence, from this general standpoint,
"Christianity is a growth, a Becoming, a Progression: 
...........History, therefore, and History under its'
highest form of Moral freedom, is that alone in which 
the Idea of Christianity can be realized.......The
1. MS.C, p.91. August 1, 1826.
2. Ibid: p.33. Cf. "God manifested in the flesh is Eternity 
in the form of Time." (Aids, p.209n).
3. MS.C. Note at end.
4. Ibid: p.91.
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Idea of the Christian Religion can be realized only 
in the 'Lives of Christians.•"
In the light of all this it is difficult to 
see how Muirhead can dismiss so easily Coleridge's relation 
to Christianity. Although he dissents from the extreme rational 
ist position as illustrated in Wellek's criticism, yet he 
retains something of this bias in dealing with the specific 
Christian elements in Coleridge's thought. True, he claims 
that his main concern is with Coleridge's
"general interpretation of the meaning of religion, what 
beliefs it seemed to him to involve, as to the nature of 
c;od and the destiny of the numan soul, how far it seemed 
to him possible to Justify these beliefs to the specu­ 
lative reason, finally, and only as a corollary, the 
place he assigned to the Christian religion and the 
theology that has come to be bound up with it." 1
But if Coleridge himself is to be believed, then the Christian 
element in his thought cannot be placed in the class of "coroll­ 
ary." The "beliefs it seemed to him to involve" were, in the 
last resort, Christian beliefs. They therefore cannot be class­ 
ed as secondary in importance in his philosophy. Y/hat Coler­ 
idge meant by "Christian Beliefs" or Christianity is seen in his 
frequent references to the beliefs common to all the Christian 
communions, the Unitarians excepted. It was catholic Christ­ 
ianity that he had in mind.
True, his were not simply the beliefs of current 
orthodoxy. He differed radically on the interpretation of
1. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, pp.218-219.
2. Aids, p.103. Cf. Appendix B.
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certain doctrines, notably the doctrines of sin, redemptior, 
and the Scriptures. But to say this is only to recognize how 
well he fulfilled his self-imposed task of freeing Christian 
theology from the intellectual and moral difficulties in the 
hyper-calvinism and extreme evangelicalism of his day.* 
IV. Spirit. Will and Personality*
In the days of a faculty psychology, Coleridge 
held firmly to the unity of thougnt and action. 2 lie was well 
aware that analytic distinctions do not imply real divisions.
"Distinct notions," he writes, "do not suppose different 
things. V/hen we make a three-fold distinction in human 
nature, we are fully aware that it is a distinction, not 
a division, and that in every act of mind the man unites 
the properties of sense, understanding, and reason. "3
the same time, Coleridge's basic metaphy­ 
sical principle of the priority of will is reflected in his 
psychology. Thus he affirms, as above, the unity of person­ 
ality. The ground of personality is, however, the will. "The 
Principle of our Personality - of that, I mean, by which we 
are responsible Agents; Persons, and not merely living Things" 
- is the will. 4 And again: "His Will is the condition of his 
personality; the ground and condition of the attribute which 
constitutes him man. "5 ihe will is not set in antithesis to 
the cognitive or emotional elements. "A V/ill conceived 
separately from Intelligence is a Non-entity and a mere
1. Cf. Tulloch: op.cit., pp.33-34.
2. Cf. Snyder: Coleridge on Logic, etc. p. 15.




phantasm of abstraction," 1 he writes in the Aids. And in the 
Huntingdon manuscript, referring to the Absolute, he writes,
"The Supreme Will is an idea incapable of abstraction. 
We not only cannot think of it abstracted from 
Intelligence and Love as real - for this would apply 
equally to the idea of an unbounded power; but we 
cannot think of it at all."2
Leaving for the moinent the question of the 
Absolute as belonging properly to his metaphysics, we may 
note the refusal to dissociate the will from intelligence and 
love. This refusal in the case of the Absolute is equally 
true in the case of man. Hence Coleridge holds;-
w lf there be aught Spiritual in Man, the Will must be
such."3
"If there be a Will, there must be a Spirituality in
Man."4 "The Will is pre-eminently the spiritual
Constituent in our Being."^
wThe Will is in an especial and pre-eminent sense the
spiritual part of our Humanity."*
These passages are of vital importance in the 
understanding of Coleridge's thought. The will is conceived, 
not in the modern sense as an element in personality, out as 
the ground and principle of personality itself. "Personal" 
and "moral" and "spiritual" are practically synonymous with 
Coleridge. That this judgment is correct is borne out by 
Coleridge's own words, when he writes of the will as "the 
true and only strict synonime of the word, I, or the intelligent 









in the case of sin, of redemption, of faith, of fellowship 
with God - must be understood in the light of this principle.
It is convenient to note further two points
in connection with Coleridge f s conception of will. The first 
is the contrast drawn between nature and will. Will is by 
definition, "that which originates an act or state of Being."1 
The idea of will alone contains the idea of self-determina­ 
tion. 2 Nature, on the other hand, is subject to the law of 
continuity, and this law, "by a necessity arising out of its 
own constitution," the human understanding is compelled to 
conceive "only under the form of cause and effect." This 
being granted, it becomes true that
"Nature is a line in constant and continuous evolution. 
Its beginning is lost in the super-natural: and for our 
understanding» therefore, it must appear as a continuous 
line without beginning or end. But where there is no 
discontinuity there can be no origination, and every 
appearance of origination in nature is but a shadow of 
our own casting. It is a reflection from our own Will 
or Spirit. Herein, indeed, the Will consists. This is 
the essential character by which WILL is opposed to 
Nature as Spirit, and raised above Nature, as self- 
determining Spirit - this namely, that it is a power of 
originating an act or state."3
Nature is therefore said to be necessitated in contrast to 
the will as free. 4 Moreover, the will must be self-determined 
ultimately, or it ceases to be a will under the law of perfect 
freedom.5 The will is therefore supernatural* Hence, in this
1. Aids. p.42n.
2. Ibid: p.190.
3. Ibid: p.!76n. Gf. Streeter: Keality. where the concept of 





sense, "Spiritual and Supernatural are Synonymous."
In keeping with this analysis of will as self- 
determined and "free," capable of originating, and of nature 
as necessitated, Coleridge holds that the will "cannot be 
contemplated in any of the forms of Space and Time."2 This 
is, in fact, a corollary of the first principle, for he offers 
another definition of nature:- "Whatever is representable in 
the forms of Time and Space, is Nature......Whatever is com­ 
prehended in Time and Space, is included in the Mechanism of 
Cause and Effect."3 He seeks to show that there are realities 
to which the relations of space and time are inapplicable and 
of these are spirit or will. 
V. Theory of Language.
To Coleridge one of the chief sources of error 
in religion was the failure to distinguish between essential 
fact and pictorial representation. "The confusion," he writes, 
"of metaphor with reality is one of the fountains of the many** 
headed Nile of credulity."4 It is the familiar distinction 
between noumenon and phenomenon in a particular application. 
Coleridge never works out a complete theory of language, but 
he does clearly distinguish between fact and descriptive 




4. Anima Poetae, p.149.
5. Cf. The Chapter on Religion and Redemption.
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Further, he distinguishes between analogy,
metaphor and symbol. "The language is analogous, wherever a 
thing, power, or principle in a higher dignity is expressed 
by the same thing, power, or principle in a lower but more 
known form." As an example of this, Coleridge cites John 
III, 6. "That which is born of the flesh, is flesh; that 
which is born of the Spirit, is Spirit." The latter half of 
the verse, Coleridge claims, contains the fact asserted, the 
first half contains the analogous fact, "by which it is 
rendered intelligible."2 "Analogies." he holds, "are used in 
aid of Conviction."3
A metaphor, on the other hand, is merely a 
means of illustration, it is a figure of speech. This is 
borne out by Coleridge's statement, "Neither do I regard the
A
words, born again, or spiritual life, as figures or metaphors." 
A metaphor is allegorical, "expressing a different subject but
K
with a resemblance."
In further distinction stands a symbol. In the 
Statesman y s Manual. Appendix C, Coleridge gives his definition 
of a symbol. "By a symbol I mean.*....an actual and an essen­ 
tial part of that, the whole of which it represents."6 In the 
Aids, Coleridge speaks of the nature of symbols as "always 
tautegorical, that is, expressing the same subject but with a
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5. Ibid: p.136.
6. Statesman's Manual. Appendix, Biog. Lit. p.348.
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difference*"1 Analogies, Coleridge holds further, furnish the 
material of symbols. 2 On the basis of this three-fold dis­ 
tinction, Coleridge grounds his definition of a Sacrament as 
a symbol. The distinction between analogy and metaphor 
furnishes the key to his treatment of the Pauline teaching on 
redemption. 4 The general distinction between fact and repre­ 
sentation is of undoubted value. Historically, it may be 
regarded as one of the "sources" of Horace Bushnell's more 
developed theory of language. Whether the particular dis­ 
tinctions between symbol, analogy and metaphor are of the same 
value is open to question. To Coleridge, at least, they are 
essential. They are typically Coleridgean. It may be pertinent 
to describe them as Coleridgean phenomena.
1 * Aids, p.136. Cf. Aids, p.212n, where Coleridge writes of
the "wide difference between symbolical and allegorical."
2. Ibid: p.136.
3. See Chapter on Church and Sacraments.
4. See Chapter on Religion and Redemption.
5. Cf. the views of Sabatier and Menegoz.
CHAPTER IV.
General Philosophy.
"Previous to any rational examination of the 
Christian Keligion we must determine first, and as far 
as history and philosophy are concerned, what the 
necessary postulates or assumptions are from which the 
examination must proceed, and, as far as the religion 
refers to the moral and religious being what state of 
mind the examinant must bring with him to the enquiry, 
the denial or absence of these being tantamount to a 
rejection of the whole beforehand by denial of the 
premises."1
This long quotation, from the unpublished Opus 
Maximum, serves as a fitting introduction to the examination 
of the "necessary postulates or assumptions" in Coleridge's 
own philosophy. This philosophy, in the last analysis, was 
an attempt to reach some single underlying unity from which 
life, thought, religion, the universe derive, and in relation 
to which they have their meaning. This continual search for 
"unity in multeity" was the guiding star of all his wander­ 
ings.
As early as 1803, Coleridge became convinced
1. MS.B. Supplementary.
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that prefatory to any attempt to apprehend the ultimate mean­ 
ing of experience some consideration must be given to the 
processes of thought itself. In a letter to Godwin in 1803^ 
he claims to be engaged on a work on logic, "introductory to 
a system* n In addition to a discussion of the common system
of logic (Aristotle), it was to contain an outline of the 
history of logic and a summary of his own Organum Vere Organum. 
and to conclude with considerations of the practical value in 
science, medicine, politics, religion and law. This work 
survives in fragmentary form, 2 and has been analyzed by Muir-
n
head. 0 What is of interest is not so much his conclusion at 
this stage - namely, that the syllogism is in reality a 
petitio principii. 4 - as his perception of the fundamental 
importance of the study of logic as the prerequisite to any 
"system" of philosophy.
under the guidance of Kant5 and Mendelssohn6 
Coleridge continued his study of the problems of logic. He
came to see the impossibility of accepting the old formal 
logic. What was required was a logic able to do justice to
1. Turnbull: op.cit., I, p.270.
Of. Snyder: Coleridge on Logic etc.. pp.50-51 
2» See Snyder: op.cit.7 PP»53-66, 140-152.
3. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, pp.62-64.
4. Snyder: op.cit., p.143. nln every Syllogism I do in reality 
repeat the same thing in other words, yet at the same time 
1 do something more; 1 recall to my memory a multitude of 
other facts and with them the important remembrance that 
they have all some one or more property in common."
5. vide Wellek: loc.cit.
6. vide Snyder: Studies in English and Germanic Philology, October 
1929, for a study of Coleridge's relation to Mendelssohn.
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the deeper movements of thought. By 1822 his mind was suffici­ 
ently clear on this point to enable him to dictate the manu­ 
script, Logic.^ which was to serve as an introduction to his 
great Logosophia - the Opus Maximum.
The Logic has been described and summarized by 
Miss Snyder in her Coleridge on Logic and Learning 2 and
T
analyzed by Dr. Muirhead in his Coleridge as Philosopher, both 
of whom print numerous excerpts from the manuscript. In 
addition, Dr.Weilek has discussed the Logic from the standpoint 
of its relationship to Kant. 4 The Logic, as planned, was to 
consist of three parts: the first, the canon or Common Logic; 
the second, the Criterion, for the Detection of errors in 
Reasoning; the third, the Organon, and Instrument for the 
Positive Discovery of Truth. 5 it is not necessary, however, to 
follow Coleridge through the details of the argument of the 
Logic. What is important for our purpose is the general stand­ 
point taken and the conclusions reached.
At the heart of Coleridge's Logic is the prin­ 
ciple of trichotomy - identity, thesis, antithesis. Me con­ 
ceived it to be the special contribution of his system, al­ 
though he denied that it was original with him. He developed 
it in opposition to the older logic founded on the principle
1. British Museum MSS., Egerton 2825, 2826.
2. Op. cit. pp.66-103.
3. Op. cit. pp.65-88. 
4* Op.cit. pp.116-126.
5, Cf. Snyder, op.cit. pp.69-70n. for references in Coleridge 
to this scheme.
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of dichotomy. In the first place, the older logic clearly is 
inadequate, as Lord Bacon showed in the case of investigations 
into nature.1 By itself mere syllogistic reasoning proves 
nothing, a thousand syllogisms amounting merely to "nine 
hundred and ninety-nine superfluous illustrations of what a 
syllogism is." In this sense it is a "hollow science."2
In the second place, logic, like every abstract 
science, is based on an assumption which it has not the means 
of examining. It assumes a relation between suoject and object, 
thought and thinker. But this is clearly a question involving 
ultimate reality. These realities are properly not objects of 
logic and "therefore cannot be submitted to a discussion or 
reasoning purely logical."3 if logic attempts to pass this 
limit, error is immediately encountered. "The first source 
therefore of falsehood in Logic is the abuse of and mis­ 
application of Logic itself."^ Either everything is resolved 
into the object5 or into the subject, as in the case of Berke- 
leian idealism; 6 or, again, the possibility of any theory being 
denied, an unresolved dualism remains.
1. Logic. II, pp.179-187. Cf. Snyder: op.cit., pp.116-118. Cf. 
Muirhead: op.cit., pp.70-72.
2. Snyder: op.cit., p.81.
3. Ibid: p.87.
4. Ibid: p.87.
5. Cf. Biographia Literaria. p.124.
6. Cf. Biographia Literaria. p.126., Cf. Snyder: op.cit., p.91. 
Cf. Muirhead: op.cit., pp.76-77. N.B. Muirhead quotes 
freely from MS.C. pp.10-11. e.g* Muirhead has, "as 
rationally might I assert a tree to be a bird as Berkeley's 
perception to be sensation, which is but a minimum." The 
MS. reads "As rationally might I assert a Tree to be a Bud 
as Bishop Berkeley's Perception to be Sensation, which is 
itself but the minimum."
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It was precisely at this point that Coleridge 
discovered the limits of Kant's transcendental analysis in 
the Critique*
"Considered as Logic. It is irrefragable:" he writes, 
"as philosophy it will be exempt from opposition and 
cease to be questionable only when the Soul of Aristotle 
shall have become one with the Soul of .Plato, when the 
Men of Talent shall have all passed into Men of Oenius or 
the Men of Genius have all sunk into Men of Talent. That 
is, (iraecls calendis or when two Fridays meet. nl
There is no mistaking the application. Kant's denial of the 
power of speculative reason to transcend the limits of the 
logical understanding is not acceptable to the .Platonic mind 
of Coleridge. The failure of Kant is but one more proof of 
the inadequacy of the older logic.
Finally, the failure of the older logic results 
from the very assumption on which it rests. A dichotomous 
principle clearly drives a wedge between subject-object, real- 
unreal, real-ideal, actual-potential, universal-particular, 
unity-multiplicity and affirmative-negative, everything is set 
in antithesis, heconciliation of opposites is impossible on 
such a basis. But this is to contradict the very essence of 
reasoning which seeks unity, the reduction of the many to one. 
The mind demands identity, not independence; absoluteness not 
relativity. 2 JJichotomy, if adopted as "the legitimate
1. Logic. II, pp.329-330. Snyder: op.cit., p.125.
2. of. waiter .eater: Coleridge's Writings, p.8. .Pater, taking 
his stand for a relativist philosophy, does not seem to 
grasp this.
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and only form of distributive logic,"1 has dire results. It
"excites, and seems to sanction this delusive conceit 
of Self-sufficiency in minds disposed to follow the clue 
of argument at all hazards, andwhlthejsoever it threatens 
to lead them, if only they remain assured that the thread 
continues entire. And it is now my purpose to evince , 
that the inevitable result of all consequent reasoning, 
in which the speculative intellect refuses to acknowledge 
a higher or deeper ground than it can itself supply, is - 
and from Zeno the Eleatic to Spinoza ever has been - 
Pantheism, under one or other of its modes:"2
For Coleridge, the way of dichotomy is thus the way of disaster.
On the other hand, trichotomy offers a method 
directly opposed to both the ordinary and the critical logic. 
It starts not from two opposing concepts, but conceives of 
these as the twin poles of an underlying unity. The method of 
trichotomy is to
"seek first for the Unity as the only source of Keality, 
and then for the two opposite yet correspondent forms by 
which it manifests itself. For it is an axiom of 
universal application that manifestatio non datur nisi 
per alterum. Instead therefore of affirmation and contra­ 
diction, the tools of dichotomic Logic, we have the three 
terms Identity, Thesis, and Antithesis."3
If dichotomy proceeds by "exclusion," then trichotomy proceeds 
by "enlargement."4 The "enlargement" is not the result of 
mere fusion, but of inner development. Stressing this point, 
Coleridge claims that his own term "prothesis" is less confusing 
than "synthesis," in that it emphasizes identity rather than
1. MS.B. 3, p.38.
Cf. Snyder: op.cit., p.129.
2. MS.B. 3, p.38. Snyder: op. cit., p.129.
3. Marginal Note on Kant: Allgemeine Naturgeschichte. etc,
Printed in Muirhead: op.cit., p.86. 
4* Anima Poetae. pp.168-169.
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mere external union. 1
Coleridge's enthusiasm for the principle of 
trichotomy knew no bounds. 2 At times he extended it into a 
tetractys3 derived from Pythagoras, and again into a pentad. 4 
And again, he was prone to apply it to all sorts of subjects, 
This extravagance has led Wellek to say: "Coleridge himself 
does not seem to have understood the actual principle of the 
dialectic. 5 It was not, however, merely a case of "an empty 
mysticism of numbers," as Wellek would infer, and Muirhead is 
more nearly correct when he writes of these "as belonging to 
the eccentricities rather than the essentials of his thought."6
His principle is closely akin to that of his 
contemporary, Hegel. That he came to it independently of the 
German thinker is a fact all the more to his credit."7
1. MS.H., pp.167-168.
This is illustrated by a note on a Sermon of Donne:- 
It is not true that body plus soul makes man. Man is 
not the syntheton or composition of body and soul, as 
the two component units. No; man is the unit, the 
prothesis, and body and soul are the two poles.......
the thesis and antithesis of the man." (Notes on English 
Divines. I. pp.96-97.)
2. Vide Snyder: op.cit., p.71, for a partial list of references. 
Cf. Snyder: The Critical Principle of the Reconciliation of 
Qpposites as .Employed by Coleridge.
3. Notes on iSnglish Divines. II. p.107.
4. Aids to Reflection, p. 288.
5. Wellek: op.cit., p.86.
6. Muirhead: op.cit., p.86n.
7. Cf. Muirhead: op.cit., pp.86-88. "He has the undoubted merit 
of being one of the first to recognize the importance of 
(such) a method."
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His introduction to Hegel's writings came only late in his life, 
and, as far as can be judged, his knowledge of Hegel was con­ 
fined to some ninety pages of the"Wissenschaft der Logik. n 
He charges him with "confusion of terms," resulting from the 
original error "of overbuilding thetrpo&<.<r,s, by the Thesis, 
Antithesis and Synthesis."2 This criticism indicates one point 
of difference between the two thinkers. Hegel stresses the 
ultimate synthesis, Coleridge the primary identity. Again, 
Coleridge feels at one point that negel has given expression to 
"Spinozism in it's superficial form......It may explain a wave;
but not a Leaf or an Insect."3 Whether this criticism be 
justified or not, it was sufficient to damn Hegel in Coleridge's
eyes. 4
But, if not from Hegel, whence did Coleridge
derive his principle? Wellek claims that Schelling is the 
immediate source, 5 but adduces no evidence in support of his 
contention. Again, it is clear that it is not derived from 
Kant, for Coleridge expressly denies that &ant discovered or 
had any true appreciation of its significance. 6 He gives the
1. British Museum Copy, wotes printed. Snyder: Coleridge on 
Logic etc. pp. 162-165. The notes are of interest as 
the first real attempt on the part of an English thinker 
to grapple with the difficulties of the negelian dialectic, 
of. jvuirhead: op.cit., p.87.
2. Note on flyleaf - Snyder: op.cit., p.162.
3. Mote on p.89. Snyder: uoleridge on Logic etc., p.165.
4. Cf. Muirhead: op. cit., pp.87-88, where a fuller discussion 
of the notes occurs.
5. Wellek: op.oit., p.86.
6. Logic, li, pp.401-402. Cf. Snyder: op.cit., p.126,
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credit for its discovery to Richard Baxter, who, a century 
before Kant, "saw far more deeply into the grounds, nature 
and necessity of this division as a Norma Philosophiae."1 
But the line of ancestry for the idea in Coleridge goes back 
beyond Baxter to Giordano Bruno's polar logic, 2 to Pythagoras, 3 
and to the dualism of the early Greeks, n first promulgated by 
Heraclitus."4 Whatever its source, the doctrine of trichotomy 
is, in fact, the logical statement of his essential principle 
of polarity. By it he felt able to bring nall problematic 
results to their solution, and reduce apparent contraries to 
correspondent opposites".It enabled him to contemplate 
"hostile tenets" as "fragments of truth, false only by negation 
and mutual exclusion."5
It was on this principle of trichotomy that 
Coleridge conceived it possible to develop his organon. As 
noetic, or the science of reason, it would transcend the 
limitations of ordinary logic, or the science of the understand­ 
ing. 
II. Reason and Understanding.
Underlying Coleridge's trichotomous principle of 
logic, and basic to his whole philosophy, is the "momentous
!• Logic II, pp.401-2. Cf. MS.B.3., p.38 note. Snyder: op.cit.,
pp.128-129*
Cf. Notes on English Livines. II, pp. 106-107. 
Cf. Wellek: op.cit., pp.85-86, where the relevent passages
are collected.
2. Hotes on .English L>ivines. II, p.107.
3. Ibid: II, p.107. 
4* The friend. p.57n. 
5» Anima Poetae. p.301.
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distinction" between reason and the understanding. He claimed 
that it is pre-eminently the Uradus ad Philosophiam. 1 It is, 
at any rate, in the case of Coleridge himself, the GraAus ad 
Philosophiam. In the Aids Coleridge does not hesitate to avow 
that
"on his success in establishing the validity and 
importance of the distinction between Keason and 
understanding, he rests his hopes of carrying the 
reader along with him through all that is to follow:"2
And elsewhere he writes,
"Let me by all the labors of my life have answered but 
one end, if 1 shall have only succeeded in establishing 
the diversity of Keason and Understanding, and the 
distinction between the Light of Reason in the under­ 
standing. ......and the Keason itself, as the source and
birthplace of Ideas."3
The importance of the distinction in Coleridge's 
philosophy cannot be overestimated. "No question," writes Ur. 
Muirhead concisely, "goes deeper than that of its origin in his 
mind, the meaning he attached to it, and the relation of this 
meaning to that of the similar distinction in Kant."^
With regard to the first of these three points-
the origin of the distinction in his mind * the critics are 
unanimous in finding the formal basis for it in Kant. Where 
they differ is in assessing the value of Kant's contribution 
to Coleridge's thought on this point. In the prospectus to The 
I'riend Coleridge himself asserts that he is to uphold principles 
of philosophy "adopted by the great men of itorope from the
1. Table Talk:, p.75. May 14, 1830.
2. Aids, p.145.
3. MS.C., p.33. Snyder: Coleridge on Logic etc. p.135.
4. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.65.
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middle of the fifteenth till towards the close of the seven­ 
teenth century,"1 and in the essay on reason and understand­ 
ing he mentions Harrington, Hooker, Bacon, Hobbes, Shakespeare, 
and Milton as English writers in whom the distinction is 
found. 2 Jeremy Taylor, 3 Leighton4 and John Smith, the Cam­ 
bridge Platonist, 5 are referred to elsewhere as drawing analo­ 
gous distinctions.
On the other hand, Kantian colouring is seen 
throughout the whole of Coleridge's writings, 6 and in The 
Friend, where the distinction is first noted in his published 
writings, direct reference is made to Kant. 7 The conclusions 
of the critics may be noted. Howard, while his own argument 
points to the predominant influence of the Cambridge Platon- 
ists, nevertheless admits that it
"should not be forgotten that Coleridge felt deeply the 
need of this distinction in his own spiritual struggle, 
and it was to this that he was far more indebted than 
to either Kant or the Platonists»"°
Muirhead's conclusion is similar: "All that Kant did in this 
case, as in others, was to confirm and give more definite form 
to what he had toiled out for himself.9 On the other hand, 
Wellek holds that "Coleridge could not have formulated the dis­ 
tinction as he did it, without Kant." 10 He recognizes, however,





6. See Wellek: loc.cit.
7. The Friend, p. 101.
8. Howard: Coleridge's Idealism, p.68.
9. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.65.
10. Wellek: op.cit., p.ios.————— ——
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the weight of Coleridge f s own claims as he adds, "even if his 
interpretation of the distinction is closer to the meaning of 
the older writers."^ From Kant, then, Coleridge derived the 
mould only. It became for him a fixed frame of reference. 
Into it he poured the content of his own experience and the re­ 
sults of his "oceanic reading, w
The second question is of more importance - what 
did he mean by it? It is obvious at once that the distinction 
itself was subject to development in Coleridge's mind. In this 
it shared the fate and the fortune of all the elements in his 
thought. It is manifestly impossible, within the limits of this 
thesis, to trace this development in complete detail. It will 
be of interest to note the first discussion of the distinction 
as it occurs in the letter to Thomas Clarkson of Oct. 13, 1806, 2 
and then to pass directly to the developed doctrine as found in 
the Aids and manuscript remains.
In the 1806 letter, the understanding is defined 
as "that Faculty of the Soul which apprehends and retains the 
notices of Experience.......all the mere ̂ *^«^£<a of our nature."3
Reason, on the other hand, is concerned with the vo->e** 
"all such notices, as are characterized by Universality and 
Necessity..••»*•which are evidently not the effect of any Exper­ 
ience , but the condition of all experience - that indeed without
1. Wellek: p.103.
2. Unpublished Letters t I, pp.352-360.
3. Ibid: I, p.359.
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which Experience - itself would be inconceivable."1 This 
contrast is continued in The Friend. 2 the Omniana of 1812, 3 
the 1816 Lay sermon, 4 and the Biographia Literaria5 of 1817, 
By the time of the Aids, the distinction was so firmly 
entrenched in Coleridge's thought that the whole book turns 
on the distinction. It recurs again and again in varying 
forms, the underlying meaning of which is, however, substant­ 
ially the same.
Archbishop Leighton's definition of reason is 
accepted by Coleridge as the true definition of understanding - 
"the faculty judging according to sense."6 The understanding 
is discursive, 7 the faculty of reflection, 8 and of generaliza­ 
tion. 9 AS the "comparing faculty it contains certain inherent 
forms, "modes of reflecting not referable to the objects 
reflected on, but pre-determined by the constitution and ^as it 
were; mechanism of the Understanding itself."1° inese are 
constituent -because they are not acquired by the understanding, 
but are implied in its constitution/' 11 une such form is that
1. Unpublished Letters. I, p*359.
2. First Landing Place, .essay V, pp. 100-106.
3. Table Talk & Omniana. pp.381-386.
4. Biographia Literaria. Appendix, pp. 339 seg.
5. Biographia Literaria. pp.96-97, 138.
N.B. for a summary of the passages in these works and 









of causal conceptions. 1 Quantity and relation are "precon­ 
ceptions** of the understanding. "Understanding in its highest 
form of experience remains commensurate with the experimental 
notices of the senses from which it is generalized."2 Under­ 
standing forms notions, entia rationalia. 3 but these become 
entia realia only "by Revelation, or the Law of Conscience, or 
the necessary interests of Morality."4
ihe understanding sees things in antithesis. 
Truth comes forth
"out of the moulds of the Understanding only in the 
disguise of two contradictory conceptions, each of which 
is partially true, and the conjunction of both conceptions 
becomes the representative or expression ( the exponent) of 
a truth beyond conception and inexpressible."5
The understanding is called the mind of the flesh. 6
Coleridge further distinguishes between the
understanding "as a mode and faculty of thought" - reflection - 
and the unaerstanding "as a Principle of Action." J.n this 
latter sense, it is the "Adaptive Power" or "the faculty of 




4. Ibid: p.109. Of. Wellek: op.cit., p.125. Wellek is wrong 
in stating that notions are converted into real objects 
by aid of the imagination. Coleridge claims such a 
process has "been the fruitful stock of empty theories, 
and mischievous superstitions, of surreptitious premises, 





The understanding generalizes on the notices received from 
the senses "in order to the construction of names." it classi­ 
fies by naming objects. 1
All this, as Wellek points out, 2 is reasonably
close to Kant. It is in his use and meaning of reason that 
Coleridge breaks clear of the closely restricted faculty of 
Kant, and reveals his deep-rooted Platonism. As contrasted 
with understanding, reason is defined as "the Power of Universal 
and necessary Convictions, the Source and Substance of Truths 
above Sense, and having their evidence in themselves."3 It 
differs in kind from the understanding. 4 If understanding is 
discursive, reason is fixed; if understanding refers all its 
judgments to some other faculty as its ultimate authority, 
reason appeals to itself; if understanding is the faculty of 
reflection, reason is that of contemplation.^ In this last 
reason is nearer to sense than to understanding.
Coleridge quotes Hooker with approval to the 
effect that reason is "a direct aspect of Truth, an inward 
Beholding, having a similar relation to the Intelligible or 
Spiritual, as SENSE has to the Material or Phenomenal."6 
If understanding depends on the representations of the senses,
1. Aids, p.153. N.B. Muirhead sums up Coleridge's Understanding 
admirably as "the whipping-boy of prudence in morality, 
reliance on mere external evidence in theology, and pure 
expediency in politics." (p.66n)
2. Wellek: op.cit., p.125.
3. Aids, p.143.




reason "either predetermines Experience, or avails itself of 
a past .Experience to supersede its necessity in all future 
time."l It affirms truths nwhich no sense could perceive, nor 
experiment verify, nor experience confirm. 1"2 This thoroughly 
Platonic idea is emphasized by the statement,
"There is an Intuition or immediate Beholding 
accompanied by a conviction of the necessity and 
universality of the truth so beholden not derived 
from the senses, which intuition when it is 
construed by pure sense, gives birth to the Science 
of Mathematics, and when applied to objects super- 
sensuous or spiritual is the organ of Theology and 
Philosophy."3
The knowledge of spiritual truth he holds to be "of necessity" 
immediate and intuitive, the nearest analogy being that of 
the natural man's intuitions of the pure sense, which are the 
subjects of mathematics,4
Understanding may give rise to rules and maxims;
reason alone gives principles, distinguished by necessity5 and 
universality.6 Elsewhere, he writes of reason as the "Source 
of Principles," and the understanding as "the faculty of Rules." 
"The heason is all end, summa finium, the Understanding all 
means, summa mediorum."^ In short, reason is the source of 
ideas. These ideas, "in their conversion to the responsible 







7. Logic.II. p.35. Snyder: Coleridge on Logic etc. p.110.
8» Aids. p.277n, note to second edition.
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This leads to a consideration of the further 
distinction within reason between the speculative and the 
practical reason. When a truth of reason is applied to facts 
of experience or to the rules of the understanding, the 
"necessity" is conditional. It is absolute when the subject 
matter "is itself the growth or offspring of the Reason.*1
"Hence arises a distinction in the Keason itself, 
derived from the different mode of applying it, 
and from the objects to which it is directed: 
accordingly as we consider one and the same gift, 
now as the ground of formal principles, and now 
as the origin of ideas. Contemplated distinctively 
in reference to formal (or abstract) truth, it is the 
speculative reason; but in reference to actual (or moral) 
truth, as the fountain of ideas, and the~TigEt of the 
conscience, we name it the practical reason. "2
In a note added to the second edition Coleridge pins his faith 
to the practical reason, as reason considered in relation to 
the will.
"The Practical Reason alone is Reason in the full and 
substantive sense* It is reason in its own sphere of 
perfect freedom;as the source of IDEAS, which Ideas, in 
their conversion to the responsible Will, become Ultimate 
Ends. On the other hand, Theoretic Reason, as the ground 
of the Universal and Absolute in all logical conclusion 
is rather the Light of Reason in the Understanding, and 
known to be such by its contrast with the contingency and 
particularity which characterize all the proper and 
indigenous growths of the Understanding."*
It is this emphasis on the will that carries 
Coleridge beyond Kant. 4 It is seen in his identification of 




4. Vide Wellek: op. cit., pp.126-129.
5. Aids. p.86n.
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more clearly in his statement that "the personal Will com­ 
prehends the idea, as a Reason, and it gives causative 
force to the Idea, as a practical Reason."1 A further dis­ 
cussion of the distinction occurs in the Logic. Although 
written prior to the Aids, the Logic carries the distinction 
beyond his ordinary elaboration of the Platonic distinction 
between discursive and intuitive thought. In this, the 
Kantian triad of sense, understanding and reason is subjected 
to analysis. Sense normally spoken of in the published works 
as presenting the experience of objects from which understand­ 
ing abstracts, becomes at times in the Logic "the common or
g neutral boundary" of objective and subjective, - the undiffer-
entiated background of experience.
Identity is dwelt upon. 3 It is the understanding 
that drives the wedge between subject and object.
"When taking our point of view from the Understanding 
we divided all things into subject, object - we did 
not disguise ourselves that something far higher was 
presupposed which was neither subject singly nor 
object nor a conjunction of both by adding the one to
the other: but the identity of both, their common root."4
In this sphere of identity,
n the antithesis of the analytic and synthetic disappears 
likewise and loses all import: for it rises out of the 
forms of Understanding and of the Sense, that are in­ 
struments for the knowledge of true relations and 
relative not absolute truth, which latter appertains to 
a higher principle."5
1. Aids. p.202n.
2. Muirhead; Coleridge as Philosopher, p.66.
3. Logic. II, p.73. Snyder: Coleridge on Logic, etc.pp.79-80
4. Logic. II, p.226. Wellek: op.cit., p.121.
5. Logic. II, p.326. Wellek: op.cit., p.121.
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In addition to its divisive quality, the under­ 
standing is a substantiating power, "that by which we give and 
attribute substance and reality to phenomena, and raise them 
from mere affections and appearances into objects communicable 
and capable of being anticipated and reasoned about."1 Thought 
thus enters into all experience. "Points, lines, surfaces are 
not bodies but acts of the minds, the offspring of intellectual 
motions, having their canons in the imagination of the geomet­ 
rician. w2 '-t-be caution is offered that although we may speak 
thus of all objects of the understanding as entia logica.they 
are not necessarily entia realia.^
This receives emphasis in his discussion of the 
Kantian doctrines of space and time as a priori forms of sense, 
and of the categories as a priori principles of unity. The act 
of the understanding, as a function of this a priori unity, 
results merely in an ens logicum.
"By generalizing a continuous act or series of acts 
essentially the same and then contemplating this 
generality as a unity, we form the notion of a power. 
A power has no scientific sense, no philosophic Genesis 
or Derivation, where it is not coincident and commutable 
with a law or introduced confessedly as the surrogate or 
substitute of a Law not yet discovered - an itos logicum 
to be reasoned with not to be reasoned from."^
Understanding, concerned with phenomena, can 
never reach beyond to the unity towards which sense points.
1. Logic. II, p.39. Of. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher., p.67. 
Of. Snyder: Coleridge on Logic etc. p.101.
2. Logic. II, p.396. Muirhead: op.cit., p.67. Of. Aids, p.109.
3. Log:.e, II, p.396. Snyder: op.cit., p.101 "
4. Log:.c. II, p.39. Wellek: op.cit., p.122.
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It is in and by reason alone that this is reached. The ideas, 
disclosed by reason, are transcendent to the conceptions, 
offered by understanding. Reason is universal, "undividual 
(sic) and transcendent." In a true sense, then, the data of
the understanding may be "considered as the offspring of a
3 higher source which for distinction's sake we named the Heason."
Finally, with regard to Muirhead's third point - 
the relation of the distinction between reason and understanding 
in Coleridge to that in Kant - enough has been said already to 
indicate how far Coleridge was prepared to go beyond the German 
philosopher. Coleridge accepted in the main the positive side 
of Kant f s teaching, that the mind is an active element in all 
experience; that there must be a "mental antecedent," as he calls 
it in The Friend, to experience; and that the forms of thought 
are valid only within the limits of that experience. But he 
declined to follow him in denying the possibility of knowing the 
real world beyond the world of ordinary sensory experience and 
leaving thus a fundamental dualism.
Even on the positive side, as Muirhead has
shown, 5 Coleridge was prepared to criticize Kant, as failing to 
do justice to the relation of the sense-experiences to the forms 
of the understanding, and leaving as the test of truth a prev­ 
iously manufactured" something of the concept!ve faculty. The
1. Cf. The Aids, p. Ill, where fancy is opposed to imagination in 
the same way as reason to understanding. "The notion may 
have its mould in the understanding; but its realization 
must be the wish of the FANCY."
2. Logic. II, p.40. Wellek: op.cit., p.123.
3. Logic, II, p.410. Wellek: op.cit., p.123.
4. The Friend, p.361.
5. Mutrhead; Coleridge as Philosopher, pp.91-96.
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criticism occurs early in the record of his first reactions to 
the Critique. 1
"How, he asks, "can that be called a mannigfaltiges 
which yet contains in itself the ground why I apply 
one category to it rather than another? The mind does 
not resemble an Aeolian harp, not even a barrel-organ 
turned by a stream of water, conceived as many tunes 
mechanized in it as you like, but rather, as far as 
objects are concerned, a violin or other instrument of 
few strings yet vast compass, played on by a musician 
of Genius. The Breese that blows across the Aeolian 
harp, the stream that turns the handle of the barrel 
organ, might be called a mannigfaltiges . a mere sylva 
incondita . but who would call the muscles and purpose 
of Linley a confused manifold?1*2
The "perpetual and unmoving cloud of darkness", 
which he finds hangs over Kant, he attributes to
"The absence of any clear account of Was ist Erfahrung? 
What do you mean by a fact, an empiric reality, which 
alone can give solidity (Inhalt) to our Conceptions? It 
seems from many passages, that this indispensible Test 
is itself previously manufactured by this very conceptive 
Power, - and that the whole not of our own making is the 
mere sensation of a mere manifold - in short, mere influx 
of motion, to use a physical metaphor. I apply the 
categoric forms to a Tree - well! but first, what is this 
Tree? How do I come by this Tree?"3
The same weakness underlies Kant's analysis of 
Judgment which leaves a chasm between subject and object. 4 
Both sense and reason point, however, to a primary unity, ̂ some 
underlying ground- reality which is the basis for both suuject 
and object, percipient and perceived world. Mind as we know it 
points to the bridge, as it as subject is also its own object. 
But mind again as we know it is not self-subsistent. Some
1. Entitled, "Struggles felt not arguments objected."
2. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Ottery St. Mary Marginalia I 
printed Nidecker: Revue de litterature comparee. VII pp.529-' 
530. (Linley:- Thos. Linley, The violinist 1756-1778 T
3. Ibid. '
4. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher pp.72-81. Of. Snyder* 
Coleridge on Logic etc. p.125.
5. Snyder: op.cit., p.88.
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ultimate ground must therefore be sought. "What," he asks in 
The Friend. wis the ground of the coincidence between reason 
and experience? Or between the laws of matter and the ideas of 
the pure intellect?"*- The answer given is that of Plato, which
"compels the reason to pass out of itself and seek the 
ground of this agreement in a supersensual essence, which 
being at once the ideal of the reason and the cause of 
the material world, is the pre-establisher of the harmony 
in and between both."2
It remains to consider the nature of this ground to which reason 
points.
III. Metaphysics.
"The grand problem," Coleridge wrote in The 
Friend, "the solution of which forms, according to Plato, 
the final object and distinctive character of philosophy, 
is this: for all that exists conditionally(i.e. the 
existence of which is inconceivable execpt under the 
condition of its dependency on some other as its antecedent) 
to find a ground that is unconditional and absolute, and 
thereby to reduce the aggregate of human knowledge to a 
system." 3
The solution of the problem, according to Coleridge, is to be 
sought in the doctrine of ideas.
(a) The Meaning of Ideas.
If the "momentous distinction" between reason and 
understanding carries us to the heart of Coleridge's philosophy, 
then in his doctrine of ideas we are at the heart itself. All 
the labours of his life, he tells us, were to establish the
1. The friend. Section II, Essay 5, p.327.
2. Ibid, p.328. MS.B. 3. p.157.
3* Ibid: p.326.
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diversity of reason and understanding, and the distinction 
between the light of reason in the understanding and reason 
itself, nas the source and birth-place of Ideas." His end will 
then have been accomplished. .Further, by this, he hoped to 
have taught
nas many as have in themselves the conditions of learning 
the true import and legitimate use of the term, Idea, and 
directed the nobler and loftier minds of the rising Gene­ 
ration to the incalculable Value of Ideas (and therefore 
of Philosophy which is but another name for the manifesta­ 
tion and application of Ideas) in all departments of 
Knowledge, not merely technical and mechanic, and their 
indispensable presence in the Sciences that have a worth 
as well as a Value to the Naturalist no less than to the 
Theologian, to the Statesman no less than to the Moralist." 1
If philosophy be "but another name for the mani­ 
festation and application of Ideas", what was the "true import 
and legitimate use" of the term that Coleridge had in mind? 
In two long entries in the Semina Herum. 2 from one of which 
the above quotation is taken, Coleridge attempts to answer the 
question directly. An idea may be contemplated, it cannot be 
conceived. To ask for a conception of an idea is, if possible, 
even more irrational than to ask for "the Image of a flavor or 
the odour of a Strain of Music."3 "For," as he says, ^between 
the harmonies of sight and sound there is at least an analogy; 
but Ideas and Conceptions are utterly disparate, and Ideas and 
Images the negatives of each other."^ Jiven language is in­ 
adequate to express the meaning^ since words are "the creatures,
1. MS.C, p.33 seq. Snyder: Coleridge on Logic etc., p.135.
2. Ibid: pp.25-26, 33 seq.
3. Ibid: p.35.
4. Ibid: p.25.
5. Ibid: Cf. MS.H, where he rejects the analogy of mathematical 
intuition - the appeal of the Cambridge Platonists - as 
being too closely dependent on sense. Vide infra "The Idea 
of God."
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instruments, and immediate Objects of the Understanding." 
There is left the possibility of attempting to define an idea; 
first, negatively, by contra-distinction - "by determining 
what an Idea is not; w second, positively, by marking "some 
character common to all Ideas;" and third, "by referring to 
some Instance*"
Negatively, an idea is distinguished by the 
fact that it is not an image of the fancy, nor is it a con- 
ception - the product of the understanding. 1 Again, ideas are 
distinguished from "schematized" conceptions or theories. 2 
Theories are subject to change and are conditioned by new 
discovery, as in the field of astronomy and chemistry. 3
Positively, ideas may be defined by reference 
to "some character common to all," such as the relation of 
particular and universal seen in natural law. 4 A law is not 
merely "a synopsis of a plurality of phaenomena," it is 
"constitutive" of them, and "in order of Thought necessarily 
antecedent."5 The idea is "the Correlative and mental Counter- 
part of the Law."s Thirdly, by reference to concrete examples, 
the meaning of ideas may be determined. In the manuscript note 
he refers to astronomical and chemical laws, and in his Pre- 
liminary Treatise on Method to the laws of electricity and the
1. Of. Aids. p.!54n. Of. Table Talk, p.64n.
2. MS.C, pp.35-38. Snyder. Coleridge on Logic etc.. p.136.
Cf. Preliminary Treatise on Method, p.4.
3* MS.C. pp.55-38* Snyder; Coleridge~pn Logic etc., p.137. 
4. Ibid: pp.35-38. Snyder: op.cit, p.136. cf. Preliminary
Treatise on Method, pp.4-11.
5* Ibid: pp.35-38. 
6. Ibid: pp.35-38.
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ideas gOYerning the biological sciences. 1 Literature and life 
furnish further examples* Shakespeare is cited as an example 
of the "happy union of the universal with the particular* n 
Shakespeare "studied mankind in the Idea of the human race." 
Life, which he defines as "the principle of individuation" with 
the power of organization from within, is a favourite illus­ 
tration as is seen from his essay on The Theory of Life. 2 
further, there is a "directing idea" of human history, the aim 
of which is "to weave a Chain of Necessity, the particular 
Links in which are free acts."^
A deeper question, however, remains to be
answered, if the idea be not given by the senses, nor derived 
by induction, how then does the idea appear in the minds of 
men? There is, on the one hand, the Lockean solution of in- 
nateness, but this Coleridge rejects. 4 Coleridge holds that 
the idea is apprehended by the reason. 5 That is to say, ideas 
are made known to the "total man."6 They are "those truths 
namely ( supposing such to exist) the knowledge and acknowledg­ 
ment of which require the whole man, the free will, no less than 
the intellect, and which are not therefore merely speculative, 
nor yet merely practical, but botn in one."7 Hence, this "grasp" 
of the meaning of experience is something which "no man can
1. Preliminary Treatise on Method, pp.17-24.
2* Miscellanies, p.385.Of. Table Talk, pp.56-57.
3. HS.C, p.39. Snyder: Coleridge on Logic etc., p.137.
Cf. Preliminary Treatise on Method, p.47. Of. Church and 
State, p.5
4. Vide infra, "The Idea of aod."
5. Aids» p.148. Vide supra, "Reason and understanding."
6. Cf* Richards: Coleridge on imagination, p. 138 seq.
7. Snyder: Coleridge on Logic etc.. pp.100-101.
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ve to another, yet every man may find for himself.
(b) The Idea of Will.
Since ideas are "found* by each man, the start­ 
ing point for inquiry concerning the first idea, the "idea 
idearunr2 in the light of which, as the ground of all reality, 
all other ideas must be seen, must be the man himself. Self- 
consciousness is not only the "fixed point" of departure, it 
furnishes also the clue to causality and hence to ultimate 
reality.
"We can never pass beyond the principle of self- 
consciousness. Should we attempt it, we must be 
driven back from ground to ground, each of which 
would cease to be a ground the moment we pressed 
on it. We must be whirled down the gulf of an in­ 
finite series. But this would make our reason 
baffle the end and purpose of all reason, namely, 
unity and sytem. Or we must break off the series 
arbitrarily, and affirm an absolute something that 
is in and of itself at once cause and effect, 
causa sui."3
The only thing of which we know that is causa sul. at once 
cause and effect, subject and object, is self-consciousness. 
And the basis of self-consciousness is will. 4 Mechanical 
power supposes spirit or will, he argues at length in the 
manuscript Opus. ^ Will, therefore, is basic, it alone is 
capable of originating, 6 and causative of reality. 7
1. Aids, p.90. Cf. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, pp.96-102. 
for a fuller treatment.
2. Cf. Muirhead: op.cit. p.102.
3. Biographia Literaria. p.133. Cf. Muirhead; op.cit. p.103 seq.
for fuller treatment. 
4* Ibid: p.132. Vide supra. Spirit, Will and Personality.
5. MS.B. 1, pp.24-36.
6. MS.B. 2, p.25.
7. MS.B. 3, p.170.
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No other definition of will is possible but " verbally, that 
which originates, and really, that which is essentially 
causative of reality. wl This leads to the idea of the Absolute 
Will, the first idea. Coleridge states, in the manuscript 
Opua. "An absolute Will, which therefore is essentially causative 
of reality, and therefore in origin causative of its own reality, 
the essential causativeness however abiding undiminished and 
indiminishable, this is our first idea*"2 There is this to be 
said of the Absolute Will. As anterior to all, will supports 
being. The idea of will is necessary to the idea of being and 
the idea of being is contained in the idea of will. They are 
not however the same*3 Moreover, the Absolute Will must be 
intelligent.
"The Supreme Will,** he writes in the Huntingdon manuscript, 
nis an idea incapable of abstraction. We not only cannot 
think of it abstracted from Intelligence and Love as real - 
for this would apply equally to the idea of an unbounded 
power; but we cannot think of it at
Temporal relations do not apply to the idea of 
the Absolute Will. In the Opus Maximum chapter on "Ideas 
flowing out of the Divine Personal ty," Coleridge devotes some 
space to a discussion of this question. The discussion hinges 
upon the familiar distinction between reason and understanding. 
The understanding deals only with the things of sense. It
1. MS.B.3, p.240.
2* Ibid, p.242. Cf. MS.B.2, p.27.
3. Ibid, pp.239-240. Cf. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher.p.112. ———————————
4. MS.H, pp.110*111. Cf. infra. "The Doctrine of the Trinity."
6. BIS; Bf>pp.213-245. Cf, Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopherpp. 112-113. ———— ————————B——
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measure* and arranges, but this doe a not cover all of exper- 
ience* It is absurd to ask "whether Anthony f s love of Cleo- 
patra was north-west or south-east of his respect for 
Octavia!"1 But if this absurdity be recognized, then "there 
must exist a class of truths to which the measures of time 
and space and the forms of quantity, ejuality and contingent 
relations are not applicable."2 This class of truths come 
under the head of "Spirit."
The idea of time is necessary in the conception 
of a causal series. But the succession itself argues "a some- 
thing that acting successively remains the same throughout the
succession." This something is the ground and condition of
2 time and space. It is eternity. Time, therefore, mast be
brought into some relation to eternity. Difficulty arises in 
applying the accidents of time to an eternal. A semblance 
either of a contradiction or of an argument in a circle appears.1* 
But this argument in a circle is necessarily the only starting- 
point. By the constitution of our own conscious understanding, 
and by the very act of reflexion, "which is for us the power
1. MS.B.3, p.215.
2. Ibid: printed in Snyder: Coleridge on Logic etc., p.132.
3. Ibid: pp.215-219.
4. Coleridge has a note on "successive" at this point which 
shows the close relation between time and consciousness 
in his thought. "But then this succession of thought, 
this still recurring resistance, as it were, to the 
continuous going forth of our being, which forces us 
backward, as it were, to our center, the result of 
which is the consciousness of the power resisting, 
constitutes Time for us; so that the conscious subject, 
the intelligible I in every man, as compared with that 
of which he becomes conscious, may without extravagance 
be represented as time in relation to space." MS.B.3, 
pp.219-220.
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and the condition of time," we are compelled "to attribute the 
relations of cause and effect improperly, and to a transcendent 
subject, in order that we may have any reality to which the 
relations of cause and effect in their proper sense can be 
applied."1
The supreme idea is God* Hence, "the first 
great truth, which all men hold implicitly and which it is 
the highest object and duty of education to render explicit, 
is comprized in the term God*"2 He is self-existent and pure 
spirit. In the language of the Schoolmen, Deus est actus 
puri3simus>3 Now, Coleridge holds in a significant passage,
"if we Join the two positions of self-existence and Spirit, 
there arises that unique idea, which can belong but to 
one subject, and can therefore be elucidated by no analogy, 
that the Fathers and the School Divines have struggled to 
express by the terms O^T.-IT^-I-^ and causa sui. but which 
is both more sublimely and more adtejiately conveyed in the 
Hebrew Words, * I am in that I am* or rather, in the literal 
translation of the words, 'That which I will to be I shall be.» w4
Nothing illustrates more clearly the religious bearing of 
Coleridge's philosophy than this statement regarding the Supreme 
Idea. It is will. It is God. The Absolute Will of speculation 
is identified with the God of religion.
(c) Ideas and Reality.






the Appendix to the first Lay Sermon, "or likewise constitutive, 
and one with the power and life of Nature......is the highest
problem of philosophy.**^ The first was the position of Aris­ 
totle and of Kant. But Cor Coleridge, as for Plato, the idea 
is constitutive of reality. In defining faith as an act of 
fidelity,2 Coleridge affirms:-
nthis is at once the distinctive and constitutive basis 
of my philosophy - that I place ay first principle, the 
ground and genesis of my system, not as others in a fact 
impressed, much less in a generalization from facts 
collectively, and least of all from an abstraction 
embodied into an hypothesis in which the pretended solu­ 
tion is most often but a repetition of the problem in 
disguise, a mere abbreviation of the thing to be solved. 
In contradistinction from this I place my principle in 
an aot» in the language of grammarians I begin with the 
verb, but the act involves its reality - it is an act of 
being, a verb substantive."3
How to prove that the act involves its reality 
is the oruoial question. The core of his trlchotomous logic 
was to show that the passage to the noumenal world was possible. 
And the burden of his elaborate distinction between reason and 
understanding was to make plain the way. He holds, therefore, 
that the logical principle on which to base the true specula­ 
tive argument is: "Whatever is real must be possible and there­ 
fore whatever is necessary in order to the possibility of a 
reality must be itself both possible and real."4 in the manu­ 
script chapter on "Faith and Conscience" the way is made even
1. The Statesman's Manual, appendix E.Biog. Lit., p.367.
2. Vide infra. Faith and Conscience.
3. MS.B.2, pp.134-136. Cf. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher. 
p.105, quoted freely, wrong reference.
4. Ibid, p.30. Vide Muirhead: op. cit., pp.105-110 for a full 
discussion of this with relation to Plotinus.
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clearer*
"From whichever of the two points the Reason may start, 
from the Things that are seen to the One Invisible, or 
from the idea of the Absolute One to the Things that 
are seen, it will find a Chasm, which the Moral Being 
only, which the Spirit and Religion of man alone can 
fill up or over-bridge.*!
Coleridge*s spiritual realism thus points the way beyond the
dualism of Kant. The final ground of reality is God. He
is "at once the constitutive will and the supreme reason of the
universe."2
"The fact, therefore, that the mind of man, in its own 
primary and constituent forms, represents the laws of 
nature, is a mystery which of itself should suffice to 
make us religious: for it is a problem of which God is 
the only solution - God, the One before all, and of 
all, and through allJ"3
"Religion, therefore," as he states in The Friend, "is the 
ultimate aim of philosophy."4 It is, at any rate, the ultimate 
aim of Coleridge*s philosophy."
1. MS.B.3, pp.38-39.
2. Statesman*s Manual. Appendix A, Biog. Lit.. p.336.
3. Ibid: Appendix C, p.347. Quoted freely Muirhead: Coleridge 
as Philosopher, p.109.
4. The Friend. Section II, Essay V, p.328 




I. Faith and Conscience*
Although epistemology runs back ultimately 
into metaphysics, it is generally recognized that some 
discussion of the nature and validity of knowledge should 
precede the full consideration of the ultimate problems of 
a religious philosophy. It would seem, at first sight, 
that Coleridge had done full justice to the problems of 
epistemology in his treatment of the distinction between 
reason and understanding* But that even his constant 
emphasis ontfris "momentous distinction" did not exhaust all 
he had to say on the subject, is seen by the presence in the 
manuscript Opus or a complete chapter bearing the title, 
nFaith and Conscience." It is a further study from another 
standpoint of the same basic problem*
Its position is of interest, as it is found
immediately preceding the chapter, "On the existential reality 
of the Idea of the Supreme Being: i.e. of God." Prior then 
to the discussion of "the existential reality" of God
1. MS.B.3, p.25.
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Coleridge devotes considerable space to an analysis of 
"]?alth and Conscience. 1^- The position of the chapter in 
relation to those sections which it follows in the manu- 
script Opus is also of interest. The object of the work, he 
tells us, consists in the assertion, "first: of Religion 
as implying revelation*...secondly: that Christianity is 
the only revelation of universal validity."8 As the common 
creed of Christendom he states four articles: first, the 
necessity and actual existence of a spiritual redemption for 
man; second, the necessity of a regeneration in order to the 
susceptibility of being redeemed; third, the necessity of 
faith, in each individual, in order to his appropriation of this 
faith; and fourth, the fruits of the faith as the test and 
criterion of its existence. 3 Now, Coleridge argues, in 
all reasoning the argument must commence with some assumption 
"which is supposed and may be demanded," but cannot
1. MS.B.2, pp.106-151. - M5.B.3, pp. 1-25.
The section appears to be an expanded version of the 
familiar Essay on Faith, (Aids, pp.341-349. Cf.Notes 
Theological. Political & Miscellaneous, pp.384-395.) 
first published in the Literary Remains of 1838-1839. 
(Vol. IV, p.425) A third version is also extant, 
preserved in the British Museum. (Egerton MS.2801, 
folios 217-221) It is probable that Henry Nelson 
Coleridge published his version by editing the fragment 
now in the British Museum. On this assumption the 
differences between these two versions may be accounted 
for readily* Except at one or two points, they are of 
no significant importance. It is probable also that 
the British Museum fragment is the original, written 
by Coleridge, and used by him when dictating the expanded 
version now to be found in the Opus Maximum.
2. MS.B.2, p.85. Cf. Aids, p.103.
3. MS.B.2, p.91.
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be proved* In sciences such as geometry the denial of the 
postulate proves only "the conscious falsehood or Jest" of 
the denier. It is otherwise in the moral world.
"The assumptions of morality it is in a man's power 
to reject believingly without the absolute forfeiture 
of his human understanding, though not without 
forfeiting that which even more than the understanding 
forms the contradistinction of the human from the 
bestial nature. "^
What this distinction is becomes apparent in his primary 
postulate.
The primary "postulate of humanity" is the 
existence of the will. As the postulate of humanity, it is 
a fortiori the postulate of every code of religion and 
morality. "Man is a responsible agent and in consequence 
hath a will."2 This postulate, Coleridge holds, is the same 
as that of moral responsibility, and that again is equivalent
to the reality and essential difference of moral good and
2evil. He devotes some space to defining will as distinct
from instinct, tendency, propensity and spontaneity. It 
cannot indeed be an object of conception.4 Responsible will 
is a fact*
"The fact then with the demand of which we commence our 
investigation is the existence of conscious responsi- 
bility and of its existence every conscious and rational 
Being must himself be the Judge, the consciousness being 
the only organ by which it can be directly known."5
1. MS.B.2, p«93





"But," adds Coleridge, "the consciousness of a conscience is 
itself conscience." From this basic postulate of 
conscience Coleridge proceeds to an acute criticism of 
utilitarian ethics which leads into a discussion of faith, 
"as the ground of all particular acts of willing."2
In the first instance, faith is defined as
"fidelity to our own being, as far as such being is not, and 
cannot be, an object of the senses."3 By "clear inference" 
this fidelity is extended to being universally wa» far as 
the same is not the object of the senses and herewith to 
whatever is necessarily afflimed or understood as the con- 
dition, concomitant or consequence of the same."4 This 
Coleridge illustrates by citing the categorical Imperative; 
a fact, "of wbich I am no less conscious and*....no less 
assured than I am of any appearance presented to my mind by 
my outward senses;" a fact, "the ignorance of which 
establishes the non-personality of the ignorant or the guilt, 
and that in the latter case the ignorance.....is equivalent 
to knowledge wilfully darkened."5 Conscience is distinguished
e
from all other acts of consciousness by its universality. 
It is the only practical contradistinction between men and 




A ^r*_ ^ .» . _ ^ «^ j«^4. Ibid: p.108. Cf. .Essay on Eaith,_Ai££, p«341.
5. Ibid: pp.109-110. Cf. Jtssay on Faith, Aids, p.341.
6. Ibid: p.lll.
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7. Ibid: p.138.
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in it. It is - and this is Coleridge's basic principle - 
the ground of consciousness, nthe root and precondition 
of all other consciousness.*1 It is "anterior...to it in 
the order of thought, i.e., without reference to time."2
Conscience, then, has underived, and uncon- 
ditional authority. It gives "legislative force and sanction" 
to the dicta of reason. It is "the true ultimate why and 
wherefore of all other things within the sphere of morals
•X
and the practical reason*" This he illustrates by a 
discussion of the ethical systems based on self-regard from 
the standpoint of the categorical imperative and the stand- 
point of naturalism. To the school of naturalism he concedes 
that all actions and the impulses thereof, as distinguished 
from the motives, proceed from self. But he denies that 
every action necessarily proceeds to self.4 And this is a 
fact "of which every honest man is as fully assured as he is 
of his seeing, hearing or smelling."5 The difference 
between the two is that in the one case the senses are morally 
passive, while in the other the conscience is connected with 
the will, although it may become blurred through habitual 
choice, becoming then "a mere product of the will mechanized 
wilfully into a habit."6 The senses are receptive and present
1. MS.B.2, p.lll. (Not in Essay.)
2. Ibid, p.lll.
3. Ibid, p.112.
4. Ibid, pp.111-124. (Not in Essay.)
5. Ibid, p.124. N.B. In other words, Coleridge not only 
makes his postulate the foundation, he attempts to 
"anchor" the foundation solidly.
6. Ibid, p.126.
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impressions, the conscience is active and presents commands 
or dictates* "In the facts of the conscience we are not only 
agents but it is by these alone that we know ourselves to be 
suolu"* The consciousness of responsibility and its proof is 
afforded by the inward assurance that regret and remorse are 
diverse in kind. 2
The first principle of his philosophy, Coleridge 
holds, is placed in an act, an act of being. The act is an 
act "in which and by which we take upon ourselves an allegiance, 
and consequently the obligations of fealty.**4 This fealty, 
implying the power of being unfaithful, is the primary and 
fundamental meaning of faith* In this sense faith is the 
commencement and indispensable pre-condition of all experience*
This leads at once into a discussion of
Kconsciousness and self-consciousness. Men are distinguished 
from animals, who are soious. by being conscious. But on 
examination: first, consciousness is found to depend on self- 
consciousness; second, self-consciousness involves the 
consciousness of another than self* The relation between 
"things" in the first and third persons depends on the primary 
relation between "things'* in the first and second persons. 
"There can be no He without a previous Thou." Again, there 
could be no distinct sense of the term ,I, was far as the
L. MS.B.2, p.128. Cf. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.342.
2. Ibid, p.130.
3* Ibid, pp.134-136. (Not in Essay,)
4. Ibid, p.134. Cf. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.343.
5* Ibid, ppo!38 seq.
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consciousness is concerned" without a thou. The ][ exists
g wholly in consciousness, not in some subliminal soul. Third,
if there can be no he or It without an _!, and no I without a 
thou. the "solution of the problem must be sought for in the 
genesis or origination of the Thou."5 Attempting the solution, 
he holds that the consciousness expressed in the term thou is 
only possible by an equation in which .1 is taken as equal to, 
but not the same as, thou* This is possible only by placing 
][ and thou in opposition as correspondent opposites or 
correlatives, that is to say, by assigning them equal rights. 
i and thou are not "sames" and indistinguishable. The differ* 
ence consists in will, which is affirmed in the one and
1* MS.B.2, p.143. Of* Essay on Faith, Aids, p.343.
2. Xbid, p.143. (Not in Essay.)
N.B. The relation between the .1 and the IT is confused 
in the Essay. The Opus Maximum reads, "There could be 
no He without a previous Thou~and I scarcely need add 
thaT"without a Thou there could be no opposite, and of 
course no distinct or conscious sense of the term 2, as 
far as the consciousness is concerned without a Thou. 
But whatever may be affirmed or believed respecting the 
soul as a substratum or hypostases of the Self, the I 
exists wholly in consciousness. Much less then would 
the neuter pronoun it exist for us except as it exists 
during the suspension of the Will, as in dreams or 
states analogous thereto, and 1 may be permitted to 
observe in transits that the clearest conception I can 
form respecting the nature of beasts, of course 
conjectural at best, is to regard them as somnambulists:" 
(pp.143-144.) The Essay version reads: "There can be 
no He without a previous Thou. Much less could an I 
exist for us, except as it exists during the suspension 
of the will, as in dreams; and the nature of brutes may 
be best understood by considering them as somnambulists." 
(Aids, p.343.) The Opus Maximum version is obviously 
the correct one, in this instance.
3. MS.B.8, p.144 (Not in Essay.)
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negatived in the other. There is no application or inter­ 
vention of the will in the afflunation of the I, that is 
«the identification of the subject and object in which 
self-consciousness consists." But there is an application 
of the will when we equate thou with .1 by means of a free 
act "by which we negative the sameness in order to establish
2 tHe equality." Fourth, the "becoming conscious of a
conscience"thus partakes of the nature of an act. Finally, 
this equation of thou and .1 constitutes "the true definition 
of conscience."3
From this I-thou relation, the I-you, I-they
relations follow, since "the plural presupposes the singular."4 
Now all of these relations conjointly constitute the materials 
and subjects of consciousness, which in turn are the conditions 
of experience. Coleridge concludes this section with his Q.E. B.:
"It is evident that^conscience is the root of all human 
consciousness, and a fortiori, the pre-condition of all 
experience, and therefore that the conscience in its 
first revelation cannot have been deduced from experience.**
Coleridge comes now to his second meaning of 
faith. Conscience may be underived from experience; it is not 
independent of it. Experience is enough to convince any man 
of the powers and impulses ready to usurp the throne of 
conscience and demand allegiance. Some of these must be
1. MS.B.2, pp. 145-146. (Not in Essejr*)
2. Ibid; p. 146. Cf. Essay on .faith, Aids, p.344.
3. Ibid; p.146. N.fi. Coleridge puts this into his character­ 
istic mould. I-Will is thesis. I+ Will: Antithesis =. Thou.
4. Ibid: p.146.
5. Ibid: p.151. Cf. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.344.
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repelled and utterly excluded, others must be subjugated, like 
"the beasts of burthen,** and others still, such as social 
tendencies and affections, must be subordinated. The preserva­ 
tion of loyalty to the conscience against all these rivals 
constitutes the second sense of faith. 1 "Faith is fidelity; 
but all human fidelity that is consistent with itself is 
fidelity to the conscience."2
This fidelity to the sole supremacy of the 
conscience demands a consideration of the objects in which 
conscience is to be manifested and a full recognition of what 
its competitors are. This leads to a further analysis of the 
I-thou correlative relation, in the determination of "what is 
presupposed in the human conscience."3 Coleridge throws the 
problem into a more or less mathematical form: I - A-Z and 
Thou -z A + Z (where Z * the will)* It then appears that the 
reason, or the universal, in each individual man, "without 
which he would not be man," is the factor to be taken as •Z, 
or "not the subject of will, 1* as in the perception of
4mathematical truth. On the other hand, the factor to be 
taken as f Z "can be no other than the Will itself, but as the 
individual Will, or the Will considered as the principle of 
personality and free-agency.*5 This means the virtual identity
1. MS.B.E, p.150* Of. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.344. 
2* Ibid: p.150. (Not in Essay*)
3. Ibid: p.151. Of. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.344.
4. Ibid: p.151. Of. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.344.
5. US.B.3, p.l. Of* Essay on Faith, Aids, p.344, slightly 
different*
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of the will and the reason. But the equations suppose 
equality, not identity*
The only solution is to take the will as the 
Absolute Will. nWe may then without anticipation affirm 
that the identity of the Absolute Will and the Universal 
Beason is peculiar to the idea of God. 1* To transpose this 
statement into the human "analogon," Coleridge calls into 
service his polar logic*
"What in God is the reality or necessary co-inherence 
of the Absolute Will and the Keason subsists in man 
as the possible, either realized or realizable, 
synthesis of the individual will and the common or 
universal reason, by the subordination of the former 
to the latter. 1**
Only in God do both factors exist "each in the other," - as 
prothesis. In man the analogous factors appear distinct - 
as thesis and antithesis. Only by a deliberate and "continued" 
act of subordinating the one to the other - uniting them in
JZ
a synthesis - does man complete the analogon. By this 
argument Coleridge claims that, antecedent to the question 
whether reason makes it necessary to affirm reality of the 
idea of God, certain conclusions appear to have the sanction 
of reason*
In the first place there is the idea, and the 
idea is unique, "not composed tyany processes of imaginary 
comparison or arbitrary assertion of indefinite intensity or
1. MS.B.5, p.2. Cf. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.345.
2* Ibid: p.2. Cf. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.345
3* Ibid: p.3. (Not in Essay.}
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magnitude."1 Secondly, if we assume the existence of the 
Supreme Being, nit is by affirming reality of this idea 
exclusively that me can attach any rational meaning to the 
term God, or to the position God is. and exists."2 Thirdly, 
this idea is the canon and criterion "by which the character
and legitimacy of whatever is offered to us as representing
j* 
or proceeding from God* is to be judged* Fourthly, the
reality of the idea (i.e., the existence of God) being con­ 
ceded, "reason itself obliges us to conclude that God-likeness 
.....must be the proper character of man.*4 This character 
is not self-existent, however. It depends on the individual 
will. If given originally, it must have been given to some 
other will as "the inceptive momentum or condition" of its 
continuance by the individual will. This proper character, 
therefore, may be lost. If lost, of which the fact itself is 
the proof, restoration to his proper character must be the 
"proper duty, the moral destination of man»"
This gives the "conditions" of religion, 
determinable while still within the limits of pure reason, 
and of ideas, "the reality of which is still problematic." 
Prior to the question of whether a true religion exists, he 
claims to have determined "what it must be and what it cannot 
be," and to have verified his definition of religion as
1. MS.B.3; p.3. (Hot in Essay.)
2. Ibid; p.4. ( Not in Essay.)
3. Ibid: p.4. ( Not in Essay.)
4. Ibid: p.5. (Not in Essay.)
5* Ibid: pp.5-6. (Not in Issay.)
109.
differing from both philosophy and history by being both.
Reason in man is thus seen as the represent­ 
ative of the will of God. Conscience is the "specific 
witnessing" respecting the unity or hannony of the will with 
the reason; the harmony being effected by the self-subordina­ 
tion of the individual will, representing the self, to the 
reason, was the representative of the will of God."2
Difficulty arises from the fact that the will 
is a factor in other moral "syntheses," such as sensuality, 
or the union of appetite and the personal will, and ambition, 
the union of the lust for power and the will. The specific 
character of conscience cannot therefore be found in the 
individual will. It must be found in reason* "Such as the
nature and objects of the reason are, such must be the
3functions and objects of the conscience. 1* This leads to a
consideration of "the nature and objects" of reason, based 
on an analysis of "the total man," as revealing those con­ 
stituents either contrary to, or disparate from, reason.
The constituents of the total man, "contrary
to or disparate from" the reason, are grouped under five
g heads. First, reason as supersensual is opposed by appetite,
"the lust of the flesh." Second, as supersensuous, it is 
opposed by the senses, inward and outward, "the lust of the
1. MS.B.3, p.6. (Not in Essay.)
2. Ibid: p.7. Of. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.345.
3. Ibid; p.8. Cf. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.345.
4* Ibid: p.8. Cf. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.345.
5. Ibid: pp.8-17. Cf. Essay on Faith, Aids, pp.345-348.
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eye." Third, as superfinite, the representative of the
infinite reason is opposed by the faculty of the finite, the
un-ordinated understanding, the ^«V7/^* cra/OA o'5 Of st. Paul,
the wisdom of this world. Fourth, as the representative 
of the will of God, reason stands in opposition to all mere 
Individual wills, seeking an object "in the manifestation
of itself for itself, in short, "the lust of the will."
g Fifth, reason appears as the love of God and stands in
opposition to earthly love, when such attachment is nin 
diminution of, or competition with, the love which is one with 
reason*"3
Recapitulating the argument from this analysis, 
faith is, in the first or most universal sense, fidelity. 
But fidelity under previous contract or particular moral 
obligation is fealty. Faith, then, is fealty. Fealty to a 
rightful superior is allegiance. Therefore, in the third place, 
faith is allegiance. Fourthly, it is allegiance in active 
service, fidelity to the acknowledged lord wamid the tempta­ 
tions of mtrpation, rebellion and intestine discord." Fifthly, 
it is allegiance to that superior, whose sovereign prerogatives 
are underived and unconditional and, therefore, in duty to 
whom all other duties find their several degress and dignities. 
In short, "faith is fidelity, fealty, allegiance of the moral
1. N.B. Coleridge in a footnote at this point in the Opus 
Maximum states that he refers to the Biblical writers 
"for fit expressions only as I can refer to other well- 
known books," not for any extrinsic authority.
2. (Classed as a corollary to 47]
3. M.S.B.3, p. 17.
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creature to God, in opposition to all usurpation, and in 
resistance to all temptations to the placing any other claim 
above or equal with our fidelity to God. n Finally, in 
accordance with the statements that the Will of God is the 
last and final claim of all man's duty and that this Will, 
one with the Supreme Intelligence, is revealed to man through 
the conscience, faith is the obedience of the individual will 
to reason. The lusts of the flesh bow to the supersensual f 
the lusts of the eye to the supersensmous, the pride of the 
understanding to the superfinite spiritual truth, the lusts
of the indiTidual will to the universal will and the love of
g the creature to the love of God*
Faith, in short, in all its relations subsists 
in the "synthesis of the Reason and the individual Will, or 
the reconcilement of the Reason with the Will by the self- 
subordination of the Will to the Reason."3 By virtue of 
the will - faith is energy, total not partial, continuous and 
ordinary, not desultory or occasional, and relates to the 
whole moral man. By virtue of the factor of reason, faith 
is a fbrm of knowing, a beholding of truth, an intuitive 
knowledge. "Faith must partake of the nature of an intuition. 
It originates in the Logos, (to use St»John f s expression.) 
He concludes with the definition of faith as:-
1. M.S.B.3, p.19. Cf. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.348.
2. Ibid: pp*20-21. Cf. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.349.
3« Ibid: p.21. Cf. Essay on Faith, Aids, p.349.
4* Ibid: p.28. (Not in Essay.)
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"the source and the sum, the energy and the principle, 
of the fidelity of man to God by the subordination 
of his human Will to his Reason as to the sum of all 
spiritual truths representing and manifesting the 
Will divine."!
Starting from the Kantian categorical imperative
g and bearing continual witness to the influence of Kant, the
argument undoubtedly goes beyond Kant. This does not, however, 
as Wellek would imply, 3 throw the argument into one for a 
philosophy of faith, in the sense of Jacobi. The argument, 
for Coleridge, is continuous. Faith is not discontinuous with 
the other activities of man's mind. It is not set over 
against reason. Rather, it is linked closely with the practical 
reason, which is, for Coleridge, the "total man," with will 
as the underlying principle of his personality. 4 Thus faith 
has its root in the will. Indeed, Coleridge states at one 
point that he is using faith "in the same sense as Kant uses 
the Will, as the ground of all particular aots of Willing*"6 
Faith, therefore, as he is quick to assert, is Ma total act 
of the soul: it is the whole state of the mind."7
This is a constant note with Coleridge. Crabb 
Robinson reports him in 1810 as claiming that "religious 
belief is an act, not of the understanding, but of the will."8
1. MS.B.3, p.22. Cf. Issay on Faith, Aids, p.349.
2. Cf. Wellek: op.cit., p.133, for an analysis of the 
resemWLances.
3. Wellek: op.oit., pp.132-134.
4* Tide supra*
5* Notes on English Divines. II, p.54.
6* MS.B.2, p.72.
7. Ibid: p.72. Cf. The Friend, p.218.
8* Robinson: op.cit., i, p»3O8*
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His own note of the same year emphasizes the same view* 
"Faith," be writes, wis a moral, not an intellectual act."1 
In the Bjographia Literarla of 1817, the position is main- 
tained again that faith in the existence of God rests on 
moral grounds* 2 And in 1818 the passage already quoted 
from the manuscript Opus appears, "Faith is a total act of 
the soul."3 Elsewhere, he writes, "Faith is as real as life; 
as actual as force, as effectual as volition."4 Faith, he 
notes, resides not in accuracy of logic, tut in wa predispos- 
ing purity of heart."^
In stressing the nature of faith as a "total act 
of the Soul, 11 Coleridge presents a religious epistemology 
equally removed from the dogmatic demand for "belief," of 
mere Intellectual assent, on the part of orthodox Churchmen, 
from the arid rationalism of Deism, and from the inadequate 
basis in feeling of Schleiermaoher. It is a contribution of 
permanent value. A* galloway rightly says, "Religion 
involves the whole man, and in Judging of religious beliefs 
we must consider their relation to all the aspects of our 
psychical nature."6 Moreover, in arguing that the primary 
act of consciousness involves an act of faith, Coleridge
1* Anima Ppetae. pp.215-216.
2* Biographia Literaria. pp.96-97
3* The Friend. p»218.
4* Southey; Life of Wesley* II, p.82.
5. Notes on English Divines, I, p.207*
6* Galloway: Philosophy of Religion, p.269.
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shows that faith emerges from the deep springs of man's nature* 
He thus vindicates faith against the denial of a sceptical 
naturalism. In addition, this primary act of consciousness 
is for Coleridge a judgment of the conscience. And conscience 
arises only in relation to an other-than-self. This goes to 
the heart of the matter. As Professor Flint says, "There is 
probably no living practical belief in God which does not 
begin with the conscience*••••Without a moral nature of our 
own, we could not recognize the moral character and moral 
government manifested by Him."
Jlirther, in the thoroughly Platonic assertion 
of the cognitive aspect of faith - na form of knowing n - 
Coleridge points the way beyond the dualism of Kant. The 
linkage of faith with reason, although not worked out clearly, 
and although it does not take into account adequately the 
implications of the doctrine of sin, nevertheless provides a 
basis for the religious claim of knowledge of the Supreme 
Reason or God* The validity of religious knowledge is thus 
established*
Looking back, the argument appears to be the 
familiar "moral argument n for the existence of God in 
another dress. In the main body of the section, Coleridge is 
emphatic that all he is attempting to do is to clear the 
ground for the affirmation of God's existence, leaving for a 
following section the question of wthe existential reality of 
the idea of the Supreme Being."2 That is to say, he declines to
1. Flint: Theism, pp.211-212. 
2* MS.B.3, p*25.
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construe it as the "moral argument." On the other hand, a 
long note appended to the section in the Opus Maximum, reveals 
how much weight he does attach to this argument. The note is 
of interest also from the standpoint of psychological study 
regarding the origin of religion. Conscience, Coleridge aruges, 
is the ground of consciousness and is under!ved. The conclud- 
ing paragraph reads:-
"The objection derived from religious scruples to the 
doctrine of the absolute primacy, the under!ved nature 
of the obligation contained in the moral law, rests 
wholly on a misconception, which may be elucidated by 
a case strictly analogous in speculative science* If 
I am asked how I know that I am, I can only reply, 
 Because I am': this is the absolute ground of my 
knowledge: but if I were asked for the cause, not of 
my knowledge, but of the thing known, and in this sense 
the question were put, 'How came you to be? 1 - the 
answer must be 'Because God is» f And vice versa the 
knowledge is derived from the former knowledge as the 
cams* is known in and through its effect.........Man,
with all finite self-conscious beings, knows himself 
to be because he is a man; but he is a man because God 
is and hath so willed it..........Thus in like manner
because we have a conscience we know that there is a 
God, i.e. that God is the reality of the conscience 
on the principle that the necessary condition of a 
certain truth must itself be true. Thus in the order 
of dignity and objective dependency, the principle of 
religion is before the moral principle, but in the order 
of knowledge, the moral principle is the antecedent of 
our Faith in the principle of religion. wl
The argument, then, in spite of Ills plea in the main body, 
does in fact amount to Coleridge's reading of the moral 
argument. It must be noted that it is Coleridge f s reading. 
That is to say, it is a confessedly religious man who is making 
use of the argument. To the criticism that this is but an 
argument in a circle, it would seem that there is no answer,
1. M.S.B.2, pp.l37»141. Cf. Notes on English Divines. I 9 p.346.
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according to strict logic. This Coleridge himself was prepared 
to recognize. From the speculative side, the doctrine of 
ideas - ideas as self-evidencing and needing no proof - is 
his only court of appeal* 2 From the religious side, faith 
gives its own assurance*
II. Faith. Prayer and Belief*
The intimate connection between faith, prayer, 
and belief revealed in his later writings serves to 
indicate how great was his desire to vindicate his definition 
of faith, not only as a form of energy, but as a form of 
knowing. Of God, freedom and immortality, Kant had denied 
the possibility of speculative proof. Such beliefs may be 
open to faith, but not to the sight of reason. But Coleridge, 
by insisting that faith is an act of the soul, not above 
reason, but including the exercise of the practical reason 
alongside the speculative, was able to go beyond Kant in 
affirming the "objective reality of the things and states 
spiritually discovered by faith*"3
Faith at its highest becomes prayer. "Prayer, w
1. Aids:p*121. 
2* Aids;p.110*
3. Notes on English Divines. I,p.33.
Cf. Ibid, pp.17-18:-"Why the very perfection of reason, 
namely, those ideas or truth-powers, in which both 
the spiritual light and the spiritual life are co- 
inherent and one, should be called super-rational, I 
do not see* For reason is practical as well as 
theoretical; or even though I should exclude the 
practical reason, and confine the teim reason to the 
highest intellective power, - still I should think it 
more correct to describe the mysteries of faith as 
plusquam rationalla than super-rational."
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he says in a note, "is faith passing into act." Prayer is
the medium of communion with God. It is the very highest
2 energy of which the human heart is capable*
"Believe me," his nephew reports him as saying, "to 
pray with all your heart and strength, with the 
reason and the will, to believe vividly that God 
will listen to your voice through Christ, and verily 
do the thing he pleaseth thereupon - this is the 
last, the greatest achievement of the Christian's 
warfare upon earth."^
This is a far cry from the early days in 
which he wrote concerning God:
"Of whose omniscient and all-spreading Love 
Aught to implore were impotence of mind,"^
By 1796, he felt petitionary prayers permissible as "the way 
most suited to our nature, to stir up the benevolent affec­ 
tions in our hearts."5 They were of no influence on the
immutable Supreme Being* This sentiment underwent some change,
g for by 1797 he had recanted the lines written in 1794, and
by 1798 felt that petitionary prayer was consistent with the 
divine attributes. 7
About this period, under the expansive influence 
of love and friendship, Coleridge penned his famous definition
of prayer in terms of human love,"
"He prayeth best, who loveth best 
All things both great and small,"8
1. Notes on the Book of Common Prayer, Aids, p.350,
2. Be Quincey: Tait's Magazine. September 1834, p.515.
3» Table Talk, p,91n.
4. Poems, p,79 - To a Friend. (1794)
5. Cottle: Early Recollections. I, p.198.
6. Poems. p.79n. Cf. Unpublished Letters. I, p.48. -
	Letter of March 20, 1796, 
7* Letters. I, p.248* 
8« Poems, p.209. - The Rime of the Ancient Mariner.
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But him own tragic voyage over the 'wide, wide sea f of lonely 
despair taught him that more was required in the true 
function of prayer. By 1805 this found expression. Prayer 
must furnish an asylum. "What comfort in the silent eye 
upraised to Godl 'Thou knowest.' 01 what a thought! Never 
to be friendless, never to be unintelligible*"1
Prayer must strengthen the will. "The first
outward and sensible result of prayer is a penitent resolution, 
joined with a consciouness of weakness in effecting it.*1 2
In the nhell of my mind and conscience and body" of 1814,
3 the ability to pray was to Coleridge the "reward of faith."
The weakness and limitations of the finite will were all too 
apparent to his mind. "It is a sore evil, n he writes later, 
"to be and not in God - but it is a still more dreadful evil
4and misery to will to be other than in God." In the light 
of this, prayer is defined as n the mediator or rather the 
effort to connect the misery of Self with the blessedness 
of God. n5 Prayer, then, is aspiration after union with God. 
"To be one with God, the Father," he notes, "an aweful thought 
beyond all utterance of the awe which it inspires; but by no
means wild or mystical. On the contrary, all our experience
g moves in this direction."
!• Aniaa Poetae. p.12?
2. Cottle: op. cit., II, pp.83-84. Letter of 1807.
3. Ibid: II, p.161.




Prayer is not just "wishful 1* thinking. It is 
an act, an act resulting from the union of the will and the
intellect, wlt is the whole man that prays."1 This is echoed
g in his dissent from Kant's rationalist conception of prayer. fc
Coleridge comments on Kant's words, "Gebet ist auch nur ein 
innerlich vor einem Herzenkundiger declarirter Wunsch:"
"I cannot suffer this to pass uncommented especially 
as the same is re-asserted at large in the 'Religion 
innerhalb den (si c) Grenzen der reinen Vernunft.* It 
takes for granted that Prayer is not an act but a 
mere wishing* 01 who ever prayed that has not more 
than a hundred times felt that scarce an act of Life 
was so difficult as to determine to pray? Effective 
resolve to heart-amendment must have commenced before 
true prayer can be uttered: - and why call words of 
Hypocrites and Formalists Prayer."3
And elsewhere he writes: "Likewise his (Kant) remarks on 
prayer in his 'Religion innerhalb der reinen Vernunft,' are 
crass, nay vulgar and as superficial even in psychology as 
they are low in taste."^ Prayer, then, is not "wishful" think­ 
ing or meditation. It does not centre in self, but proceeds 
from self, as an act. Under the stress of his own needs, Coleridge 
dame to see that prayer must involve petition. "What a deathly 
Preteritum Perfectum," he exclaims, "would this Denial of Prayer 
petrify the Universe into!"5 Among the petitions constantly 
recurring in his own prayers are those for forgiveness, and for
1. Note on Book of Common Prayer: Aids, p.350.
2. Cf. Wellek: op.cit., p.94.
3. Kant: Metaphyaiohe Anfangsgriinde der Tugendlehre. p. 105. 
British Museum Copy. Printed Wellek:vop.cit., p.94. 
Cf. Nidecker: Ravue de litterature oomparee, VII, p.339.




Prayer is not simply spiritual auto-suggestion. 
In a note in the Semina Rerum. Coleridge criticizes severely 
Wordsworth and Southey for asserting that the main element in 
prayer is pious feeling*
"Wordsworth 1 s and Sou they f s position, that pious 
prayers addressed to Idols, Saints, Virgin-Mother 
etc, find their way to the right object and are 
well-pleasing to God, is...... a very dangerous error.
Is not the Love of Truth a part of Christian Perfection? 
But this position necessarily tends to a spirit of 
indifference with regard to the false faith of our fellow 
men or our
Prayer, then, involves an attitude of belief. 
It must be grounded in the assurance of the reality of God. 
Further, in virtue of the cognitive aspect of prayer, any 
belief in the efficacy of prayer must involve a belief concern­ 
ing the nature of God. As Galloway says succinctly: nTo say
in a general way that God is means very little, unless we
g know what you mean by the word God. w This question is faced
by Coleridge in a long note of March 6, 1832 in his Semina 
Rerum.
Leaving for the moment the full discussion of this 
question, we may so far anticipate the chapter on Coleridge's 
doctrine of God as to give his conclusion concerning the relation 
of faith to belief. His closing prayer ends, nOf all the truths 
of Faith, the most previous to the afflicted Soul is the Faith
1. MS.C; pp.90-91 Note of July 30, 1826.
Cf. MS.C: p.Ill, where a similar note occurs.
2. Galloway: Philosophy of Religion, p.373.
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that thou art a God that hearest prayer." God, as the object 
of faith, is not demonstrable by the theoretic reason. But 
faith, passing into prayer, affirms not only His existence, 
but declares that in some sense or other, His nature is 
personal, nthat He heareth prayer. n
Moreover, Coleridge's experience demanded a God 
who forgives and redeems. At times, a more specific Christian 
content may be discerned in his notes.^ In a note on Southey's 
Life of Wesley. Christian faith is defined in the familiar 
terms as the identity of the reason and the will, but it is 
"consequent on a divine rekindling."3 In a note penned on 
Kant's: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloszen Vernunft. 
he writes:
"Revelation forbids us as much to affirm a Justice in 
God unmodified by Mercy, as Mercy at variance with 
Justice. The attribute, mercy-justice, consists in 
the acceptance of the Past, according to the Total 
State of the final Present. The total Energy of Will, 
the one act of the whole Being, whidn alike can 
produce this state,is Gospel Faith."4
The most striking passage, however, is to be found in the Aids:
"Stedfast by Faith. This is absolutely necessary for 
resistance to the Evil Principle. There is no stand­ 
ing out without some firm ground to stand on: and this 
Faith alone supplies. By Faith in the Loire of Christ 
the power of God becomes ours. When the soul is 
beleaguered by enemies, weakness on the walls, treachery 
at the gates and corruption in the citadel, then by Faith
1. MS.C: p.166.
2. Cf. Notes on English Divines. I, pp.193-196. Note on the 
Lord's Prayer.
3. Southey: op.oit., II, p.82. Cf. Notes Theological.
Political & Miscellaneous, pp.131,138. 
4* British Museum Copy, pp.95-96 v Printed by Nidecker:
Retue de litterature oomparee. VII, p.142*
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she says - Lamb of God, slain from the foundation 
of the Worid! thou art my strength! I look to 
thee for deliverance! And thus she overcomes 
......Fix thy thought on what Christ did, what
Christ suffered, what Christ is - as if thou 
wouldst fill the hollowness of thy Soul with Christ!
On the whole, however, Coleridge is content 
with defining the nature of faith rather than expanding the 
content of the belief affirmed. His one insistence is that 
God must be a God able to commune with man, able to redeem 
man and fit him for such communion* In short, God must be 
a God "that heareth prayer, n and "that seeketh that which 
was lost." It is the conclusion of a man whose long mental 
and spiritual pilgrimage has taught him that intellectual 




1. The Idea of God*
On the basis of his argument from faith and 
oonsoienoe, Coleridge is prepared to discuss "the existen­ 
tial reality of the Idea of the Supreme Being."1 The 
existence of faith is a fundamental fact in human nature* 
On this ground alone is it possible to consider the notion 
of a divinity which the senses cannot convey nor the world 
afford* As an idea it is indemonstrable by reason* Yet it 
may be possible "by reason itself to demonstrate its indemon-
strability it2
In a note written in Term em ami's Q-esohichte 
der Philosophic, Coleridge asks,
"May not the Indemonstrability of the Existence of 
£ Supreme Being be demonstrated? And is it not 
evident, that in the sentence, Proof of the exis­ 
tence of the Supreme Being, the words, "the
1. HS.B.3, pp.25-61.
Cf« Anima Poetae; p*63. Note from 1^03.— "The whole 
or religion seems to me to rest on and in the ques­ 
tion: The One and The Good—are these words or 
realities?"
Cf» Anima Poetae; p«77» Note from 130*4-. — "I saw that 
Goo. is the one, the Good—possesses it not, but is it*"
2. MS.B.3, P
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Existence of" are superfluous* a pleonasm? Again: I 
can understand what is meant by a Proof, that the 
Supreme Being does or wills this or that; but that 
the Supreme Being is, is a mere tautology.• *»•Again: 
the Idea of ji Supreme Being is a misuse of the term, 
Idea" We may have conceptions of £ Man, perceptions 
ana images of this man; out the Idea of Man. Equally 
improper is the phrase, an Idea of—It is either no 
Idea, or not at all; or Tf is the Idea. 111
The dialectic intellect is able to establish the 
general affirmation of a supreme reality, but it is incapable 
of communicating insight or conviction concerning the Deity and 
his relation to the world. Hence, it confounds the creator 
with the aggregate of his creatures and thus denies the reality 
of all finite existence* 2 This amounts to practical atheism*
On the other hand, the postulates with which all 
speculative disquisition must commence derive their legitimacy 
and sanction from the conscience* Hence,
"from whichever of the two points the Reason may start, 
from the Things that are seen to the One Invisible or 
from the Idea of the Absolute One to the Things that 
are seen, it will find a Chasm, which the Moral Being 
only, which the Spirit and Religion of man alone can 
fill up or over-bridge*"3
A. Criticism of the Theistio "Proofs.*
Turning from this affirmation of spiritual
realism, Coleridge proceeds to discuss the teleological
k argument for the existence of God. He admits the full
weight of the argument. "The self-evidence of the great





Truth that there is a Divine Author of an order so excellent 
seems to us to supersede all detail of proof."1 Judged by 
its practical value, "that we should all have a firm and
lively faith in the existence of God, not that all Men should
P be enabled to give a philosophic demonstration of existence."^
it deserves its superiority over all other methods of convic­ 
tion. In the first place,^ it is free from abstractions. The 
reasoning is conveyed in a series of pictures. The only connec­ 
tion needed is supplied instinctively by the soul* Secondly, 
it is "that proof in which every other must have begun." 
Thirdly, the proof is connected in every part with a "sense of 
the high Wisdom, Providence and adorable Power" of the God 
whose existence it sets out to demonstrate* Thus the soul is 
filled with the highest emotions of humility and wonder— 
feelings "which in their highest degree belong exclusively to 
the Idea of God*"1*"
On the other hand, it is one thing to deny the 
validity of an argument, and another to determine its true 
nature and "thus to prevent it from being passed off for a 
proof of a different kind, for a something which it neither can 




Cf. Otto: The Idea of the Holy, Chapters II, III, where
he discus sea the "numen" ana the "numinous." 
5. MS.B.3: P
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idea of God already present in the mind and assumes that the 
reality of His moral attributes has already been established* 
To learn the proof is really "a process of reminiscence."1
Not to understand this religious assumption in 
the argument leads to the mistaken belief that the idea of God 
and the conviction of its reality were deduced from nature* 
This habitual referring of the divine idea to nature leads to 
an identification of the one with the other. The idea is first 
abstracted from nature and then personified, "by that most 
common of artifices, the sudden transformation of an effect 
into a cause by repeating the same number of facts under the 
form and the terms of agency. "2 This is the road by which 
many speculative minds have travelled from theism to pantheistic 
atheism. God thus is deprived of any religious significance. 
He becomes Fate, not a moral Creator and Governor. Holiness 
and sin lose all meaning*
"If, however, we dare anticipate any result from the 
known Laws of Association, we may predict that the 
habitual connection of the Idea of God with the laws 
of Nature, and for the same purpose that of accounting 
for the Phenomena of Nature, in proportion as it 
estranges the Mind from the personal, will indispose it 
to all those doctrines of Religion, which either present 
the Deity to our Minds in the form of personality, as 
well as those that rise out of his personal attributes 
and, in fact, to Religion itself, which without a sense 
of the Divine Personality ceases to be Religion and 
becomes (a) mere hypothesis, which, if it were more 
legitimate and philosophical, might enlarge the Intellect 
and gratify the curiosity, but could inspire neither 
fear, nor hope, nor love. "3
1. MS.B.3:
2. Ibid:
3* Ibid: pp. 56-57.
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On the other hand, in the like spirit as St. Paul,
"all the sounder Schoolmen and the first Fathers of 
the Reformation with one consent place the origin of 
the Idea in the Reason, the ground of its Reality in 
the Conscience and the confirmation, reproduction and 
progressive development (of it) in the order and 
harmony of the visible World: as far. I mean, as they 
speak abstractedly from Revelation* 1* 1
Again, the mind, absorbed in the strict contem­ 
plation of law in nature, finds it difficult to grasp the 
principle of a personal will--»»that very principle, of which 
Nature knows not, which the light of the Sun can never reveal, 
which we must either despair of finding or must seek and find 
within ourselves*"* Hence, it is understandable how a mind so 
educated should recoil from or despise as folly the organized 
creed of a religion "the very postulate and precondition of 
which is an admission of a Will."3 in short, "to deduce a 
Deity wholly from Nature is in the result to substitute an
h
Apotheosis of Nature for Deity.»»^
Coleridge's general thesis of the indemonstra- 
bility of the existence of God, is elaborated further in the 
second of the long chapters of the Huntingdon manuscript* 
If it be possible, he argues, to demonstrate the existence 
of God by deduction from the notices of the senses or by the
1. MS.B.3** p»5#» Printed Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher 
p*109, (quoted freely).
2. Ibid: p.62. 
2* Ibid: p.6l* 
4. ibid: p.6l.
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ordinary processes of logical reasoning, then there must be 
a corresponding science. 1 And if such a science exists, 
then it must be true that "without pre-supposing the idea of 
God," the existence of God can be determined by the senses, 
i.e. f intuitively, or by deduction by the understanding. 2 
The understanding, however, does not give knowledge materially** 
"It is by placing knowledge under some given series of concep­ 
tion, as their common support" that we are said to understand 
this or that. These conceptions are the postulates of each 
particular science. Again, all the sciences assume "a some­ 
thing common to them all, by virtue of which they are all
h
alike science substantively."^ However we separate by means 
of reflection, abstraction or generalization the objects of 
the sciences from each other (e.g., physics from zoology) yet 
we assume that all "co~inhere" in one common ground. Similarly, 
with our reasoning, "that, without which we cannot reason, 
must be presumed as the ground of the reasoning."5 This basis, 
common to all science, cannot however be itself the subject of 
any particular science. There can be therefore no such science 
as suggested.
"I look round, and try in vain to discover a vacant 
place for a science, the result of which is to be 
the knowledge and ascertainment of God, i.e. of the 







conditions being such as were stated when the 
question was first proposed by us, namely, in 
the absence or rejection of the idea as the 
datum. The doubt respecting the possibility of 
such a science was expressed so far conditionally, 
i.e. unless the idea was taken as the datum, and 
the result anticipated and precontained in the 
premise."1
In the very nature of the case f no proper 
scientific proof or logical demonstration of the existence 
of God is possible. In other words, "the idea of the Godhead 
is the true source and indispensable precondition of all our 
knowledge of God."2 Consequently, all that is valuable in 
the so-called proofs consists in expositions of this idea, or 
"the different means, by which the understanding is enabled to 
exemplify this idea in all its experiences. "3
Coleridge seizes the opportunity of illustrat­ 
ing his thesis by a critical review of certain of the so-called 
theistio proofs. The first is the "proof" from intuition,^" 
based on the view that we know God by the sense, "in the same 
way as we behold mathematical figures, e.g. the Point, Line, 
Triangle, Circle, &c. of pure Geometry." Coleridge rejects 
this view on the ground that mathematical forms are entitled 
objects of the sense "only because they may be confidently 
anticipated in all men at all times." They have their sole 
subsistence in the mind or sentient faculty. The so-called 
proof, therefore, starts from a contradiction, for, on asking






for the real ground of all reality, which includes "the 
reality of the mind and the reality out of the mind", we are 
offered a portion or derivative of the one as the ground of 
both* As Kuirhead has pointed out, 1 there may be some doubt 
on the realist side as to Coleridge's characterization of 
mathematical forms as purely mental. On the other hand, there 
is no doubt that his fundamental criticism goes to the root of 
all schemes that would claim absolute existence and validity 
for ideas basically derived from the "sentient faculty." Such 
theories leave out one-half the facts at the very outset. 2
The second theory to which Coleridge turns his 
attention is that God is everywhere revealed to sense: n Jupiter 
est quodounque vides."3 This theory is of some historical 
importance, forming as it does the basis of Brahminism. Quoting 
from the Bhagavad Gita, a book that "walks like a ghost of a 
departed world," Coleridge finds little in it to sustain his 
early homage* He finds in the Sanskrit philosophical and 
religious writings a character best accounted for on the 
supposition of "childish intellects living among gigantic 
objects, of mean thoughts and huge things—-living Lilliputs 
among inanimate Brobdignags."^ There is nothing "Miltonio" in
1. Mairhead: Coleridge as Philosopher; p.221*-*
2* Coleridge classiries the scheme as a "mere possibility", and 
not a theory that had been actually adopted anywhere. 
Mairhead points out (op* oit* p.224) that certain of 
Coleridge's English predecessors, notably John fforrls, 
had constantly appealed to such illustrations drawn from 
mathematics as samples of the ideas, not merely in the 
mind of God, but of the mind of God* This is of interest, 
indicating the point at which, under Kantian influence, he 




them. Milton never passes off bigness for greatness. 1 
Theologically, the system of Brahminism is essentially 
"Atheism in the form of Polytheism."2 Judged by its ethics, 
and talcing "the ethical consequences as the criterion of the 
Theology," the system fails at two points. In the first place, 
the ethics are equivocal at the best and "worthy only of a 
Mexican priesthood." In the second place, the ethics, good or 
bad, have "no imaginable connexion." Life is only hinted at, 
while of love, "without which as the source, life itself has 
no religious bearing, nor any intelligible genesis," there is 
no word. This criticism is of some importance historically. 
It goes to the root of the matter, and therefore remains valid.^
Finally, there is the theory founded on inference
h
from sensory data; that is to say, the argument from design. 
Again acknowledging its impressiveness, Coleridge criticizes 
the argument on the grounds already familiar. The phenomena 




3. Coleridge's interest in Hinduism has historical significance 
He acknowledges a debt of homage on his presentation to 
"these foreign potentates" of Brahminism and is able 
therefore to enter sympathetically into the state of 
mind of those of his contemporaries—he names, "the 
late truly admirable Sir W. Jones" and Mr. Wilkins— 
who had come under their spell.
**-. MS.H: pp.2^1-293.
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Summing up, Coleridge reaffirms the impossibi­ 
lity of deriving the idea of God from any foreign source. 1 
God can neither be discovered by the senses, nor by the under­ 
standing working on sensory data, neither from the facts of 
the forms and functions of the understanding, nor by the judg­ 
ments formed in consequence of the congruity of the phenomena 
of the senses with its own forms. The "proofs" have value only 
when it is understood that the idea is already existent in the 
human mind* This being understood, "the proof is by me admitted 
to be no less conclusive on the intellect than it is persuasive 
for the affections." What remains is to expose the "insufficiency 
and confusion in the reasoning" of those who hold the possibi­ 
lity, in Locke's language, "of conveying it (the idea of God) 
into the mind." The idea can only be awakened "so that the 
knowledge resulting.•..can be fairly said to have been given." 
What is needed to awaken the idea is the appropriate stimulus. 
As the manuscript ends abruptly at this point, where some posi­ 
tive exposition is to be expected, we are forced to rely on 
kindred passages elsewhere* 
B. The Idea of God not proved, but "given."
From what we know of his fundamental religious 
realism, we may take it that the appropriate stimulus necess­ 
ary to awaken the idea has its origin in the divine, the resul­ 
tant experience being the experience of religion, the response 
of a person to the personal God. This, in fact, is what
1. MS.H: pp.293-301.
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emerges from a review of the argument* God's existence 
oannot be proved by logical argument* As an idea, it is not 
subject to the ordinary rules of logic. It is "given." This 
is made explicitly clear in a note in Term emarm's Qesohiohte 
der Philosophic, where Coleridge gives what he supposes would 
be the reply of Anselm or Plotinus to Kant's criticism of the 
ontologioal proof.
"Friendl" he writes, addressing Kant, "Your whole 
argument is a petitio prinoipii on your side, 
involving an equally arbitrary negatio prinoipii 
against me. You assume the falsehood or my 
principle and from this assumption you conclude 
its* falsehood. I begin by asserting that there 
are Thoughts that are not simply and distinctly 
Subjective, Thoughts (if so you will call them) 
that are not of the same class with the Conceptions 
of the Understanding, the reality or objective 
validity of which is derived from the Senses. To 
distinguish the one from the other, I name the 
former, Ideas. This distinction therefore you 
should have attacked, and not against my sense— 
& identifying Ideas with Conceptions, deduce against 
me what relatively to Conceptions I am ready to admit 
and see as clearly as yourseir."
This note is also of interest as revealing
Coleridge*s Platonic attitude to the Anselmic argument. The 
existence of God comes under the heading of ideas. It is 
given by reason, "the presence of the Deity to a Soul."2 
It is revealed only in the experience of communion with the 
Supreme Reason, the source of ideas. It cannot therefore be
deduced.
"Did you deduce your own being?" he asks. "Even that 
is less absurd than the conceit of deducing the Divine 
being? Never would you have had the notion, had you
1. British Museum COpy, Vol.3, 1st half: Note at end.
2. Ibid.
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not had the idea—rather, had not the idea worked 
in you like the memory of a name which we cannot 
recollect and yet feel that we have and which reveals 
its existence in the mind only by a restless antici­ 
pation and proves its a priori actuality by the almost 
explosive instantaneity with which it is welcomed and 
recognized in its re-emersion out of the cloud, or its 
re-ascent from the horizon of consciousness."1
Hence his acute criticism of the teleological argument:-
"Assume, 1* he states, "the existence of God,—and then 
the harmony and fitness of the physical creation may 
be shown to correspond with and support such an 
assumption?—but to set about proving the existence 
of a God by such means is a mere circle, a delusion. 
It can be no proof to a good reasoner, unless he 
violates all syllogistic logic, and presumes his 
conclusion. 112
Coleridge's rejection of the argument from
design on the grounds that it assumes the idea of God, and then 
reads this into the phenomena, instead of deriving it from them, 
is essentially sound3 It strikes deeper than any criticism, 
in the tradition of Hume and Kant, which points to the failure 
of the argument to prove more than the existence of an architect 
of the world limited by his materials.
Coleridge, finally, is eager to point out that 
the exposure of the flaws in an argument is not the same thing 
as the rejection of the argument in toto. If the religious 
a priori be clearly recognized, he is prepared to accept the 
"proofs" for what they are--"a process of reminiscence"--and
1. Anima Poetae: p.300. Cf. Table Talk: p.2?1!-. — Jan.20,
—HHow did t'he Atheist get his idea of that God whom he 
denies?" t . .
2. Table Talk; p.27^- — Feb.22, 1*34.
3. cr. Aids: p.!21«
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for their confirmatory value. His respect for the teleological 
argument on this basis is openly acknowledged. His adherence 
to the moral argument, as seen earlier, is clearly on the same 
grounds. In a note on Nikolai*s Philosophic, he writes,
"But tho» Kant Justly denies a positive demonstrative 
force to the Arguments a posteriori, for the existence 
of a God, does he not admit tnat they are inducements 
of such strength that a man would deserve to be deemed 
mad, who rejected them?"*
Again he says, in the Aids,
"For every mind not devoid of all reason, and des­ 
perately conscience-proof, the Truth which it is the 
least possible to prove, it is little less than im­ 
possible not to believel*2
This, then, is the end of the matter.3 His criticism of the 
theistio proofs is essentially the same as that of Professor 
James years later:- "the attempt to demonstrate by purely 
intellectual processes the truth of the deliverances of direct 
religious experience is absolutely hopeless."^ 
II. The Origin of the Idea of God in the Mind of Man.
The foregoing discussion leads logically to the 
consideration of the experience which awakens the idea of God 
in the soul of man. Coleridge recognized this, as the sequence 
of chapters in the manuscript Opus clearly indicates—"Faith
1. p.20. Ottery St. Mary Marginalia, I, 39.
2. Aide; p.121.
3. vide Wellek: op.cit., pp,#g-9^, for a discussion of
Coleridge's relation to Kant with regard to the theistic 
proofs.
^* James: Varieties of Religious Experience; p.^35. Vide 
App endix C.
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and Conscience", "The Existential Reality of the Idea of the 
Supreme Being", and now, "On the Origin of the Idea of God in 
the Mind of Man." In the one the basis is laid for his 
religious epistemology. Conscience, he states, is the ground 
of consciousness, and religion of morality. In the next 
the speculative way to aod is shown to be wanting. The exis­ 
tence of God is indemonstrable by speculative reason. The 
theistic proofs are valid only for the religious man—for the 
man who already has the idea of God in his mind. How then 
oometh religion? How oometh the idea of God to the soul of man?
The question here is one of the psychological 
process rather than of the ultimate origin. Writing as a 
psychologist Coleridge finds the roots of religion in instinct. 
He does not mean by this that there is a special religious 
instinct* Uor does he mean instinct in the sense of merely 
animal instinct. Man carries these animal instincts within 
his nature, but he has something in addition. This something, 
which is reason, is the hallmark of his humanity. "All begins 
in instinct, but do all therefore begin alike? Oh, no! each 
hath its own and the instincts of Man must be human, rational 
instincts, Reason itself mutely prophesying of its own future 
advent."2 All nature's instincts are prophetic. "Through all 






The instinct of humanity that prophesies of
religion is not, however, the animal one of self-preservation 
or the impulse to happiness. 1 It is rather that in man there 
is an impulse to respond to something beyond himself. "Beyond 
the beasts, yea, and above the Nature of which they are the
inmates, Man possesses love and faith and the sense of the
p permanent." And this is because his understanding is a human
understanding. It differs not only in degree, but in kind, from 
that of animals. It differs
"not solely nor chiefly from its greater extent than 
which the dog, the elephant, and the ant possess, but 
because it is irradiated by a higher power, the power 
namely of seeking what it can nowhere behold and 
finding that which itself has first transfused the 
permanent, that which in the endless flux of sensible 
things can alone be known, which is, indeed, in all. 
but exists for the Reason alone, for it is Reason."3
This "love and faith and sense of the permanent" 
is first evinced in the child's trust in its parents.
"The first Dawnings of its humanity will break forth 
in the Eye that connects the Mother*s face with the 
warmth of the mother's bosom, the support of the 
mother's Arms. A thousand tender kisses excite a 
finer life in its lips; and there, first, language is 
imitated from the mother's smiles. Ere yet a conscious 
self exists, the love begins and the first love is love 
to another. The Babe acknowledges a self in the 
Mother's form years before it can recognize a self in its 
own. Faith implicit, faith the offspring of unre­ 
flecting love, is the antecedent, and indispensable 
condition of all its knowledge."^
MS.B.3: P«67« Cf« Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, 
p.252, where he points out that current psychology 





"Why," he asks in conclusion, "have men a Faith in God? There 
is but one answer, the Man and the Man alone has a Father and 
a Mother." 1
On the other hand, ""by a mystery of the human 
soul," there is the possibility that the place of the truly 
permanent may be usurped by "the objects of the senses." 2 
Man's humanity then becomes subordinated to his animal nature. 
By giving eyes to blind appetite, selfishness is transformed 
into self-love and degradation is enriched by consciousness, 
intuition and choice. The higher part of man's nature becomes 
his avenging demon. "He must become the victim of those powers 
beyond self which he has alieniated and estranged from their 
rightful objects."3 if the senses be thus directed to "objects 
incapable of being sympathized with,"*" the self borrows from 
the objects a sort of unnatural outwardness and "becomes, as 
it were, a thing;" while by reaction the things are invested 
with the attributes of life and power.5 Hence, religion is 
degraded into ceremony and then by reaction the ceremonies 
are animated into magic. But such a process, the "necessary 
consequence of the first false step in the formation of the 
human character," has no warrant in nature.
"As sure as ever the heart of man is made tender by 
the presence of a love that has no self, by a joy in







the protection of the helpless, which is at once 
impulse, motive and reward, so surely is it ele­ 
vated to the Universal Parent."1
In short, the dawn of humannes s in the child is the birth of 
religion. It is also the birth of thought.
wThe first introduction to thought takes place in 
the transfer of person from the senses to the 
invisible. The reverence of the Invisible, sub­ 
stantiated by the feeling of love, this, which is 
the essence and proper definition of religion, is 
the commencement of the intellectual life, of the 
humanity.«£
All this has the merit of seizing the essen­ 
tial point. Dr. Muirhead interprets Coleridge as holding 
that religion has its beginning in "that which carries the 
soul beyond itself and connects it, through the affect ions,^ 
with a larger world." This would make religion an affair of 
the emotions—something which Coleridge himself rejects. 
Rather is it not that religion has its roots in an initial 
act of trust, in which the whole personality is involved? 
This surely is Coleridge 1 s meaning.
In adopting this view, Coleridge took a
position far in advance of the psychology of his own day. 
There can be no question of influence, but in the light of 
the recent studies by Piaget in this field of the child's 
ideas of the external world, Coleridge*s view takes on 
added historical significance. Measured against the
^ ^, — j^^^^» <^«» <»^^«»^»^^»»«»^^«»^^^»^^««»^^
1. MS.B.3: P-7#- Cf. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.253.
2. Ibid: p.79- ., ,
3. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, pp.253-254. (Italics
mine.)
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voluminous literature of modern times, Coleridge's treatment 
may appear meagre enough. Compared, however, with the vary­ 
ing theories which this literature reveals—from the psycho­ 
analytic theories of Freud and Jung and Leuba to the 
sociological theories of Durkheim—Coleridge's view merits 
our attention as being both psychologically and religiously 
sound.
III. God and Personality.
Underneath all of Coleridge's later writings 
lies the assumption that God, in some sense, is personal. 1 
God must be more than a first cause, even if, as in his own 
metaphysical theory, this first cause be defined as will*
"This is a constituent of Religion"—to repeat a passage 
already given—"but something is still wanting. To be 
Religion, it must be the Reference of an intelligent, 
responsible Will Finite to an Absolute Will! and the 
Rererant must refer as a Will, ana a Life, i.e. a Person, 
to a living I AM. We may reel from, and about a thing, 
an event, a quality--we can feeTTo"r whatever is 
sentient—but we feel toward a Person only. The 
Personal in me is the ground and condition of Religion: 
and the Personal alone is the Object."2
Only on the basis of belief in God as personal has religion any 
meaning*
1. Cf» the letter of December 5, 1#03, in which Coleridge speaks 
of the "article of my faith...which is the nearest to my 
heart,—the pure fountain of all my moral and religious 
feelings and comforts,--I mean the absolute Impersonality 
of the Deity." - Letters, I, p.Wf.
By 1^05, this thought has undergone change:-
Cf. a note of 1#05 - Anima Poetae, p.133* "the best, the truly 
lovely in each and all, is Goa. Therefore the truly beloved 
is the symbol of God to whomever it is truly beloved by."
Cf9 Ahima Poetae, pTSffK "God is Love—that is, an object 
that is absolutely subject."
2. MS.C; pp.125-126.
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But Coleridge was never content to rest simply 
in an affirmation. He realized that the problem of persona­ 
lity in God is one of cardinal importance; and he recognized 
that the ascription of personality to the Supreme Will raises 
certain difficulties* It is not surprising, therefore, to 
find in the manuscript Opus Maximum two chapters in which 
personality, in "both its human and divine aspects, is sub­ 
mitted to examination. The chapters in question are entitled 
"Personality"1 and "Ideas flowing out of the Divine Personeity." 2
Examining the concept of personality, Coleridge 
finds that it is not the same as individuality.3 nor is it 
possible to predicate personality of animals or plants. Two 
attributes are necessary to the predication of personality- 
reason and a responsible will,^ Of these two, reason is 
incompatible with peculiar possession. "It cannot in strict 
language be called a faculty, much less a personal property 
of any human mind."^ A responsible will, therefore, is the 
essential ground and indispensable condition of personality. 
The conclusion is that personality "is contained exclusively
1. MS.B.3: pp.16^-190.
2. Ibid: pp.191-233*
Cf. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.222, where he 
coins the title "Personal and impersonal Reason" and 
ascribes it to Coleridge. This title does not occur 
in the manuscript.
. MS.B*3» P~7~ --ff
. Ibid: pp.165-166.
. Ibid: p.167.
. Ibid: p.15$. Cf. Aids, p.190
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in the idea of a finite will, which cannot indeed be conceived 
otherwise than in some relation to a co-present reason, but yet 
capable of being conceived in a relation of difference and 
contrariety to it."1
The difficulty of applying such a definition to 
the idea of God derives from the fact that in man the will is 
subject to limitation, or deficiency, defect or adulteration.
"Were it otherwise, the wiser a man became, the greater 
his power of self-determination, with so much less 
propriety could he be spoken of as a person; and vice 
versa the more exclusive the limits and the smaller 
the sphere enclosed, in short, the less Will he possessed, 
the more a person, till at length his personality would 
be at its maximum when he bordered on the mere animal 
or the idiot, i.e. when, according to all use of 
language, he ceased to be a person at all."2
The essence of personality, therefore, cannot be limitation, 
which has reference only to the reason** On the contrary, with 
the increase of limitation, the personality decreases. Theoret­ 
ically this would mean the possibility of the evanescence of the
personality. But in reality, "it is not permitted to a respon-
k 
sible Will utterly to vanish." A man may "precipitate" himself
into a fiend, but he cannot be on a level with the beasts.
"It follows therefore, " Coleridge concludes, that the 
essence of Personality is to be found in none of those 
qualities, negations or privations by which the finite 
is diverse from the absolute, the human Will from the 
divine, man from God:- nay, as we have found these 
diversities proportionally subtracting from personal 
perfection, it inevitably follows that by the subtrac­ 
tion of these diversities, the personality must become 
more perfect."5
i vs B "5: - —
2* Ibid: pp'173-17^' Printed Kuirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher,





In the light of this analysis of personality 
from the side of limitation, it is easy for Coleridge to 
take the next step. The perfection of personality is in God. 
"GOd therefore must be at once the absolute person and the 
ground of all personality."1 To hesitate to call God a 
person is like hesitating, when thinking of the root as 
antecedent to the stem and branches, to name it the root, 
because the name
"might convey a false conception of its being such 
in exclusion and privation of the other parts, and 
should thus cast back the eclipsing shadow of the 
indigent particulars on the all-sufficient, self- 
sufficing basis of their common being and the 
originating cause of their particular existence."^
On the other hand, Coleridge is quite aware 
that there must be some difference between personality as 
predicated of man and as predicated of God. He, therefore, 
suggests the term personeity to indicate what is at once 
personal and more than personal in God.-' Reserving the term
MS.B.3: pp«l$9-190« The manuscript reads personeity here* 
It appears to be a mistake in view of what is saia else­ 
where of the relationship between personality and 
personeity.
Ibid: p.190. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.223. 
Quotes freely from the MS. which reads, "ir we hesitated 
in calling him a Person, when we are with cautious rever­ 
ence speaking of Absolute Deity, it can be only on the 
ground of his transcendency and inclusive nature* If, 
to take an imperfect and rude metaphor (but what other 
on a subject so unique is possible?) we were thinking 
of the root antecedent to the shooting forth of the stem 
and branches, and hesitated to name it the root inasmuch 




personality for man, Coleridge holds that personeity differs 
from personality as being free from imperfection. 1 Further, 
as the Absolute Will is the ground of the finite will, so 
personeity is the ground and source of personality. ̂  On 
this basis Coleridge feels Justified in maintaining that 
personeity is an essential constituent in the idea of God, 3 
If, then, the idea of the Absolute as will be Coleridge »s 
first idea, his second is that this will is personal. 
"The Will therefore as being, and because a Will, therefore, 
a personal being having the causa sui or ground and principle
of its being in its own inexhaustible causative might:- this
k is our second idea."
Again, Coleridge's conception of finite
personality demands a reciprocity between the self and an 
other-than-self •* The will as the principle of personality 
is manifested only in expression. Further, the only rational 
objects of a will M in reference to itself as a will" are 
persons. The I, in short, needs a thou in order to develop.' 
This development comes through sympathy and understanding. 
The conception of personality as an exclusive centre of
M» M _ Mfl» M M»M^«w»A^wwa»w^Mv.MW*»«MM»«*«»MM<
1. MS.B.3: p. 190.
2. Ibid: ppol60, 243. Cf. Notes Theol., Pol., & Mise» p. 3.
. Ibid: p. 190.
. Ibid: pp.
. Vide Faith and Conscience, Chapter V.
. MS.B.3: p.ltfO.
7. Vide Faith and Conscience, Chapter V.
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self-feeling is thus precluded. Personality is an ideal 
to be realized in ever fuller degree by progressive spirits.
Difficulties, however, are at once apparent 
when the attempt is made to apply this conception to the 
Deity. Coleridge faces the difficulty squarely. He holds 
that if his analysis of personality be correct, then 
"alterity" or "otherness" cannot be a mere abstraction. 2
"The alterity must have some distinctive from the 
original absolute identity or how could it be con­ 
templated as other, and yet this distinctive must 
be such as not to contradict the other co-essential 
term* It must remain in some sense the Self, 
though another Self."3
Applied to the Deity, this means that the infinite fulness 
is poured into an infinite capacity, that is to say, into
a self "wholly and adequately repeated," so that the "very
k 
repetition contains the distinction from the primary act."
This other self is self-subsistent, but not self-originated. 
Only God is self-originated* The other self is therefore 
not "the same" as God. 5
Again, if it be said that God is love—a 
wider statement than merely that God is—then there must be
1. Muirhead remarks that this view of personality is "the 
first clear statement in English philosophy of this 
point of view, and has the advantage of carrying us 
beyond the ambiguities that still infect voluntaristic 
schemes in our own time."—Coleridge as Philosopher^.229*
2. MS.B.3: p.2^5.
3. Ibid: p.246. Cf« Muirhead: op. cit. p.229, where he wrongly 
gives "altereity" as Coleridge's word for "otherness." 





some adequate object of the divine love. "How can there 
be love without communication? And how can there be a 
communication without pre-supposing some other with (-rrp os -r-oV 
the communicant?" As there can be no love without life, 
no communication without act, so the divine act must be 
causative—either generative, productive or creative. "Next 
therefore to the eternal act..».is the co-eternal act of 
alterity or the begetting of the identity in the alterity."2 
This is not the same as production of thing from thing. It 
has meaning only as we remember that it is "truths of mind," 
"acts of spirit,« and "unities transcendent and indivisible" 
of which we are discoursing* The only terms, "however 
inadequate," which convey meaning are such terms as "utterance 
of the Word," "the Word." But this Word or Logos "in and to 
whom the mind passeth forth or is uttered" is personal* The 
Word is spoken of therefore as "the only begotten Son of God."
"Thus," Coleridge concludes, "the filial Word is the 
intelligible et mens altera, the Father the mens 
absoiutaV but then in relation to the idea or Himself 
the intellective Word,—he is both the mens absoluta 
et intelligibile reoiprooum; as the Father icnowetn 
the son even so tne Son knoweth the Father. "3
From this argument for the self-created alterity 
in the Deity, Coleridge advances to the discussion of the 
Trinity, in keeping with his avowed purpose of showing "the 
possibility and ideal truth of the dogmas common to the churches
1. MS.B.3: P*252.
2. Ibid: pp.262-253.
Ibid: p.254. N.B. Coleridge cites Philojudaeus in this 
discussion of the Logos.
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of Christendom." His treatment of the problem of person­ 
ality, however, first merits some comment.
It will be recognized at once that Coleridge's 
treatment of the problem is strikingly modern in tone. It 
is of particular historical significance in that it anticipates
omuch that is best in modern theism. Analyzing personality 
from the point of view of limitation, it is seen that God is 
the perfect person, in whom no limitations exist. But judged 
by human standards of personality, God is different. In Him 
there is personeity, or—as modern writers suggest—God is 
supra-personal. Coleridge even writes of personality or 
personeity in God--anticipating Webb's suggestion that it is 
better to speak of personality in God rather than the person­ 
ality of God.
Finally, there is the recognition that, if the 
development of personality in man necessitates an other-than- 
self, in God this cannot be. He creates the necessary conditions 
within Himself. God is not confronted with an independent 
not-self. He is not self-centred. He is self-manifesting, 
by and through His Word. Coleridge therefore feels that the 
claim of the religious soul that its God is personal—self- 
manifesting and able to maintain relations with men—is 
Justified on metaphysical grounds.
1. MS.B.3: P.255'2. Cf. C.C.J. Webb: God & Personality, and
Galloway: Religion ana Modern Thought.
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IV. The Doctrine of the Trinity.
To a mind like that of Coleridge the subject 
of the Trinity was one of peculiar interest. He was well 
aware of the danger to Christian life involved in exclusive 
pre-occupation with metaphysical questions.
ft l am persuaded," he writes, "that the vehement, 
widely spread and long continued Arian Controversy 
had the effect among other injurious effects, of 
fixing the mind and heart of the Church too ex­ 
clusively on the Metaphysical Prolegomena of the 
Christian Religion, even to the obscuration of the 
Son of Man in the co-eternal Son of God. Even as 
the exclusive contemplation of God as the Ground of 
the Universe and of his physical attribute's^ 
omnipotence, omnipresence &c, seducing the imagin­ 
ation into (conscious or unconscious) Spinozism, 
indisposes men for the Personal Deity, the Doctrine 
of the Trinity and the Incarnation....so did the 
too constant and partial occupation of the Thoughts 
with the Trinity, and the eternal Divinity of the 
Word eclipse.....the mild Orb of our Lord's Humanity 
that rose with healing in its' rays."1
But in spite of this caveat, his mind was too 
deeply immersed in the "metaphysical prolegomena" of each and 
every subject of human interest for Coleridge to pass lightly 
over the problems of Trinitarian theology. 2 Even during his 
Unitarian days the subject was one of speculative interest. 
Under the influence of neo-Platonism he was able to regard
1. MS.C:
2. Vide his notes on Sherlock's Vindication of the Doctrine 
of the Holy and Ever Blessed Trinity, etc.(Notes on 
Ihglish Mvines, II, pp*3M-17g.J ——————
Vide his notes on Waterland's Vindication of Christ's
Divinity, etc. (Notes on English Divines, II, pp.l/g-gll.)
Vi'de his notes on Oxiee's The Christian Doctrines of the 
Trinity and Incarnation, etc* (Notes on English Divines,II, pp .abb-afrO———— ——————————————
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the Trinity as w a fair scholastic inference from the being 
of God as a creative intelligence. n^ Constant notes bear 
witness to his continued interest in neo-Platonism especially 
from the standpoint of the doctrine of the Trinity. This 
has led to some misapprehension regarding his relation to 
neo-Platonism. It is therefore of interest to find in the 
Huntingdon manuscript a long passage in which Coleridge 
institutes a direct comparison between his own scheme and 
the neo-Platonio one, submitting the latter at the same time, 
to an acute criticism. 2
At the outset he points out that it is necess­ 
ary to distinguish between the neo-Platonic scheme and the 
work of Plato, It was no part of Plato's aim in his public 
works to develop his philosophy along this line, and what 
is known from the Dialogues is incompatible with the doctrine 
of emanation or expansion.3 The neo-Platonic scheme of the 
Absolute proceeding as The Good, Mind and Soul, each identical 
in essence with the other, was developed in opposition to the 
warning given by Speusippus, "the most faithful organ of
original Platonism." The true order, according to Speusippus,
k was The One, Reason and the Good.^
But aside from this difference, the neo-Platonists, 
and even Speusippus, failed to give a positive character to the
1. Biographia Literaria: p.97»




first principle* To describe the Absolute as that which neither 
jao_ts, nor does, nor thinks, nor even is, is to describe nothing. 
But nothing implies something. Negation implies a positive 
idea. Here is one weakness in the neo-Platonic scheme. The 
Good ceases to have real meaning and becomes "a mere reverential 
epithet" independent of being, intelligence and action, whereas 
goodness "assuredly" implies "a given direction of a power" or 
"the directing act itself" and in all cases "the accomplishment 
of any act or process morally considered."2
Again, the Plotinian scheme does not render
intelligible the relation of Mind to The Good, inasmuch as "we 
are forbidden to conceive of the antecedent as efficient."* 
Nor is this the only evil. The graver defect is that Mind is
held inferior to The Good. But "assuredly an infinite power
k 
must have an infinite effect." All this applies in a still
more obvious manner in the case of the third principle, Soul.-^ 
In both cases, it implies "comparative debility, obscurity and 
progressive deterioration," and "gradual exhaustion." But this 
idea of a "fragmentary Deity, a diluted Godhead" is wholly in­ 
compatible with the true meaning of the word God»°
Finally, and most serious, are the moral conse­ 
quences of this system, and all systems, "in which the being and
1 9 Cf. Table Talk; p.271^ "How did the Atheist get his idea of 
that God whom he denies?"
2. MS. Hi pp-l63-175»





nature of God and the World are explained on the hypothesis of 
emanation." For in this scheme good and evil are distinguished 
by no positive difference, "but by a mere difference in degree." 
Further, either the idea of guilt is denied, and "with it there­ 
fore responsibility, and all the religion of the world" or "by 
a strange absurdity" crime and evil increase as guilt diminishes 
due to the degradation of reason. There is no explanation of 
the fact that it is to the noblest and most intellectual creature 
alone that we attribute guilt or the possibility of guilt. 1
Coleridge therefore concludes that the neo-Platonic
O
doctrine bears only a verbal resemblance to the Christian doctrine. 
There is no gainsaying his conclusion* Moreover, it answers com­ 
pletely the charge of "neo-Platonising philosophical Trinitarian-
•z h
ism" levelled by Rigg,-' and concurred in by Benn. Hort's judgment 
that the charge was "absolutely false" is vindicated.^
In the light of his criticism of the Plotinian 
doctrine, Coleridge's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity 
takes on added interest, Muirhead finds in this theological
extension "of his metaphysics" a revival of what is most mediaeval,
6 
and perhaps repulsive, in English Platonism," and feels that "his
apologetic interests at this point vitiate Coleridge's results."^
1. MS.H: pp.191-195
2. Ibid: p.!95«
3. Rigg: Modern Anglican Theology, Chap* II.
4. Benn: The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth 	Century, I, p.m.————— ——————————————————
5. Cambridge assays; p»332«
6. Coleridge as J^hflosopher: p*115«
7. Ibid: plllb'.
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Muirhead has in mind speculative results as may be gathered 
from his words regarding "the power of speculative truth to 
break through the swaddling-bands of theological dogma."1 
Here, as elsewhere, Muirhead fails to treat with sympathy Cole­ 
ridge's adherence to the Christian Faith - an adherence which, 
equally with his love of speculative truth, was the absorbing 
interest of his mind.
In the Opus Maximum, Coleridge proceeds from 
his analysis of personality to a discussion of the Trinity. 
We have seen how, in this analysis, an element of alterity 
is necessitated for the development of the personality. In
the case of the Divine, this is recognized in the doctrine of
p 
the Logos. Continuing the argument from this point, Coleridge
allows that his subject-object analysis does not in itself 
suggest any third element such as the Spirit. But, he argues, 
if within the Godhead the presence of a "co-eternal being 
and intelligence" be admitted, then
"it is not possible consistently with such admission 
to advance any argument against the rationality of 
the latter nor can any reason be assigned why, seeing
1. Coleridge as Philosopher: p.ll6.
2. It is difficult to see why Muirhead should in one case
commend Coleridge*s attempt to find a place for alterity 
in the infinite (Coleridge as Philosopher: pp.229-230) 
and on the other hand should censure him for being 
w involved in the f metaphysical prolegomena 1 and Laocoon- 
like coils of Trinitarian theology" (ibid: p.2^3). It can 
only be explained on the basis of Muirhead»s aversion to 
Christian doctrine.
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that a procession is possible, and that the circle 
is not yet closed, we should not proceed till we are 
led to the point from which we commenced, and in the 
full sense of a plenitude and sufficiency that pre­ 
cludes all conception of any additional process, 
find the justification of relinquishing all further 
attempt."1
The infinite product of the infinite causality— 
the alterity—must be real. It is GrOd»s co-eternal and 
adequate Idea of Himself. It is therefore substantial as
o
and consubstantial with God. But because the term Idea 
"does not in itself involve relation" it is a "less fit 
exponent" of the truth it is meant to convey than either Son 
or Word«5 jn fact, the "least inappropriate term and 
conception" of the divine act is that of begetting; the "most 
expressive relation" is that of Father and Son.^ The Father 
has communicated Himself absolutely. The Son is no shadow. 
He is real and has His own form. The Son "oo-eternally 
becomes." This becoming does not mean succession, however*-*
The act of the Divine Will, "in and by which 
the Father attributeth his Self to another," is reciprocal. 
It is not only the act of the Father in "generation and 
contemplation" directed towards the Son, It is simultaneously
1. MS.B.3:
2. Ibid: pp«2o3-264. Cf. Unpublished Letters, I, pp«355~35° 
Letter of October 13, 1806.
3. Ibid: p.261!-. Cf. Unpublished Letters, II,
Letter of October 25, 
^. Ibid: p.259. 
5. Ibid: p.2bb.
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the act of the Son, referring Himself to the Father, directed
towards the Father. This "eternal proceeding" is therefore
/ . 
in nature circular; the TT«f ̂ VP^**** of the Greek Fathers* L
But this "primary, absolute, co-eternal interoirculation" 
of the Deity is an act. It must have a form as an act. The 
form must be real and self-subsistent. 2 Difficulty arises 
from the thought that all possible forms are exhausted in 
the first distinction between God and the Word.3
Seeking some term which imports at once being 
and act, and expresses at the same time that the distinct 
being is the consequent of the act, Coleridge finds in the 
analogy of wind and air the term most suggestive*
"The air distinguishing and, as it were, individual­ 
izing itself from the air by motion, naturally ex­ 
presses, we might say instances, being or substance 
manifesting itself in the form of action, and having 
its particular or individual being consequent on the 
act;—this is the Spirit."^
Similarly the rational acts of the soul, self-subsistent and 
not divided from the soul, are distinguished as the spirit. 
Carried to the highest and eliminating all adulterations,
"we approach to the perfect Idea in the Holy Spirit, 
that which proceedeth from the Father to the Son, 
and that which is returned from the Son to the 
Father, and which in this circulation constitutes 
the eternal unity in the eternal alterity and 
distinction."5
Coleridge concludes with a re-assertion of 
the grounds on which is affirmed the necessity of the
1. MS.B.3: p.263.





co-etemal filiation or alterity. The necessity is "the 
unwithholding and communicative goodness of the Supreme 
Mind."1 He communicates Himself wholly to another. Such 
communication is love. So also is "the re-attribution 
of that Self to the Communicator." "This too is Love, 
filial Love,—Love is the Spirit of God, and God is Love."2 
"Thus we have the Absolute under three distinct ideas, and 
the essential inseparability of these without interference 
with their no less interdistinction is the Divine Idea."3 
The doctrine is derived from the transcendent unity of God 
and cannot therefore be inconsistent with that unity. And 
on the other hand, if the doctrine be denied, the idea of 
God is reduced to a formless and hollow unity.^
1. MS.B.3: p.273.
2. Ibid: p.27^.
3* Ibid: p.279. Cf. Unpublished Letters, I, p.356, where he 
concludes in similar fashion, "neither of these three 
can be conceived apart, nor confusedly—so that the Idea 
"5T~GOd involves that of a Tri-unity."
Cf. his comment on the Nicene and Athanasian formulae:- 
(Notes Theol., Pol*, & Misc., p.*J4.) "In both there are 
three seir-subsistent and. only one self-originated:- 
which is the substance of the idea of the Trinity." 
Cf. Ibid: pp.115-116, where he rejects the Athanasian 
creed on other grounds.
Cf. Notes on English Divines, I, pp.216-217; II, p.l^seq, 
for further comments on Nicene Trinitarism.
^. MS.B.3: pp.279-232.
Cf. Notes on English Divines, I, p.12.- "The Trinity is 
an idea, ana no idea can iDe rendered by a conception.... 
The Trinity is the only form in which an idea of God is 
possible, unless indeed it be a Spinozistic or World-God." 
Cf. Ibid, II, p.179-* "I affirm, that the article of the 
Trinity is religion, is reason, and its universal formula; 
and that there neither is, nor can be, any religion, any 
reason, but what is, or is an expansion of the truth of 
the Trinity."
Vide Appendix D - Additional Material re Coleridge 1 s Doctrine 
of the Trinity.
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This is all, Coleridge holds, that can be 
said from the side of philosophy. The practical necessity 
of the doctrine of the Trinity, which, "and not its truth 
merely", constitutes it an article of faith, can be affirmed 
only on religious grounds. The doctrines of redemption 
and the divinity of the Redeemer are positions "mutually 
supporting and requiring each other."1 To what extent this 
latter interest determined his thought in affirming the 
necessity of an ontological view of the Trinity will be 
seen in the chapter on Christianity and Redemption.
With regard to the argument itself, it is 
admittedly speculative, but the speculation has the merit 
of avoiding the dangers of tri-theism on the one hand, and 
of conceiving God as a solitary unit on the other* God 
is eternally Father and eternally Son, moving within the 
eternal life of Spirit. And as Paterson remarks,
"The divine holiness acquires a new depth and 
sanctity when we conceive of the Godhead also 
as involving a communion of Persons who reverent­ 
ly find, each in each, the plenitude of the Divine 
Being and attributes."2
Moreover, the argument is not subject to the weakness inherent 
in the Hegelian thesis of the world or universe as the "other.
On the other hand, Coleridge does not make 
clear the relation of the Logos to revelation and to the 
person of Jesus Christ. Nor--as will be seen—does a review
1. MS.B.3: PP»232-233.
2. Paterson: The Rule of Faith, p.221* 
ex* gr. Bledermann.
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of the passages in which Coleridge relates redemption to 
G-od make the matter clearer. Coleridge in this instance 
is content to rest in an affirmation. It may be that he 
planned a fuller discussion of this in a later section. 
It is at least certain that all he is concerned with at 
this point is to deal with the question from the side of 
philosophy and to establish a rational basis for the 
doctrine. But judged as it stands, Coleridge's view of 
the Trinity suffers from lack of contact with the Christian 
doctrine which he sets out to establish.
V. The Relation of God to Man.
Closely allied to Coleridge's belief in the 
personality of God stands his belief in the efficacy of 
prayer. The two are, in fact, different aspects of the 
same basic belief. Religion is a personal relation between 
God and man. Prayer is that relation in expression. It is 
faith in action. But prayer involves petition, and this 
demands some "belief" concerning God's relation to the uni­ 
verse. Belief in prayer then must face, on the intellectual 
plane at least, the difficulties involved in the scientific 
view of the world as determined by undeviating law. Cole­ 
ridge was well aware of this difficulty. Towards the end 
of his life, as his journal shows, he gave much thought to 
the whole question. A long entry in the Semina Re rum, dated 
March 6, 13321 , is typical of his method of meeting the problem.
1. MS.C: pp.
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Starting from his general definition of 
faith as fidelity of the personal will to the reason,— 
"reason in the form of Conscience, the conscience in the 
light of reason,"—Coleridge proceeds to the question of how 
far this faith requires the support of "belief." The answer 
is that "ordinarily Faith implies Belief; but not always, 
nor of necessity."1 There are three possible positions: 
faith against belief, faith without belief, and faith with 
belief.
n
In the first place, the mind "may have so 
accustomed itself to contemplate God as a God of Order," 
i.e., God as the supreme Mind and Reason underlying law and 
order, that it will with difficulty adjust itself to the idea 
that God is "a God that heareth prayer." The proofs of this 
latter position "rest so almost wholly in the Individual's 
own secret persuasion," that the faith itself is the main 
evidence of the truth of the faith. 3 Hence reason might 
easily reduce any providential act of God to a case of casual 
coincidence.
The question resolves itself into the inquiry 
concerning the nature of God and the relation in which man




stands to Him. If God be generalized from the laws of 
the universe as "a transcendent Abstract", or "Absolute 
Necessity", or "Eternal Scheme of inherent Law", then 
man stands in relation to God in the same way as he does 
to the law of gravity. But, on the other hand, man sees 
plainly "that if God be not a God that heareth Prayer, a 
God who seeketh that which was lost, he is relatively to 
the Creature no God, at all."2 The intellectual theism 
which finds in God "a mere word of generalization" is moral 
and practical atheism. Thus when some moral issue is at 
stake, conscience takes possession of the whole man and 
faith exists without belief^—i.eo, without the support of 
the intellect or understanding. Such was the case with Kant.
But this "permissive" faith in God is not 
satisfactory to Coleridge in the face of discord between 
the intellect and the moral being. In the second place, 
therefore, he suggests a re-examination of the premises in 
the process of reasoning*^ If, by reference to his own act 
of self-affirmation, he discovers that "he had arbitrarily 
assimed Reason and Truth, as the Absolute First" then he 
must admit something prior to all true being, "an antecedent, 
self-originated as well as self-subsistent." This "ungrounded
and groundless Ground of all Being" can only be conceived as
— — — — — «••• — ••••••••••••••••«•••••• — — •»•
1. MS.C: pp.l6o-l6l. Cf« Notes on English Divines, II, p.6. 
2! Ibid: p.l6l.
3. Cf. Notes on English Divines, II, p«5^»
4. Cf» MuirheaA: Coleridge asThilosopher, p.231.—where a 




"Will and Good— the Holy Will, the Absolute Good." As the 
eternal cause of all reality, it affirms itself by an eternal 
act and begets truth, being and reason, "as the Alterity to the 
Identity; " and life, individuality, love and spirit as the 
"Community."1 God is not just a mere generalization of law. 
As the Supreme Reason, He is the substance, "the noumenon of 
which all the Laws of Nature are the perspective and revealing 
Phaenomena." He is perpetually present as the Supreme Will; and 
also as the Supreme Spirit. The Spirit relates to life and indi­ 
viduality, and "is therefore conceivable only in relation to Indi­ 
viduality* (The Spirit is not for All; but for Each and Every.)" 
The conclusion is
"that as the universal Gravity does not exclude, but 
include all the specific Gravities, even so with the 
Law and the influence of Prayer — for our limited 
faculties only are they in antithesis. "^
Finally, there is the third possibility — faith with 
belief. ̂  Man, though emancipated from the power of the understand­ 
ing, finds it possible to enlist its "aidance." In view, however, 
of its uncertainty, through its close alliance with the senses, the 
moral reason is usually content with the neutrality of the under­ 
standing. Man's highest act is to affirm that God hears prayer.
1. MS.C: p«l62« Coleridge gives the scheme in the form of a 
"Tetraotys. 11
Identity
The Absolute Will t the Good.
Ipseity Alterity 
The I AM Being, Truth, the 
The Father Supreme Mind, the 
The Supreme Will only begotten Word,
Community 
Life, Love the Holy Spirit.
2. Ibid: P .
3. Ibid: pp. 164-165.
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"The purest aot of the finite Will made personal in 
the individual I AM, submitting itself to the Reason1 
as the representative of the Holy Will, and in it of 
the Universal Reason, is the Faith that the Ground 
and Cause of the Universe is a God that heareth 
Prayer, a God who seeketh that which was lost and 
caiieth back that which had gone astray.«....Who hath 
framed the heart of Man to love and to seek him, and 
shall he not love the creature whom for the purposes 
of Love he made, and not aid the searcher?"2
Fere is faith with belief. The belief "derives its origin 
and stability wholly from the antecedent Faith."^ In 
other words, man at his highest level realizes that God 
must he a God capable of maintaining ethical relations with 
men and who works for good in the world by redemptive means. 
And this demand of the religious spirit is rooted deep in 
the very nature of man. It derives from the primary act 
of the soul—an act of faith; which act of faith is conscience,
h
"the soul's testimony of its' own reality."^
1. N.B. Not merely the universal.
2. MS.C: p.165. Cf« Notes on English Divines, II, p,12g* 
Cf* the 1306 letter:- "For if God with the Spirit of 
God created the Soul of Man as far as it was possible 
according to his own Likeness, and if he be an 
omnipresent Influence, it necessarily follows, that 
his action on the Soul of Man must awake in it a 
conscious(ness) of actions within itself analogous 
to the divine action? and that therefore the Spirit 
of God truly bears witness to the Spirit of Man, even 
as vice versa the awakened Spirit will bear witness 
to the Spirit of God." (Unpublished Letters, I, pp«359-
360.)
3. MS.C: p.163. Cf. Notes on English Divines, II, p.128.
4. Ibid: p»117« Cf. the idob Letter to Clarlcson - 
Unpublished Letters, I, pp.359-3*>0.
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Belief, in the last resort, is concerned
with ideas, that is, with ends—God, holiness, truth, love, 
beauty, immortality. The Christian element in Coleridge's 
thought, seen in the latter part of the quotation above, 
breaks through again as he affirms, "Christ, the only 
be-gotten Word, is.........the Idea Idearum, the living
and adequate Image of the Father.........As the Idea Dei
Absoluta, he is the Ultimate End, all ultimate Ends in one."1
Coleridge concludes with a prayer, closing 
with:- "Of all the truths of Faith the most precious to the 
afflicted Soul is the Faith, that thou art a God that hearest
Q
prayer."^ It is an affirmation of his fundamental religious 
realism. It appears as the third article in his 1$32 Confession 
of Faith—the third moment of the Christian faith. It is the 
"triumph of faith." Without this belief, "prayer would be 
folly—Sin and the Fruits of Sin, irredeemable Hell*"3
In his section on "God as Special Providence," 
Dr. Muirhead pays tribute to Coleridge's argument:
"If prayer in the sense of petition for something 
for which the physical and moral constitution of 
the world, as we ordinarily know it, makes no 
provision, is to be vindicated, we may agree that 




3. Ibid: p.151 *
4. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.232,
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Coleridge's argument, as Muirhead points out, goes beyond the 
ordinary pragmatic view of the control of events by the "will 
to believe," by recognizing the existence of an external 
reality in identification with which our wills attain true 
individuality,—"Whose service is perfect freedom."
On the other hand, Muirhead asks whether Cole­ 
ridge is not too much dominated by the Kantian dualism between 
sensory experience as determined by mechanical conceptions and 
the spiritual as something extraneous to the natural region. 
He continues in implicit criticism by arguing that the Whole 
must be spiritual and therefore in the end providential. Hence,
"It is not by having things altered from without that 
we have to seek the goal of union with Its spirit, 
but by accepting them, whether in the natural or the 
moral world, Just as they are and turning them to the 
ends of the spirit."1
Petitionary prayer is, to Muirhead, "the assertion of our will." 
He therefore indicts Coleridge for including petition. But, it 
may be asked, is all petitionary prayer necessarily the asser­ 
tion of our will? Is it necessarily an attempt to get "things 
altered from without?" Surely the petition for forgiveness 
cannot be classified so, and this, it must be remembered, is 
the primary concern of Coleridge. From what Muirhead says 
elsewhere, it seems certain that a misunderstanding of the 
Christian doctrine of forgiveness lies at the root of his 
criticism of Coleridge's conception of prayer. Forgiveness,
1. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.233.
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to Muirhead, apparently involves "the cancellation of the 
incidents of time*" Coleridge's prayers for forgiveness 
he holds are traceable to morbidness. 2
But Coleridge had a far clearer insight into 
the meaning of forgiveness. What troubled him was the broken 
relation with God. This must be rectified, and—as his own 
experience revealed to him—rectified by God in redemptive 
action. This involves forgiveness of sins. And forgiveness 
must be grounded in a God "that heareth prayer", and "who 
seeketh that which was lost." Faith in Providence lies at 
the heart of Coleridge's thought of God and forms the staple 
of his religion. In other words, Coleridge's conception of 
the nature of God and his relation to man, is in the last 
resort, not only theistic, but Christian.
1. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.220.
2. Ibid: p.
CHAPTER VII.
The Problem of Evil.
1. Early Discussion.
"Woe to the man to whom it is an uninteresting 
question," wrote Coleridge regarding the problem of evil. 
This was in 1803, when he was experiencing in full measure 
what may be called the tragic element in life. His sin was
o
ever before him. Sin and evil could never be uninteresting 
questions to him. Typical of his attitude is the letter 
written in 1820 to his friend, J. H. Green, after a sickness 
which Coleridge regarded as a 'summons: 1
nMy only ray of hope is this, that in my inmost heart, 
as far as my consciousness can sound its depths, I plead nothing but my utter and sinful helplessness and 
worthlessness on one side, and the infinite mercy and 
divine Humanity of our Creator and Redeemer crucified from the beginning of the world, on the other'. ........
'In relation to God I appear to myself the same as 
the very worst man if such there be, would appear to an earthly tribunal.' I mean no comparatives; for what have a man's permanent concerns to do with comparison?" 0
That sin was his permanent concern may be seen from the Journal 
entries of his later life. To quote again an entry of 1830—
1. AnimaPoetae, p.41.Z. The events lying back of this have been discussed in
Chapter II. 
3. Letters. II. pp.?06-707.
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"Oh 1.—that in the outset of life I could have felt as well 
as known the consequences of Sin and error, before their 
tyranny had commenced." This same sense of sin is voiced 
also in his prayers. Typical is the prayer of March 8,1832, 
in which Coleridge speaks of "the sinful self-condemned Soul" 
whose only recourse is in God "abundant in forgiveness and in 
Judgment remembering Mercy ."2
The reality of his sense of sin has never been 
called in question by his critics. They have differed as to 
its significance. Typical of one school of criticism is that 
of Benn. He writes satirically,
"One can understand that the sense of sin conceived as 
an overwhelming fatality should have been particularly 
active with Coleridge. It is less intelligible that he 
should have generalized this deep and well-founded 
consciousness of his own delinquencies into a compre­ 
hensive indictment of human nature as such; and that he 
should have regarded the spirit of the Gospel as a cure 
for the world at large when it was proving so totally 
inoperative in his own particular instance."3
But, as Muirhead has seen, 4 the point is otherwise. Coleridge 
was not playing the role of prosecutor, seeking a bill of 
indictment of the human race. Rather, to continue the metaphor, 
he was the prisoner at the bar, entering a plea of guilty, and 
throwing himself on the mercy of the court. He desired above 
all pardon and redemption. As Maurice said pf him, "Besides 
being a philosopher, he was a penitent." 5
1. MS.C, p.143.
2. Ibid: p.lV3.
3 Benn: The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth 
Century. I. p,2%9. ~~ " ~~
4 Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher. p,37n.
5* Maurice: Life of Frederick Denison Maurice, II. p.194.
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Bonn's criticism falls to the ground, if for 
no other reason than that the problem was an intriguing 
intellectual problem before ever he felt deeply conscious 
of his own sin. It is not necessary to take too seriously 
the schoolboy lines concerning,
Tt bitter-smiling Woe 
Which all mankind are born to know." 1
They probably reflect an accepted orthodoxy. Of more import 
is the letter to George Dyer, written early in 1795. Writing 
of the contrast between rural urban life, Coleridge says, 
"Almost all the physical Evil in the World depends on the 
existence of moral Evil ."2 It is not necessary to discuss 
here the theory of a causal nexus between physical and moral 
evil set forth by Coleridge in this letter. The point is that 
the problem was present to his mind early in 1795. Later in 
the same year he included a discussion of "The Origin of Evil" 
in his first theological lecture at Bristol. 3 Further evidence 
is supplied by the so-called "Gutch" Notebook of 1795-1798. 
Among its miscellaneous entries, there is to be found a list 
of projected works. It includes the entry, "The Origin of 
Evil an Epic Poem." 4 Further on in the same notebook, there 
is marked for future reading Butterworth1 s Origin of Evil.5
1. Poems p.l. The poem is dated May, 12, 1787, and is the 
first known poem of Coleridge.
2. Unpublished Letters I. p.32.
3. Cottier Early Recollections. I. p.27.
4. British Museum Add. MSB. 27, 901. Folio 21a. Printed in 
Archiv fur das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Litter- aturen. 97. p.351.———————————
5 Ibid: folio 89a. Printed in Archiv etc, p.372. The date 
of Butterworth 1 s book is 1792.
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Even by 1798 the question of guilt was not the 
pressing personal problem of his later years. The very letter 
from which Benn has taken his phrase, f the spirit of the 
gospel as a cure for the world, 1 is significant.
"Of guilt I say nothing," he wrote to ffeorge Coleridge, 
"but I believe most steadfastly in original sin; that 
from our mothers 1 wombs our understandings are darkened; 
and even where our understandings are in the light, that 
our organization is depraved and our volitions imperfect; 
and we sometimes see the good without wishing to attain 
it, and oftener wish it without the energy that wills 
and performs. And for this inherent depravity I believe 
that the spirit of the Gospel is the sole cure." l
By 1803 the dream of the epic poem had faded,
but the problem was beginning to assume a deeper meaning, under 
the stress of his own experience. TI I made out," he says in a 
notebook entry, "the whole business of the origin of evil sat­ 
isfactory to my own mind." 2 This entry gives a delightful 
picture of Coleridge sitting for his portrait for Hazlitt, all 
the while he expounded the f whole business of the origin of 
evil 1 to the young painter. To Coleridge, the metaphysical 
argument reduces itself to the question,
1. Letters, I. pp.241-242.
Of. Coleridge's Bristol Lecture printed in Essays on his 
own Times, I. pp.22-23.
in interesting parallel to this discussion is Lowes 1 
refutation of Robertson's thesis that The Ancient Mariner 
was the "abnormal product of an abnormal nature under 
abnormal conditions," i.e., due to opium. (Robertson: 
Hew Essays towards a Critical Method, p. 187. Lowes proves 
conclusively that Robertson's thesis is without foundation. 
(The Road to Xanadu, pp.414-425.)
2. Anima Poetae. p.36.
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"Why did not infinite Power always exclusively produce 
such beings as in each moment of their duration were 
infinite? why, in short, did not the Almighty create 
an absolutely infinite number of Almighties,"^-
Coleridge argues that those who impeach the power and goodness 
of God, claiming a weakness in the one or the other, rest 
their justification on an argument "which has nothing to do with 
vice and misery, as vice and misery." 2 The whole case hinges 
on the notion of creatability. He asks whether something more 
than infinity of number, sorts, and orders is not demanded of 
infinite power; and answers that there is still room in the 
imagination for the creation of finites. Confronted with the 
bewilderment of notions of infinity applied to numbers, the 
imagination turns to contemplate a world. n an harmonious system, 
where an infinity of kinds subsist each in a multitude of indi­ 
viduals apportionate to its kind in conformity to laws existing 
in the divine nature, and therefore in the nature of things.* 3 
If the admission be made that conceive is equivalent to creation 
in the divine nature, synonymous with beget, then "all diffi­ 
culty ceases... .all is clear and beautiful." 4
Admitting this to be a notebook entry, awaiting 
amplification, still it is by no means as clear as Coleridge 
optimistically asserts. A later entry returns again to the 
"sophism of imaginary change in a case of positive substitu­ 
tion " and insists on the "necessity of omniform harmonious





action." "Order and system (not number—in itself base, 
disorderly and irrational) define the creative energy." 2 From 
the standpoint of his developed theory, these entries are 
of interest as foreshadowing the argument in the Opus Maximum.
A note-book entry of December 1803 is of in­ 
terest in the light of modern psychological theories. The 
entry reads,
"I will at least make the attempt to explain to myself 
the origin of moral evil from the streamy nature of 
association, which thinking curbs and rudders. Do not 
the bad passions in dreams throw light and show of 
proof upon this hypothesis? If I can but explain those 
passions I shall gain light. I am sure. A clue! A Clue.1 " 3
But the clue, as far as can be seen, was never followed up. 
Tears were to pass before Freud came to seize upon the self­ 
same clue. However, with the conclusions of the New Psychology 
Coleridge—it may be said with some degree of certainty—would 
have been in sharp disagreement; for the question of guilt and 
responsibility, passed over in 1798, became in his later years 
a major problem in his own experience. His final break with 
Schelling, as has been seen, 4 dates from the time Then he came 
to realize the implications of pantheism with regard to human 
responsibility.
The belief in an original corruption in human 
nature, which Coleridge had voiced in 1802, 5 became by 1616 a
1. Anima Poetae, p.42.
2. Ibid: p.42
3. Ibid: p.55.
4. Vide Chapter II.
5 Unpublished Letters, I. pp.201-203.
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fixed article of his personal creed. The first three articles 
assert his belief in freedom, God and immortality—the Kantian 
postulates. This constitutes his creed as a finite rational 
being. The first article in his creed "as a Christian" reads,
"I believe, and hold it as the fundamental article 
of Christianity, that £ am a fallen creature; that 
I am of myself capable of moral evil, but not of 
myself capable of moral good and that an evil ground 
existed in my will, previously to any given act, or 
assignable moment of time, in my consciousness.......
This fearful mystery I pretend not to understand. I 
cannot even conceive the possibility of it—but I 
know that it is so. My conscience, the sole fountain 
of certainty, commands me to believe it, and would it­ 
self be a contradiction were it not so—and what is 
real must be possible ."!•
In later life, sin is to him one of the two moments of the
Christian Religion. He regards original sin and redemption as
2 "that the ground, this the Superstructure of our faith." These
two moments are repeated in a Confession of Faith, dated 1832, 
and found in his Semina Herum. 3 Coleridge was quite aware of 
the paradox in the whole question,—a bias towards sin in 
human nature coupled with a sense of moral responsibility on 
the part of the individual man. His own sense of moral respon­ 
sibility was too great to allow him to rest in the position of 
contemporary orthodoxy—guilt inherited.
1. Table Talk, pp.430-431.
2. Aids, p.206.
3. MS.C, p.150. Cf. Notes on English Divines. I. p.198.— 
"Christianity itself, which rests on the two articles 
of faith; first, the necessity, and secondly, the 
reality of a Redeemer."
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The Question of Original Sin.
It is this sense of moral responsibility no 
less than the frankly apologetic aim which underlies Cole­ 
ridge's treatment of original sin in the Aids to Reflection 
of 1825. The immediate occasion of his remarks is his exam­ 
ination of a passage in Jeremy Taylor's Deus Justificatus. 
Coleridge makes use of the passage as a foil for his own 
argument.
The clue to Coleridge's treatment is given in 
a phrase which occurs late in the discussion, where Coleridge
writes of the "monstrous fiction of Hereditary Sin,—guilt
P inherited." 6 This repeats his comment on the theologians who
"perverted original sin into hereditary guilt," 3 It is to be 
noted that Coleridge does not argue concerning the fact of sin. 
It is a fact attested by every religion, and those who deny the
4fact in virtue acknowledge it.
Sin, to Coleridge, is a matter of the will. It 
is moral evil. Moral evil originates in a will. "A moral Evil
1. Aids pp.172-200. Cf. Taylor: Deus Justificatus; or a
Vindication of the glory of the Divine Attributes in the 
Question of Original Sin, Against the Presbyterian Way of 
Understanding it.The passage in question may be"found 
in Eeber's edition, 1822. IX. pp.215-316. Coleridge 
has altered the text slightly. (Aids, p,175n.) 
N.B. An illuminating commentary on the discussion in the 
Aids is afforded by Coleridge's marginal comments on 
Taylor, which, fortunately, have been preserved.
2. Ibid: p!200. Cf. Notes on English Divines, I. p.261. 
where he speaks of "the phantom of hereditary guilt."
3. Hotes on English Divines. I. p.247.
4. Aids, pp.188-189.
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is an evil that has its origin in a Will." 1 This originating
will cannot be God. Nor can the origin be attributed to
n 
nature, for, as has been seen, Coleridge holds that nature
is bound by cause and effect and cannot originate.4 The idea 
of will alone contains the idea of self-determination. 5 Hence, 
Coleridge objects to the phrase original sin as a pleonasm. 
"For if it be sin, it must be original." Any state or act, to 
be considered sin, must have its origin in the will. Otherwise, 
it may be classed as calamity, deformity, disease or mischief, 6 
but not as sin.
Coleridge holds that the will must be ultimately 
self-determined or it ceases to be a will under the law of 
perfect freedom. Moreover, as life is known by being, so will 
is known by acting. 8 Now, if by some act, the possibility of 
which is always present in a free agent, the will becomes sub­ 
ject to the "determination of nature," that is, what is below
it, it "receives a nature into itself and so far it becomes a
9 10 nature." This constitutes a corruption of the will. In
fact, the "admission of a nature into a spiritual essence by 













is recognized as the "ground, condition, and common Cause of 
all Sins. But inasmuch as the will is ultimately self-deter­ 
mined, this corrupt nature must be regarded in some sense as 
its own act.2 This, then, is original sin. Thus, Coleridge 
is driven back from sin to evil nature to will. But the will 
which originated the evil nature must be itself evil, that is 
evil by nature. As Coleridge says himself, "Thus we might go
back from act to act, from evil to evil, ad infinitum. without
2 advancing a step." The conclusion reached is that original
sin is ultimately a "mystery," "problem, of which any other 
solution, than the statement of the Fact itself, was demonstrab- 
ly impossible."4 Original sin is "an unaccountable fact," 6 
and in one place, Coleridge even writes of original sin as an 
idea and therefore not adequately expressible in words.
III. Every Man his own Adam.
This "unaccountable fact" has, however, this
to be said of it. Horal evil is common to all. Moreover,
7 
"an evil common to all must have a ground common to all. The
ground must be in a will; it cannot be in the divine will;
Q





5. Notes on English Divines. I. p.259




therefore holds that this constitutes the fall of man, inasmuch 
as the will is the ground and condition of man's personality. 
Moreover,
"the ground work of personal Being is a capacity of 
acknowledging the Moral Law (the Law of the Spirit, 
the Law cxf Freedom, the Divine Will) as that which 
should, of itself, suffice to determine the Will to 
a free obedience of the law..... What ever resists, and, 
as a positive force, opposes this in the Will is there­ 
fore evil." 2
For the individual, this cannot be on account of Adam, but 
may be spoken of legitimately as a conseguence of Adam's fall,
n a link in the historic chain of instances, whereof Adam is
g the first." Nor can it be due to an evil principle inserted
or infused into one will by the will of another, the will in
4such case being no will.
The theory of a causal nexus is ruled out for 
another reason, namely, that this theory would relate sin to 
the category of time, and Coleridge holds that in questions 
concerning the will, the categories of time and space are 
irre levant .
"The subject stands in no relation whatever to time, 
can neither be called in time nor out of time; but 
that all relations of time are as alien and heterogene 
ous in this question, as the relations and attributes 
of space. ..... .are to our affections and moral f eel-
ings .w6
Although sin is revealed in deeds, that is, in time, basically, 
"Time is not with things of spirit." 6
1. 4i*s, p. 190.
2. Ibid: p. 190.
3. Ibid: p. 194.
4. Ibid: p. 194.
5. Ibid: p. 191.
6- Notes on English Divines. I. p*261. Vide Chapter III 
	section
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Coleridge thus comes to the conclusion that 
"it belongs to the very essence of the doctrine, that in 
respect of Original Sin, every man is the adequate representa­ 
tive of all men." Interpreting the first chapters of Genesis 
symbolically, Coleridge holds that "the first human sinner is 
the adequate representative of all his successors*,1 and that it 
is "the same Adam that falls in every man." 2 "What Adam did, 
we all do." 3 The condition of the will which is the ground of 
original sin is, therefore, "not peculiar to the individual 
agent, but common to the human race." Coleridge construes 
Adam genetically as well as symbolically, 6
In the Aids, Coleridge's concern with the doc­ 
trine of original sin is to find "the sense in which alone it 
is binding" on a Christian's faith. 6 In seeking thus to retain 
the doctrine by re-interpreting the meaning of the words, Cole­ 
ridge leaves himself open to the charge of neglecting altogether 
the technical ecclesiastical meaning of the phrase, original 
sin. Nor is it better than a sophism to empty the phrase of 
its technical meaning and then to equate original with origin­ 
ated. But this aside, the treatment has certain features which 
are undoubtedly sound. Coleridge saw the necessity of ground­ 
ing sin in human volition. The religious interest at stake in
1. Aids, p.194.
2. Tbil: p,172n.
3. Notes on English Divines. I. p.262.




the concept of guilt is thus safe-guarded. It may be true, as 
Orchard contends, that Coleridge's use of will is faulty and 
that he neglects the factor of development in connection with 
the will. This may be granted, but Orchard neglects to give 
Coleridge his due for refusing to accept a view of sin that 
would make it an inheritance from nature. Coleridge's stress 
is on the will as distinct from nature. Moreover, as distinct 
from nature, will is not subject to the ordinary laws of nature,
gconceived in terms of space and time. Coleridge f s insistence 
on will as a category distinct from those of time and space is 
a fruitful suggestion. Both Tennant and Orchard have seized
on this as reflecting Kant's view of sin as a timeless act.
2They, in fact, assume that Coleridge is but echoing Kant. Cole­ 
ridge was acquainted with Kant's Religion within the Bounds of 
Pure Reason. But his divergence from Kant makes it equally 
clear that here, as elsewhere, he was not merely an English
c
parrot of the German philosopher. Coleridge is more concerned 
with actual experience than is Kant, aloof in his stoi-cal in­ 
tellectual! sm. Sin is inherent in man and manifest in deeds in 
time and space. But because it is rooted in the will, it is
1. Orchard: Modern Theories of Sin, p.48.
2. Vide Chapter III. section 17.
3. Tennant: The Origin and Propagation of Sin, pp.58-59; 
Orchard: op.cit., p.46.
4. Biographia Literaria. p.70.
5. Orchard devotes a half-page of criticism to the "Timeless 
Act" of "all human wills collectively." (op.cit., p.48) 
Neither phrase occurs in Coleridge. They are taken over 
from a footnote of Tennant. (op.cit., p.59). Orchard's 
looseness is further emphasized by his failure to quote 
Tennant correctly.
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not subject to the ordinary laws of space-time causation— 
laws invoked by contemporary orthodoxy to explain hereditary 
guilt. Each man is responsible for his own sin. Coleridge 
is also aware of the social character of sin. He avoids the 
individualism so fatal to Pelagianism and one of the chief 
weaknesses in Kant's view. 1 On the other hand, Coleridge, 
like Kant, breaks completely with the shallow optimism of 
the preceding age.
Again, Coleridge's symbolic interpretation of 
the early Biblical narratives strikes a new and helpful note 
in an age of literalism. His interpretation of Adam as the 
representative of all men, and his stress on the Adam in 
each, point the way to moral and religious reality. The ultim­ 
ate groundcf human sin, common to the race, remains a mystery. 
As an apologetic for his age, Coleridge's treatment may be 
said to be fruitful in suggestion. It is not, nor does it 
claim to be, a complete discussion of the problem of sin and 
evil. It is concerned only with finding a sense for the words 
by means of which the fact of sin may be brought home to each 
man and the doctrine itself retained in the Christian creed.
IV. The Origin of Evil.
The treatment in the Aids, suggestive on the 
whole for the purpose of a Christian apologetic, left deep 
problems still unsolved. "The origin of evil," he had written
1. Cf. Tennant: op.cit., pp.50-59.
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in the Aids, w is a question interesting only to the meta­ 
physician, and in a system of moral and religious philosophy." 1 
It was to this question that Coleridge set himself in his un­ 
finished Opus Maximum. In the chapter entitled On the Divine 
Ideas2 he faces squarely the problem presented by his own 
system of moral and religious philosophy founded on the idea 
of an Absolute Will. Dr. Muirhead, after examining this chapter, 
reaches the conclusion that "there are few things of equal power 
in the literature of Theism." 3 This is high praise. To what 
extent it is justified, the following summary will reveal.
Coleridge commences in typical fashion by'dis- 
claiming all wish and attempt of gratifying a speculative re­ 
finement" in himself.4 He then proceeds to state the problem 
as one of fimiteness. The problem is that of "presenting an 
intelligible though not comprehensible idea of the possibility
of that which in some sense or other is, yet is not God, nor
5 One with God." The phrase not comprehensible he proceeds to
justify by reference to the hidden mystery in every form of
c
existence. This mystery, when examined apart from the con­ 
ceptual relations of time and space, and seen in the depth of 
real being, is revealed as a "That which is not, but which is 
for ever only about to be." 7 This mystery is illustrated by
. Aids P
E. MS. H. pp. 3-145.
3. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p. 242.
4. MS.H. p. 3.
5. Ibid: p. 5.
6. Ibid: p.V.
7. Ibid: p. 9.
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the "infinite problem" presented even by a dew-drop. From this 
Coleridgean digression, the argument returns to the main pro­ 
blem.
"The passage from the absolute to the separated finite, 
this is the difficulty which who shall overcome? This 
is the chasm, which ages have tried in vain to over- 
bridge. If the finite be in no sense separate from the
infinite, if it be one with the same, whence proceeded Evil?" 2
The bridge offered by the definition of the 
finite as negation or privation will not do. The shapes of 
the living forms of nature are "at once the product, and the 
sign of the positive power" at the root. 3 It is only in the 
inanimate that a form or shape "proceeding from negation" is 
found. This results from an over-powering impression from 
without, and may be seen in such examples as the arrow in the 
air, the storm-rent fragment of rock, and the tide-rounded 
pebble. Even granted that the finite were negation, the ques­ 
tion of its possibility would still return, "From such a fin­ 
ite we might educe the origin of Evil: but such a finite were
Evil'." 4
Coleridge claims that this is the knot which 
has been cut, rather than untied, by all schemes of pantheism 
and atheism. 5 The narrow isthmus to be passed has on either 
side atheism and pantheism. The point of departure is that: 
"The Will the Absolute Will, is that which is essentially
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causatire of reality, essentially and absolutely, that is, 
boundless from without and from within." This same principle 
has been affirmed and supposed in all the great and stirring 
epochs of the Christian theology. 2 Bearing in mind the moral 
and religious interest, Coleridge refuses to set up the 
Absolute Will distinct from, and superior to, God. The 
following long quotation illustrates how Coleridge faces the 
problem of evil in its ultimate and most difficult form. 3
"In the Absolute Will we conceive what in God as the 
Supreme Being as the Divine Person, we could not admit 
if we dared for it would involve a contradiction; and 
we dared not if we could, for it would introduce 
imperfection into the reality of Deity. For in God as 
God the Absolute Will is absolutely realized, but the 
actual alone is absolutely real, and the possible, there­ 
fore, or potential, as contradistinguished from the 
actual, and which in all lower than Deity is the opposite 
pole of the actual, cannot be in God. ... .Whatever is in 
God as one with God is, and can be, such only as far as 
it is actual: but in the Absolute Will which abideth in 
the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, totally and absolut­ 
ely in each, one and the same in all, the ground of all 
reality is contained, even of that which is only possible 
and conditionally possible alone: and this is indeed im­ 
plied in the idea and essential conception of a Will, for 
a Will, in which there is no possibility, ceases to be a 
Will absolutely. Hence, in speaking of the Will self- 
realized, which is more than the Will conceived absolutely, 
we do not hesitate to affirm the necessity of the divine 
Nature and attributes, — nay, we affirm it with the clearest 
insight that such necessity is the perfection and proper 
prerogative of God. It is impossible for God not to be 
God and it is impossible for a part which is one with the 
whole to be other, than the whole as long as it remains one 
with the whole. It does not however follow that in the 
part as a part, there should not be contained the condition­ 
al possibility of willing to be a part that is not one with 
the whole, of willing to be in itself, and not in another, 
for this is not precluded in the Will, or in a realization 
of the Will through and in the Divine Will: it is pre­ 
cluded only by the absolute self-realization of the 
Absolute Will. "4
' J
1* Cf . Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p. 2 39.
4*. MS.H. PP. 23-2^
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It is this possibility of willing to be a part 
that is not one with the whole that Coleridge sets himself 
to elucidate. He starts from the doctrine of divine ideas. 
wAn Idea is not simply knowledge or perception as distin­ 
guished from the thing perceived: it is a realizing knowledge, 
a knowledge causative of its own reality." 1 It is light, self- 
subsistent and living, jf£* vo £/a ;>/ *»; ^07 f^ t a light at once 
"intelligent and intelligible, and the communicative medium." 2 
To suppose God without ideas, or the realizing knowledge of 
all the particular forms potentially involved in the absolute 
eausativeness, would destroy the very conception of God. 3 The 
universal and the particular, the possible and the actual, are 
all contained in the "whole plenitude." Difficulty arises 
when the nature of the reality of each is considered. The idea 
is a form of will, and that in a sphere which admits only of 
supreme or perfect reality, since "all perfect reality is found 
in the Absolute only." 5 Here, then, is the crux of the problem.
In this dilemma a clue is afforded from "the
c
analogy of the highest intuitions or ideas in our minds." This 
suggests the possibility of solution.
"To God the idea is real, inasmuch as it is one with 
that Will which, as we see in its definition, is verily 
Idem et Alter; but to itself the idea is absolutely real, 
in so far only as its particular Will affirms, and, in 
affirming,, constitutes its particular reality to have no







true being, except as a form of the universal, and one 
with the universal Will. This, however, is the affirma­ 
tion of a Will and of a particular Will. It must there­ 
fore contain the potentiality, that is, the power of 
possibly jnpji affirming the identity of its reality with 
the reality of God, which is actual absolutely."*
In other words, if the essence of its being be will, and this 
will under a particular form, there must be the possibility 
of willing the universal or absolute under the predominance 
of the particular, instead of willing the particular solely 
as the glory and presentation of the universal.
As long as this act remains wholly potential, 
Coleridge argues that it is perfectly compatible with the 
reality of God, and "so long therefore hath it an actual real­ 
ity as one of the eternal immutable ideas of God."** But in the 
will to actualize this potentiality, in the will to convert
<z
this possibility into a reality, it necessarily makes—itself. 
That is to say, a self is affirmed that is not God. In thus 
making a self that is not God all actuality is lost, since all 
actuality is contained in God. All that is left is potential­ 
ity, by virtue of the eternal nature of will. A world of con­ 
tradiction results from this first act which, in constituting 
a self, is in essence a contradiction, 4—"the Will, to make a 
centre which is not a centre, a will not the same with the 
Absolute Will, and yet not contained in the Absolute, that is 
an Absolute that is not an Absolute."






To this difficulty, Coleridge feels that his 
trichotomous principle of logic offers a solution. He refuses 
to accept the logic which would divide the world into actual 
and potential, and equate this division with that of real 
and unreal. On such a "basis, the problem is insoluble. But, 
argues Coleridge, if these two opposites, the actual and the 
potential, be the two opposite poles of one reality, the 
question assumes a totally different aspect. 1 Thus it is 
possible to predicate reality of the potential, and to claim 
for any subject that its being is actual, as far as it is in 
the being of God, and potential in relation to itself as par­ 
ticular existence.2 Coleridge asks whether the infinity of 
images, thoughts, acts, emotions, of which he is capable, be 
not nas really potential" as such images, acts and states of 
affection, which are present, are "really actual." 3 Failure 
to recognize this results in one of two positions: either the 
"futuritions" of the mind and nature must be regarded as no­ 
things, or the "absolute universal Thing of Atheism," which 
blots out all distinction between finite and infinite, must 
be accepted. 4 Neither, however, is acceptable.
When the conception provided by his polar logic 
is taken along with the idea of the will, a key is supplied 
for the problem.





here is what was with no unseemly fear and inward 
trembling named the abyss or abyssmal mystery, that 
there is in the causative Allmight of God (who shall 
dare utter it? or if he feel permitted, in what terms 
shall he utter it? Shall he say) a more than God, or 
a less than God, and yet more in the sense other, a 
somewhat that God did not realize in himself, for the 
real containsth both the actual and the potential, but 
in God as God, by the necessity of his absolute perfec­ 
tion, there is no potentiality."!
Coleridge argues that it is possible to speak of God as having 
power as against his being power. It is by this power that 
God produces "that, which could not be save in him, but which
9
he is not."^ Such are all beings in whom the potential co­ 
exists as "alternable" with the actual. And such may be con­ 
sidered as realization of the will, by virtue of its being 
their common essence. 3 By this line of argument, Coleridge 
holds that he is able to avoid the conception of a chaotic 
depth begetting the Deity, "a Not-Good, which yet is not Evil, 
a Hot-Intelligent, which is not the contrary of Intelligence... 
before the evolution of the Good and Wise." 4
Moreover, the religious and moral conscience 
demand two things. In the first place, the reality of the 
existence of distinct beings within the divine plenitude must 
be maintained. The essence of these distinct beings is will. 
Their actuality consists therefore in their will being one 
with the will of God. This actuality constitutes what is known 
as eternal life. Secondly, room must be found for the





bility of a fall from this state, "a ceasing to be etern-
transition into the temporal." These two points, it is 
ed, are safeguarded by the argument. 1
It was the possibility of a being "willing its 
lity in its self and not in God" that Coleridge had set 
o establish. "There must be," he says, "if the actual 
be a Will, a potentiality of willing the universal under 
the predominance of the particular, instead of willing the 
particular solely as the glory and presentation of the pleni­ 
tude of t£e distinctions of the universal." 2 Again, the possi­ 
bility must be an eternal possibility. 3 In God all good inheres. 
To will a self that is not God is to will evil. And since in 
will alone causation inheres, to will evil is to originate
A
evil. The possibility once established, the fact of its exist­ 
ence is the only proof of the actuality of evil. 5 To deny its 
existence is to render religion purposeless, the conceptions of 
guilt and punishment 'meaningless, and to leave the distinction 
between pain and pleasure as the only criterion of value. But, 
on this basis, the fact of remorse implies evil in the causer 
or inflicter. 7 God must then be either a demoniacal will or 
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no higher unity than a heap of corn or a pillar of sand, the 
architecture of a whirlwind." 1 The patent fact is that evil 
exists. Further, from moral evil all evil derives. The 
conclusion of the matter is: "That moral Evil i£—an Evil 
which is the sting of calamity, an Svil from which all else 
that is, or can be called Evil, derives its evilness, either 
as a necessary consequent of that evil or by its continued 
presence therein/' 2
One of the advantages which Coleridge claims 
for the principle on which he builds his argument is that he 
can predicate of will that it is higher and deeper than mere 
power. God is will, he has power. Power may be conceived of 
apart from intelligence and love. It is otherwise with will.
"The Supreme Will is an idea incapable of abstraction. 
We not only cannot think of it abstracted from Intelli­ 
gence and Love as real—for this would apply equally 
to the idea of an unbounded power; but we cannot think 
of it at all, which cannot truly be said of the latter, 
i.e. of power as power ."^
Will must be accepted as the ground, cause and condition of all 
possibility and reality. This necessity is due to its nature 
which includes both the possible and the real—"for necessity 
is the identity or co-inherence of the possible and the real." 4
Coleridge refuses to accept the words cause, 
ground or principle in discussing the origin of evil. He 







and is not eternal. It must of necessity have had an ante­ 
cedent. The possibility of this antecedent is the heart of 
his whole argument. Nor will he allow the terms begotten 
or proceeding, made or created in the relation between God 
and evil. 1 Only the conception of the bi-polar will gives 
the solution, a will in which the potential and the actual 
are the two poles of reality. Evil arose when the potential 
willed itself to be actual under impossible conditions, and a 
self became which was not God.
"The potential, still a form of reality, though its 
negative pole, and therefore a form of will, willed it­ 
self to be actual under impossible conditions, for to 
be actual was to will its subsistence to be in Gpd and 
the power of willing otherwise existed potentially, by 
necessity part of a Will and part because it was a 
particular Will. It could not but be, because the real 
was and the actual was. but in all particular forms the 
actual could not be without the particular. The result 
can be no otherwise expressed, as far as it can be at all 
expressed, than that a Self became which was not God, nor 
One with God. The potential was actualized yet not as 
actual, but by a strange yet appropriate contradiction, 
as potential." 2
Coleridge concludes with a typical summary. The 
passage reveals his struggle to express in words the result of 
his daring flight with the polar logic.
"Such an origination of self must have been eternally 
possible; that it became, the fact itself has proved; and 
the glory, the wisdom, the omnipotence, and the infinite 
Love of God, unassailed, unapproached. We have learnt 
from reason that it is a legitimate idea -that Svil may 
be, as experience proves that it is, that it was not 
nor cannot (sic) be eternal, and therefore had an origin; 
that it did not originate in God, or in the Will of God 
as God, or in the Absolute Will as absolute, nor even in
1. MS. H, p..139.
2. Ibid: p.141.
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the particular eternal as eternal; but that Evil was 
and is, in the strictest sense of the words, self- 
originated, self-originant . The false Self and Evil 
differ but as essence and form, as cause and effect; 
differences that exist only for the abstracting and 
dividing understanding, but contemplated absolutely 
must be represented in a fearful sense,*«r°/"i Tnp
It is by this argument that Coleridge feels 
that he has walked his isthmus. Identifying God and the 
Absolute, he faces squarely the problem at its deepest point. 
On the basis of a thoroughgoing monism, the problem of evil 
as solved by Coleridge, would appear to be so much verbal 
Juggling. The monist's criticism would fall heavily on his 
play between potential and actual. On the other hand, Cole­ 
ridge's criticism would fall with equal weight on the monist f s 
failure to recognize in the fact of evil something more than 
ngood in the making. 11 This Coleridge could never accept. Evil 
is positive. Pull credit must be given Coleridge for his 
courageous attempt. The problem may be ultimately insoluble, 
for as Lotze says, ?t No one has here found the thought which 
would save us from our difficulty." 2 But the value of Cole­ 
ridge's particular attempt by means of his polar logic may be 
seen from Dr. Muirhead's judgment that, if God and the Absolute 
be identified, "it is by some such argument that the reality of
n
moral evil must be vindicated."
Coleridge's argument has the merit of avoiding 
the dualistic solution. Moreover, it avoids the weakness in
1. MS. H, pp.143-145.
2. LotzeJ gicrocosmua. English translation, Vol. II. p.716.
Quoted in Galloway: op.cit., p.512. 
3" Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.243.
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theories such as those of Leibnitz and Hegel, which find evil 
in the necessary imperfection of the finite and consequently 
discover evil to be a necessary constituent in experience. 
In relating evil to the freedom of the will, Coleridge points 
the way again to religious reality.
On the other hand, his solution suffers from 
lack of contact witix man's actual experience, the arena in 
which freedom is expressed. Again, there is a weakness in 
Coleridge's underlying assumption of a causal nexus between 
physical and moral evil. As has been seen, this assumption 
finds explicit expression in the course of his argument. The 
assumption may be true. It is another matter simply to assume 
it.
Muirhead raises the deeper question involved in 
Coleridge's basic principle of the eternal reality as pure will. 
Echoing Coleridge's words that the clue to reality is to be 
found in "the highest intuitions or ideas in our minds," he 
launches his criticism, from the standpoint of idealism, by ask­ 
ing whether the appeal to religious consciousness at its highest 
"does not suggest a level of experience at which will no longer
survives as will, and sin is done away with in the peace of
p God." Aside from the idealistic assumption which underlies
this criticism, it is nevertheless suggestive. Would not the 
appeal to the highest intuitions of the religious consciousness 
suggest something other? Viewed from the standpoint of the
Y.~" Tide Galloway: op.cit., pp.525, 528.
2. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.244.
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religious relation between God and man, sin is godlessness. 
It consists in a certain attitude to God. Would not the appeal 
to the religious consciousness, therefore, reveal sin to be a 
specifically religious conception? 1 Wrestling—we may even say, 
wrestling magnificently—with the problem as a purely metaphy­ 
sical problem, has not Coleridge somehow or other missed the 
clue of his own religious experience and conscience?
Summing up Coleridge's discussion of sin and
evil, it may be said that his treatment falls into two divisions, 
the one apologetic, the other metaphysical. The first is con­ 
cerned with the question of original sin raised by the inter­ 
pretation of the doctrine in contemporary orthodoxy; the second 
with the possibility of evil, the ultimate difficulty of the 
theistic philosopher. By the one he sought a purified Christian 
doctrine, by the other a more firmly-grounded theism.
1. Cf. McDowall: Is Sin our Fault? p.198 seq.




If, as has been seen, Coleridge's views of 
the nature of sin were conditioned by his own experience, 
so also were his views of redemption. His sense of sin 
had its counterpart in his sense of the need of redemption, 
of forgiveness, of pardon.
n lf," he writes in his Semina Rerum, "I were disposed 
to accept a pure and practical code of morals under 
the name of Religion, as Christianity, I should adopt 
the Discourses of Dr. Frederick Schleiermacher, as my 
Manual and Guide. But I want, I need, a Redeemer. f| l
The written prayers of his later life reveal 
clearly the sense of this need of a God "that heareth prayer" 
and who forgives sin.2 Muirhead attributes this to "the 
morbid bent" in his character. 3 But the theory does not seem 
to meet the facts. In the first place, the haunting dread,
1. MS.C, p.48. Cf. Notes on English Divines. I. p.28. 
Writing of "assurance," he says, "To assert that I 
have the same assurance of mind that I am saved as that 
I need a Saviour, would be a contradiction to my own 
feelings, and yet I may have an equal, that is, an 
equivalent assurance. How is it possible that a sick 
man should have the same certainty of his convalescence 
as of his sickness? Yet he may be assured of it."
2. MS.C, p.173. Vide Chapter VI. section V. 
3* Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.36.
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occasioned by his opium habit, was by now a thing of the past. 
Although the moral scar of his opium-habit remained, his High- 
fcate days, in comparision with the dark period of the opium- 
ridden years, were days of spiritual peace. His considerable 
intellectual output, together with the affection of and in­ 
fluence on his friends during these years, bears ample witness 
to this. A letter to Stuart early in 1826 reveals this in 
another way. He informs Stuart that he finds himself thinking 
and reasoning on all religious subjects with a more cheerful 
sense of freedom, because he is secure of his faith in a per­ 
sonal God, a resurrection and a Redeemer, and further, and
practically for the first time, "confident in the efficacy of
«2prayer."
Nor does Muirhead's view ring true with his
reading. The fact that Southey ! s Life of Wesley was the
n 
favourite of his library, and along with Baxter, Luther,
Jeremy Taylor, Leighton, the mystics and the Bible furnished 
much of his later reading, 4 cannot be accounted for simply 
on the basis of morbidness. On July 13th, 1834, shortly be­ 
fore his death, Coleridge wrote his godson:-
"And I thus, on the brink of the grave, solemnly bear 
witness to you that the Almighty Redeemer, most gracious 
in His promises to them that truly seek Him, is faithful
1. Vide Watson: Coleridge at Highgate. p.40
2 Letters from the Lake Poets. pT294. - letter of April 19, 
"1826.—Of. Campbell: op.cit., p.262.
3 Coleridge wrote that it was "more often in my hands than 
any other work in my ragged book-regiment." 
(Southey: Life of Wesley. I. xv. - Uote of August 1825)
4. Cf. Watson: op.cit., p.153.
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to perform what. He has promised; and has reserved, under 
all pains and infirmities, the peace that passeth all 
understanding, with the supporting assurance of a 
reconciled God who will not withdraw His spirit from 
me in the conflict, and in His own time will deliver me 
from the evil one.......Eminently blessed are they who
begin early to seek, fear, and love their God, trusting 
wholly in the righteousness and mediation of their Lord, 
Redeemer, Saviour and everlasting High Priest, Jesus 
Christ."!
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his faith. like 
his view of sin, his doctrine of redemption is coloured through­ 
out by his own experience.2 But this is a far different matter 
from attributing it to morbidness.
Turning to his developed doctrine, we see that 
as sin is the ground, the condition, the occasion of Christ­ 
ianity, so redemption is the edifice of faith. 3 It is the 
other moment of Christianity.4 It is Christianity itself. 
"Christianity and Redemption/1 he writes, "are equivalent 
terms." 6 If the fact of sin be recognized by every religion, 
then "peculiar to the Christian religion are the remedy and.... 
the solution." 6 It is to be expected that Coleridge, with 
his strong emphasis on the volitional aspect of sin, would 
stress the corresponding element in his doctrine of redemption. 
This is, in fact, found to be the case. 9in is the corruption 
of the will, resulting from an act of self-subjection to the 
determination of nature and the rejection thereby of its own
1. Letters. II. P;776 - _ TTT
2. Vide Chapter II. section III.
s! Aids, p.306.




law. Correspondingly, redemption is the reinstatement in the 
place of sovereignty of the will's own law, the law of perfect 
freedom, "the resumption of the Law into the Will/* 1
"Whenever/1 writes Coleridge "by self-subject ion to 
this universal light, the will of the individual, the 
particular will, has become a will of reason, the man 
is regenerate: and reason is then the spirit of the 
regenerated man, whereby the person is capable of a 
quickening inter-communion with the Divine Spirit." 2
This constitutes what may be called the content of redemption. 
The mystery of redemption consists in the fact "that this had 
been rendered possible for us." "And so," he quotes in con­ 
clusion, "the first man Adam was made a living soul, the last 
Adam a quickening Spirit." 3
II. Idealist or Christian?
This last quotation leads us at once to the 
consideration of the nature of the redemptive act. Is it, 
like sin, a self-willed act; in this case, of restoration? 
Is the last Adam, like the first, merely the representative 
of all men? In short, what place does Coleridge assign to 
the historic person of Christ in the redemptive act? Such a 
question is of some importance in view of his later remarks 
on the Christian doctrine of Atonement.
The materials on which to base a judgment re­ 
garding the question are admittedly scanty. The Aids do not 
attempt to discuss the question directly and, unfortunatdy, 
there is no treatment of redemption comparable to that of evil
1. Aids, p.E02.
2. IbicT: p. 143.
3. Ibid: p.143. I.Cor., XV. 45.
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in the manuscript remains, reflecting his developed thought. 
We are therefore forced back on indirect evidence, and on 
previous Judgment of the general trend of his thought.
On the one hand, there is the view that Cole­ 
ridge is purely idealistic in his interpretation of Christianity 
Potter contends that Coleridge ! s conception of religion as "a 
self-changing act" was far removed from the religious themes 
of his time. This view has behind it also the weighty auth­ 
ority of Dr. Muirhead. As his presentation is typical and the 
best from this standpoint, it is necessary to examine it at 
length. Coleridge, in his judgment, stops short of speaking 
of the representative Christ only because of the method of the 
Aids. "But," says Dr. Muirhead, "that this is his real meaning 
we cannot doubt from what we hear elsewhere both from himself
and others of his view of what is essential in the teaching of
o 
Christianity." In support of this view, Dr. Muirhead adduces
two types of evidence, the one suggestive, the other confirm­ 
atory.
Without calling in question at the moment
Muirhead 1 s general contention, it is of interest to examine the 
passages adduced in support of his view. Muirhead 1 s words may 
first be noted,
"Prom what he had already said of the first Adam 
as the representative of all men, we might have ex­ 
pected him to go on to say the same of the last Adam 
as the head of a race renewed in the spirit of their 
minds, all the more as he takes this to be the meaning
1. Potter: Coleridge and S.T.C. p.230.
2. Muirhead; Coleridge as Philosopher, p.245.
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of St. Paul's use of 'the Word, on which he founds his whole reasoning.'" 1
Muirhead f s method of free quotation has obscured the fact 
that Coleridge is speaking of St. Paul's use of the word 
law and not of the Word. The passage is as follQws,
"In the original purity of a rational agent the un- corrupted will is identical with the law. Nay, in as much as a Will perfectly identical with the Law is one with the divine Will, we may say, that in the unfalien rational agent the Will constitutes the Law. But it is evident that the holy and spiritual power and light which by a prolepsis or anticipation we have named law, is a grace, an inward perfection, and without the commanding, binding and menacing character which belongs to a law, acting as a master or sovereign distinct from, and existing, as it were, externally for, the agent who is bound to obey it. Now this is St. Paul's sense of the word; and on this he grounds hia whole reasoning/'2
This passage, it may be remarked, is inconclusive regarding 
the point at issue.
Further, Dr. Muirhead quotes Coleridge's
summary of St. John's doctrine of redemption. Redemption is 
identified "in kind with a fact of hourly occurrence— 
expressing it, I say, by a familiar fact, the same in kind 
with that intended, though of a far lower dignity." 3 Cole­ 
ridge in the particular section is contending against slavery 
to Pauline metaphors. The passage as it stands emphasizes 
the nature of redemption as a life. It does not point necess­ 
arily to the view of Christ as a mere representative man.
1 Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.245. 2* Aids, pp.201-202.
3 Ibid: p.217. Quoted freely by Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher,p.245.
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In further support of this view, there is the 
evidence of Allsop who reports Coleridge as holding that 
miracles are supererogatory, and that "the law of God and the 
great principles of the Christian religion would have been 
the same had Christ never assumed humanity." 1 This reported 
speech of Coleridge is in keeping with what we have from his 
own pen in his Unitarian days. "Although the Man Jesus had 
never appeared in the world, yet I am Quaker enough to believe, 
that in the heart of every man the Christ would have revealed 
himself, the Power of the Word."^ And we have Allsop's word 
for it that "Coleridge ever retained the convictions of his 
early, earnest youth." 3
Finally, there is the evidence drawn from
Green in support of this view. Green draws a parallel between 
Adam, "as the name intended to signify primaeval man collect­ 
ively," and Christ, as "the Almighty Power of Goodness," his 
spirit, *the eternal Humanity working in us."
The redemptive process is only another name for 
"all the works of creation," and therefore independent of all
1. Allsop: Letters. Conversations and Recollections, p.47. 
The conversation is undated, but occurs sometime later 
than 1818 the date of Coleridge f s introduction to 
Allsop. (Campbells op.cit., p.236.)
2. Letters, I. p.286. - Letter of April 8, 1799, not cited 
by Muirhead.
In addition there is the notebook entry of 1804: "This is 
the true Atonement—that is, to reconcile the struggles 
of the infinitely various finite with the permanent." 
(Anima Poetae. p.81.)
3. Allsop: op.cit., preface.
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profession of Christianity. 1 Muirhead remarks that Green M is 
not likely to have misrepresented him (Coleridge) in anything
o
so fundamental."
On the other hand, it must be noted that Allsop 
had his own particular view of Christianity; 3 and it is 
legitimate to infer that he would seek in Coleridge authority 
for his own views, and that his bias would furnish him with a 
filter to eliminate any other views of Coleridge. A similar 
reservation is necessary in the case of Green. Green was a 
disciple, not a mirror. Not to raise this point seems equiva­ 
lent to begging the whole question. Finally, allowance must 
be made for the personal equation in the case of Muirhead him­ 
self, who is admittedly pure idealist in his interpretation of 
Christianity.
A quotation from Coleridge, "Christianity is a 
growth, a Becoming, a Progression...History, therefore, and 
History under its highest form of Moral freedom, is that alone 
in which the Idea of Christianity can be realized," 4 leaves 
the question of the historical origins of Christianity still 
unanswered and the point at issue unsettled. But the expand­ 
ing footnote reflects the tenor of Muirhead 1 s mind. The
1. Green: Spiritual Philosophy. Yol. II. p.386 seq.
N.B. Connecting on Jeremy Taylor's words that "nature 
alone cannot bring them to heaven," Coleridge says, "This 
is likewise my be lief and that man must have a Christ, 
even if Adam had continued in Paradise." (Notes on 
English Divines. I. p,267.
2. Muirhead; Coleridge as Philosopher, p.246. 
3! Allsop: op.cit., preface. 
4. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.247. 
Quoted freely from MS.C, p.43.
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quotation is from the Confessions, Letter VI. where Coleridge 
emphasizes the priority of the Christian faith to the written 
Scriptures. Coleridge urges,
"Draw their minds to the fact of the progressive and 
still continuing fulfillment of the assurance of a 
few fishermen, that both their own religion, though 
of divine origin, and the religion of their conquerors, 
which included or recognized all other religions of the 
known world, should be supereeded by the faith in a man 
recently and ignominiously executed." 1
Muirhead, citing the passage, changes the whole meaning by 
quoting the words "faith in a man recently and ignominiously 
executed" as "the faith of a man recently and ignominiously 
executed." 2 The change in preposition at this crucial point 
is significant.
Further, remarking on Coleridge's interpretation 
of Christianity as equally removed from both materialism and 
Evangelicalism, Muirhead concludes with the sentence,
"To him Christianity thus interpreted was the highest 
achievement of religion, itself the blossom and flower 
of the spirit—a position from which there is no going 
back for anyone who claims a future for it in the 
atmosphere of modern thought."3
This last sentence reveals the situation in its true light. 
Muirhead has seized on those features of Coleridge's thought 
which he believes to be in agreement with his own idealistic 
view of Christianity. Religion, it will be remembered, is to 
Coleridge philosophy plus history; and Christianity, Judaism 
plus Greece. Muirhead 1 s interpretation stresses the "Grecian"
1. Confessions, p.329.
2. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher T p.247n. (italics mine)
3. IbidS p.246.
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aspect to the neglect of the former. In doing so, It neglects 
half the facts.
In the first place there are the explicit state­ 
ments of Coleridge himself. Article 7. of the 1816 Confession 
of Faith reads:-
»1 receive with full and grateful faith the assurance of 
revelation, that the Word, which is from all eternity 
with God, and is God assumed our human nature in order 
to redeem me, and all mankind from this our connate 
corruption. My reason convinces me, that no other mode 
of redemption is conceivable, and as did Socrates, would 
have yearned after the Redeemer, though it would not dare 
expect so wonderful an act of divine love, except only as 
an effort of my mind to conceive the utmost of the infinite 
greatness of that love."
Article 71. carries this position further:-
"I believe, that this assumption of humanity by the Son 
of God, was revealed and realized to us by the Word 
made flesh, and manifested to us in Christ Jesus; and 
that his miraculous birth, his agony, his crucifixion, 
death, resurrection, and ascension, were all both symbols 
of our redemption ( ^»,v«/w«'/«. T~£>-> vo«y»«^«u^ ) and necess­ 
ary parts of the awful process." 1
This position is repeated sixteen years later in his 1832 Con­ 
fession. The second article or moment reads, "that the Creator 
is God, and a God who seeketh that which was lost, raiseth up 
that which had fallen—and this by the only-begotten Word incarn­ 
ate, God and Man." Again, in the note already mentioned in which 
Coleridge criticizes Schleiermacher's Heden, he proceeds to 
state the grounds of the possibility of a redeemer. "This is 
possible only under the two-fold condition, which I find 





Church—that he is my fellow-man, yet not my fellow-creature."
This is repeated substantially in a note on Jeremy Taylor, 
where he denounces
"the heresy of those who divided and severed the 
divinity from the humanity; so that not the incarnate 
God, very God of very God, would have atoned for us 
on the cross, but the incarnating man; a heresy which 
either denies or reduces to an absurdity the whole 
doctrine of redemption, that is, Christianity itself, 
which rests on the two articles of faith; first, the 
necessity, and secondly, the reality of a Redeemer— 
both articles alike incompatible with redemption by a 
mere man."2
It is difficult to see how such plain statements can be set 
aside.
In the second place, all of Coleridge's con­ 
stantly repeated strictures against the Unitarian or Soci£ian
theology, together with his statements on the Christian doc-
2 trine of Atonement, lose their whole point on the basis of
such a view as that of Dr. Muirhead.
"Socinianism," he holds, ?l is not a religion, but a 
theory, and that, too, a very pernicious, or a very 
unsatisfactory, theory. Pernicious,—for it excludes 
all our deep and awful ideas of the perfect holiness 
of God, his justice and his mercy, and thereby makes 
the voice of conscience a delusion, as having no corres­ 
pondent in the character of the legislator; regarding 
God as merely a good-natured pleasure-giver, so happi­ 
ness be produced, indifferent as to the means:—Unsatis­ 
factory, for it promises forgiveness without any solu­ 
tion of the difficulty of the compatibility of this 
with the justice of God; in no way explains the fallen 
condition of man, nor offers any means for his regenera­ 
tion. "4
1. MS.C, p.48. - Note of 1826.
2. Notes on English Divines. I. p.198.
3. Aids, pp.214-225.
4. Omni ana,, p.420.
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A typical utterance is the following, taken from the note on 
Schleiermacher, already quoted, "Christ 1 s humanity seems 
divine in subordination to his Divinity;—but is shorn of 
half ite 1 rays, when substituted for it." 1 Elsewhere he 
writes,
"The true life of Christians is to eye Christ in 
every step of his life—not only as their Rule but 
as their Strength: looking to him as their Pattern 
both in doing and in suffering, and drawing power 
from him for going through both: being without him 
able for nothing."2
In the Aids. Coleridge answers his own rhetorical question
as to the causal agent in the redemptive process, by replying,
"The Agent and Personal Cause of the Redemption of 
Mankind is—the co-eternal Word and only-begotten 
Son of the living God, incarnate, tempted, agonizing 
(agonistes ay*>v//»^«:vo, ) crucified, submitting to 
death, resurgent, communicative of his Spirit, ascendent, 
and obtaining for his Church the Descent, and Communion 
of the Holy Spirit, the Comforter." 3
In a note in Steffens 1 TJeber die Idee der IJniversltaten. 
Coleridge aeks what Steffens means by the word, Christ, and 
proceeds in criticism to state that he would have taken a 
different way of expressing his own faith.
n l would have followed St. John's example, and have 
called the Ens supremum or the absolutely Real, the 
co-eternal Offspring of the Absolute Cause of Reality, 
the Word relatively to the Eternal Mind; the Reason, 
the living self-subsistent Reason relatively to the 
Absolute Will and as its' only adequate Exponent— 
and then have shewn its incorporation in the visible 
World—and lastly, its 1 incarnation or personal Human- 
ization in the Son of Man, the Christ."^




4. British Museum Copy. - Note at end of volume.
204.
And again, there is the letter to his godchild already quoted 
in which Coleridge lays emphasis on the person of Jesus Christ 
as Redeemer and Saviour.
Thirdly, there is, in addition to his own
statements, the testimony of Gillman, with whom he lived for 
the last eighteen years of his life, that Coleridge's favourite 
Hew Testament writers were St. John and St. Paul, and that rt he 
died in the faith of these apostles." 2 To this there may be 
added the judgment of Dr. Watson, the editor of Coleridge's 
Theory of Life, that he was undoubtedly na pious Christian," 3 
and of Shedd, his .American editor, that Coleridge rt in the end 
embraced the Christian system" 4 and that, after all his investi­ 
gation, "saw his way clear into the region of Christian Revela­ 
tion and rested there." 5 Hort, writing a few years later of 
Coleridge's fondness for Luther, gave his judgment, n On the 
whole, this fervent sympathy with Luther is perhaps the truest
extant token of the man Coleridge antecedent to the poet or
/• 
the philosopher."
Coming to more recent critics, there is to be 
noted that Dr. Wardrop in his study of this question7 accepts 
the words of Coleridge as they stand and does not recognize
1. Letters. II. pp.775-776.
2. Gillman: op.cit., p.317.
3. Theory of Life. Preface Miscellanies, etc. p.358. 
Cf. Ibid: p.263.
4. Shedds Introductory Essay, Vol. I. p.IE.
5. Ibid: p.15.
6. HortJ Cambridge Essays, p.345.
7. Vardrop: The Dootrine of Atonement in Coleridge and Maurice 
Ph.D. Thesis. Edinburgh University, 1932. ———————"——
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the view expressed beet by Muirhead. Again, Dr. Wellek's 
censure of Coleridge as one who became in the end na 
defender of orthodoxy" may be noted.* To Wellek, Coleridge's 
"acquiescence in all the doctrine of the Anglican Church" 2 
is pernicious, but his recognition of this aspect of Cole­ 
ridge is testimony to the fact that Coleridge's Christian 
faith cannot be dismissed as negligible. Muirhead himself 
recognizes the fact also, but dismisses the matter by attribut­ 
ing it n to the exaggerated sense of his own mission as a 
renovator of the Christian religion, blown into a flame by 
the adulation of some of the more fanatical of his friends." 3 
Potter, following the lead of Muirhead, recognizes also this 
Christian element in Coleridge's thought, but refuses to take 
it seriously. He writes of him as one who ntried to keep on 
the windy side of orthodoxy," and suggests that in "his appar­ 
ent swing to orthodoxy there is something of an increasing 
physiological love of tradition."4 In accordance with his 
analysis of Coleridge, Potter attributes this "panic adoption 
of Christianity" to Coleridge's alter ego. nthe all-too-human 
Coleridge," and holds that it "is true of Coleridge down to 
a not very deep level." 6 Over against this typical modern 
analysis by Potter the sane balance of Hort's criticism is to 
be commended. Hort spoke the truth when he wrote that, with
1. WellekJ op.cit., p.135.
2. Ibid: p.129.
3. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher. p.E48.
4. Potter: Coleridge and S.T.C., pp.217-236
5. Ibid: p.235.
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the exception of two or three aberrations, "the Creeds have 
rarely had a believer at once so hearty and so intelligent."
Summing up, it is clear that there is an
authentic Christian element in Coleridge's thought, and that 
this element is seen clearly in his doctrine of redemption. 
"Not alone," he writes, "the knowledge of the boon, but the 
precious inestimable Boon itself, is the Grace and Truth that
came by Jesus Christ* I believe Moses, I believe Paul; but I
2believe in Christ." Allowing for the characteristic hyper­ 
bole of the statement, it reflects an element in his thought 
which cannot be dismissed as merely verbal. 3 The fact is, 
the two strains, idealistic and Christian, are interwoven in 
his thought. He himself sought an integration, but the inte­ 
gration was not to be at the expense of either of the two.
III. The Christian Doctrine of Atonement.
It is a mistake to assume that Coleridge's
reaction to the Evangelicalism of his day indicates a complete
4 break with the Christian tradition. Hather, it was in the
interests of a purified Christian faith that his life was
1. HortJ op.cit., p.344.
2. Aids, p.241.
3. Cf. Miscellanies, p.309. Commenting on Thomas Browne's 
statement that~~there is no salvation to those who be­ 
lieve not in Christ, Coleridge remarks:- M This is 
plainly confined to such as have had Christ preached 
to them;—but the doctrine, that salvation is in and 
by Christ only, is a most essential verity, and an 
article of unspeakable grandeur and consolation." 
Cf. Notes on English Divines. I. pp. 29, 73, 218.
4. Notes""on Englisn Divines. II. p.274.
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spent. This is clearly seen in the passage in the Aids, 
where Coleridge deals with redemption. 1 The error of 
contemporary orthodoxy, with its literalist interpretation 
of the Scriptures, was that it confused picture with fact. 
Coleridge does not call in question the Christian doctrines 
regarding the forgiveness of sin, and abolition of guilt, 
through the redemptive power of Christ's love.2 What he 
does criticize is the confusion between St. Paul's metaphor­ 
ical descriptionsof the effects of redemption and the redemp­ 
tive act itself. In particular, his strong sense of ethical 
reality protested against the current commercial and penal 
theories of the Atonement. 3
Coleridge lays down the principle that redemp­ 
tion may be considered in a two-fold relation; first, in rela­ 
tion to the causal antecedent. the Redeemer's act, and 
secondly, in relation to the consequent effects in and for 
the redeemed. The causative act is transcendent and ultim­ 
ately a mystery. At one point Coleridge states."Facturn est: 
and beyond the information contained in the enunciation of 
the Fact, it can be characterized only by the consequences."*
1. Aids, pp.214-225.
2. ToTI: p.214.
3. Cf. Notes on English Divines. I. pp.41-43. The original 
notes on which the whole argument in the Aids is based 
are dated May 4th, 1819. The date is significant in 
view of what has been noted above regarding his reputed 




The consequences from the effect of "being born anew: as 
before in the flesh to the world, so now born in the spirit 
to Christ," are sanetification from sin and liberation 
from the inherent penalties consequent to sin in the world 
to come. These consequences, Coleridge contends, are described 
by St. Paul in Jewish metaphors, and by St. John in analogies.
Coleridge argues that it is reasonable to ex­ 
pect that St. Paul's thought would be coloured by his own past 
and that he naturally would adopt the thought forms of his own 
period. Coleridge lists "the four principal metaphors'* used
by St. Paul as illustrations of the consequences of Christ f s
o
redemption of mankindj-
1. Sin-offerings, sacrificial expiation.
2. Reconciliation, atonement,
3. Ransom from slavery, redemption, the buying back again, 
or being bought back.
4. Satisfaction of a creditor's claims by a payment of the 
debt.
Coleridge argues that under one or other of these all of St. 
Paul's writings on the mediation of Christ may be referred, 
and, further, that "the very number and variety of the words 
or periphrases used by him to express one and the same thing
furnish the strongest presumptive proof that all alike were
« 
used metaphorically." It is not necessary to pause over
Coleridge's statement that St. Paul is concerned with bring­ 
ing home to the minds of his readers and hearers only the con­ 
sequences of the act of redemption. It is, in fact,
1. Aids, p.223.




On the other hand, St. John, according to 
Coleridge, "enunciates the fact itself, to the full extent 
in which it is enunciable for the human mind, simply and 
without any metaphor." 1 St. John makes use of the analogy 
of birth. "In the Bedeemed it is a re-gene rat ion, a birth,
a spiritual seed impregnated and evolved, the germinal
2 principle of a higher and enduring life, of a spiritual life."
This constitutes "the differential of immortality," since
"regeneration to spiritual life is at the same time a redemp-
* 
tion from the spiritual death."
Here, then, was the first mistake of the 
theologians of the day. They confused metaphor with fact 
and then applied the metaphorical ideas to the redeeming act 
itself, its motive and its necessity. In doing so they failed 
to grasp the true significance of the Pauline metaphors, Re­ 
garded as metaphorical descriptions of the effects or "conse­ 
quents" of the redemptive act, as realized in the experience 




3. Ibid: p.217. Cf. Southey: Life of Wesley. II. p.361. Note 
"I profess myself unable to conceive how the truth of the 
Gospel can be brought home to, or laid hold of, by a 
sinner, without something more than a vague XYZ—without 
some realising apprehension of that from which we are to 
be rescued. This seems indispensable to the intelligi­ 
bility of Christianity. Without it, the Gospel is the 
fragment of a sentence."
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"the same for the Sinner relatively to God and his own 
Soul, as the satisfaction of a debt for a debtor relatively 
to his creditor; as the sacrificial atonement made by 
the priest for the transgressor of the Mosaic Law; as 
the reconciliation to an alienated parent for a son who 
had estranged himself from his father's house and 
presence; and as a redemptive ransom for a slave or 
captive." 1
In the second place, the "Bargain and Purchase 
Theologians," as he calls them, failed, to distinguish between 
persons and things. Coleridge repudiates the idea of Christ's 
sufferings and death being a "satisfaction" or payment of debt
a
to God in the absolute sense of contemporary orthodoxy. 
Even granting for the sake of argument the validity of a theory 
involving debt, satisfaction, payment in full, and the like, in 
short, a theory based on a notion of justice, Coleridge asks, 
"Is this Justice a moral attribute?" 4
"If you attach any meaning to the term Justice, as 
applied to God," Coleridge writes, "it must be the 
same to which you refer when you affirm or deny it 
of any other personal agent—save only, that in itd 
attribution to God, you speak of it as unmixed and 
perfect." 5
Coleridge illustrates this principle by two imag­ 
inary stories. In the first a sum of money is owing from one 
man to another. The debtor is insolvent and is saved from ruin 
by the payment of the debt by a friend. Complete commercial 









In the second story, the debt is not one of 
money, but of gratitude and love owing from a prodigal son 
to a worthy mother. A friend steps in and performs, as a 
"vicarious son," the duties of sonship. Coleridge asks 
whether this will satisfy the mother's claims on her son or 
entitle him to her esteem, approbation, and blessing. The 
form of the question indicates the negative answer. But, 
adds Coleridge, if by the force of the example of the vicar­ 
ious son, or persuasion, the prodigal should be led to repent­ 
ance, then the mother would be wholly satisfied. But this is 
only because it is no longer a question of things. The pass­ 
age is of some importance historically, foreshadowing as it 
does the developed moral influence theory of Horace Bushnell. 
It may be given, therefore, in full, as published in 1825. 
The notes on which it is based date from 1819.
"If indeed by the force of Matthew's example, by per­ suasion or by additional and more mysterious influences, or by an inward co-agency, compatible with the existence of a personal will, James should be led to repent; if through admiration and love of this great goodness 
gradually assimilating his mind to the mind of his bene­ factor, he should in his own person become a grateful and dutiful child— then doubtless the mother would be wholly 
satisfied 1." 2
Although Coleridge does not enlarge this analogy 
in relation to Christ's mediation, he is certain that in the 
case of redemption "the beneficial act is the first, the indis­ 
pensable condition." Then follows the "co-efficient," 3 or




reaction on the part of the sinner. Although liberation must 
be attributed to the act and free grace of another, yet 
"reaction or co-agency" is necessary on the part of the redeemed
Hence, it is not impossible for the spiritually 
disciplined mind to realize that the redemptive act, though 
ultimately a "mystery," supposes "an agent who can at once act 
on the Will as an exciting cause, quasi ab extra; and in the 
Will, as the condition of its potential, and the ground of its 
actual, being." Only on such a supposition is redemption even 
negatively conceivable. In a note written in a copy of Kant's 
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloszen Yernunft Coleridge 
attempts to show how divine influence on the will of man is 
rationally conceivable. Accepting the Kantian assumption of the 
difference between the apparent and the real man, Coleridge 
declines to follow Kant in his denial of the action of outer 
influences on the will.
While admitting that "regeneration through an 
act and energy of the diseased Arbitrement aided and fostered 
by a supernatural Will, or divine agency" is ultimately a
Aids, p.225.
N.B. In 1808, Coleridge wrote to Estlin:- "The Calvinistic Tenet of a vicarious Satisfaction I reject not without some Horror, and though I believe that the Redemption by Christ implies more than what the Unitarians under­ stand by the phrase, yet I use it rather as an XYZ, an unknown Quantity, than as words to which I pretend to annex clear notions. I believe, that in the salvation of man, a spiritual process sui generis is required, a spiritual aid and agency, the nature of which I am wholly ignorant of, as a cause, and only imperfectly apprehend it from its necessity and its effects. (Miscellanies of the Philobiblon Society.Vol.X7. pp. 105-106. Letter of— December 3, 1808.)
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mystery, yet he finds analogies to it
"in the undoubted influence of example, of education, in 
short of all the administrants and auxiliaries of the 
Will, The will then may be acted on, not only by our­ 
selves in the cultivation of auxiliary Habits, but by 
the will of others—nay, even by nature, by the Breeze, the Sunshine, by the tender life & freshness of the 
sensation of convalescence, by shocks of Sickness." 1
"Why then," Coleridge continues tentatively, 
after referring to George Herbert's poem, The Sonne,
"not an influence of influences from the Sun of God, 
with the Spirit of God acting directly on the Homo tfoa^t^ov t as well as thro' the Homo Phaenomenon? 
This would make a just distinction between Grace and 
Redemption and Providential Aids; the direct action on the noumenon would be the grace—the call—the influence on the noumenon through the homo phaenomenon by the pre- arrangement of outward or bodily circumstances would be, as they are commonly called in pious language, provid­ ences ."
Whether Coleridge himself would have been satis­ 
fied with these speculations is doubtful. Certainly, in the 
Biographia. he declares against such a distinction between the 
apparent and the real man, on the assumption of which the 
speculative note is based. What is certain is that the redemp­ 
tive power must act as an influence in the will.
"No power," he writes in 1830, "can be redemptive which does not at the same time act in the ground of the life as one with the ground, that is, must act in my will 
and not merely on my will; and yet extrinsically as an outward power, that is, as that which outward Nature ie 
to the organisation, viz. the causa correspondens et conditio perpetua ab extra."3 —
VMM ^BW ^^B ^^» *•• ••• ^^m «^"» ^^* ^^~ ^^m "i^ *^" ^BW m^» ^MM "——• ««M ^MB ^^v ^^v ^^m ••» ^M. ••• _^ ^w ^^^ ••» ^^_ JT^ ^™»
1. Note in Kant? op.cit., p.297. British Museum Copy. Printed Nldecker: Revue de lltterature comparfe.VII. pp.144-146. Quoted in Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher pp.249-250 "-/ *_• »J_* ^» _a_A J_ " ' I* '"^•^•^ f ••i*i"^^^^a-^i » i —~^***m "»"^^-«^-^--a 9 * * * ** *X VX »(slightly different here.)
2. Biographia_Literaria. p.127.
3. Letters, II. p.710.
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Coleridge therefore continues,
"The Redeemer cannot be merely God, unless we adopt 
Pantheism, that is, deny the existence of a God; and 
yet God he must be, for whatever is less than God, may 
act on. but cannot act in, the will of another. Christ 
must become man, but he cannot become us, except as 
far as we become him, and this we cannot do but by 
assimilation; and assimilation is a vital real act,not 
a notional or merely intellective oneTTTTFor it is 
evident, that the assimilation in question is to be 
carried oft by faith."*
Coleridge here is insistent on two things: first, the necess­ 
ity of God's action in redemption; and second, the necessity 
of man's response or "co-agency" in the redemptive process. 
It was at this latter point that he joined issue with a 
Calvinism that regarded the soul as merely passive. That the 
soul must be active, active even in such an event or process 
as redemption, was basic to his whole thought.
In his insistence on the distinction between
P the Pauline metaphors and the redemptive act itself, and in
his rejection of commercial and judicial theories in favour 
of a more personal conception of the work of salvation, Cole­ 
ridge struck two notes of undoubted value.^ From the point 
of view of history they are of tremendous importance as giving 
the first impulse to the movement towards the adoption of more 
ethical conceptions, the movement manifested in the work of
1. letters. II. p.710.
2. Of. Notes. Theological. Political and Miscellaneous pp.103-104 
Cf. Rotes on English Divines. II. p»227.————————'
3. Tide Franks; A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ II. p.379. ~~———-——————————— 
Vide TullochJ op.cit., pp.22-23.
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Maurice, Erskine, Bushnell and MacLeod Campbell.
On the other hand, it is legitimate to ask by 
what criterion Coleridge is able to distinguish between what 
is metaphor and what is analogy, to use his own distinction. 
The distinction, in itself, is understandable. But on what 
basis is Coleridge able to assert, for instance, that recon­ 
ciliation is a metaphor, while birth is an analogy? And, 
aside from the question of exegesis, 2 how does it chance that 
St. Paul uses only metaphors and St. John only analogies? 
Here the weakness of Coleridge's particular theory of language 
becomes only too patent.
Again, as Shedd pointed out, it may be asked 
whether Coleridge's apparent lack of interest in the tran­ 
scendent or divine aspect of the redemptive act does not indi­ 
cate a failure to grasp the full significance of the Christian 
doctrine of the Atonement. 3 It is necessary in the first place 
to make due allowance for the apologetic interest which, 
dominant in the Aids, precludes a full treatment of the doc­ 
trine. Coleridge states explicitly that his one object is 
that of "clearing this awful mystery from those too current mis­ 
representations of its nature and import that have laid it open 
to scruples and objections." 4 Further, one may express, as
1. Vide Sabatier: The Doctrine of the Atonement and its 
Historical Evolution pp.97-98. ~"
2. Of. Notes on English Divines, II. pp.302-303.
3. Shedd: Introductory Essay. 7ol. I. pp.53-55.
4. Aids, p.207.
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does Tulloch, 1 a judgment in favour of Coleridge's principle 
of Christian agnosticism. As against the claim to explicit 
and detailed knowledge of the workings of the Divine Mind, 
which characterized the orthodoxy of his day, there is much 
to be said for Coleridge's reticence.
Bushnell, his American disciple, held that 
Coleridge took a wholly subjective view of the nature and 
value of Christ's work, that its effect is wholly on man and 
has no effect on God. 2 Although differing from Bushnell in 
certain respects, Wardrop, in recent years, takes a similar 
view. He maintains that the whole bearing of Coleridge's 
teaching is in line with the principle underlying the Pat­ 
ristic Bansom Theory, 3 namely deliverance from evil as opposed 
to satisfaction to God, 4 Certainly Coleridge repudiates the 
idea of Christ's death being a satisfaction or payment of debt 
to God in a literal sense and lays emphasis on redemption as 
deliverance from the bondage of evil, Wardrop does good ser­ 
vice in drawing attention to this aspect of Coleridge's 
thought. It is going beyond the evidence, however, to assert 
that Coleridge's answer to the Cur Deus Homo? of Anselm n is 
the evil and the evil alone — not God at all.n ^ As Fisher
1. TullochJ op.cit. fp.23. Cf. Grensted: A Short History of the 
Doctrine of the Atonement. pp. 26 6-2 67 T where he notes 
Bishop Butler as the chief exponent of "intellectual 
humility." "Butler is content to assert the objective effi­ 
cacy of Christ's death as against Deistic rationalists 
without inquiry into its method." '
2. Bushnell: Christ in Theology, p.233.
3. Wardrop: op,cit. t p*99.
4. Vide Aulen: Christus Victor.
5. Wardrop: op.cit., pp. 33-34 7
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remarks, "It is a mistake to attribute to Coleridge the 
opinion that the atoning work of Christ consists in its 
power to affect the minds of men.* Coleridge's one inter­ 
est in the Aids is the consequences for man of the redemptive
lore of God.
There can be no question as to his own faith. 
In an ex officio note, where the man stands clearly revealed, 
he writes,
"Without Christ, or in any other power but that of 
Christ, and (subjectively) of faith in Christ, no man 
can be saved.....If he verily embrace Christ as his 
Redeemer, and unfeignedly feel in himself the necess- 
its of Redemption, he implicitly holds the Divinity 
of Christ ."2
Elsewhere, Coleridge argues with insight that the Christian 
Doctrine of the Trinity derives from the experience of re­ 
demption, 3 and in the Aids asserts explicitly, "On the doc­ 
trine of Redemption depends the Faith, the Duty, of believing 
in the Divinity of our Lord."4
It is not surprising, therefore, to find certain 
passages which indicate that Coleridge was at times prepared to 
go beyond Jaotum Est. In the Appendix to the Statesman 1 s 
Manual he writes:- "From God's love through His Son, crucified 
for us from the beginning of the world, religion begins: and 
in love towards God and the creatures of God it hath its end
1. Fishers History of Doctrine, p.449.
2. Notes on English Divines. II. pp.149-150.
3. Omniana. p.438. Cf. Hole's on English Divines. I. p.68.
4. Aids, p. 120.
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and completion ,ni And in a letter to the Reverend Edward 
Coleridge, written probably in 1825, he says, "The World was 
made for the Gospel—or that Christianity is the final Cause 
of the World. If so, the Idea of the Redemption of the World 
must needs form the best central Reservoir for all our know­ 
ledges physical or personal." In a note on a Sermon of 
Donne, Coleridge writes of the crucifixion, resurrection and 
ascension of Christ as the
n visible words of the invisible Word that was in the beginning, symbols in time and historic fact of the redemptive functions, passions, and procedures of the Lamb crucified from the foundation of the world;- the incarnation, cross, and passion,—in short, the whole life of Christ in the flesh....being essential and substantive parts of the process, the total of which they represented."3
Such passages, taken together with those al­ 
ready quoted concerning the God" who seeketh that which was 
lost," indicate that to Coleridge,in the last analysis^the 
nature of God is redemptive. From a review of the whole 
matter the impression grows that, for Coleridge, the Incarna­ 
tion in all its fulness is the Atonement. A note in the Aids 
is striking in its tone:-
"God manifested in the flesh is Eternity in the form of Time. But Eternity in relation to Time is the absolute to the conditional, or the real to the apparent, and Redemption must partake of both;—always perfected, for it is a ?iat of the Eternal;-
1. Appendix to Statesman's Manual; Biog. Lit. p.356.
2.. Unpublished Letters, II. p.358.
Cf. Notes on English Divines. I. p.87.3. Notes on English Divines. I. pp.79-80. Cf. Ibid: II. p.lEO.4. MS. C, p.166. Vide Chapter 71. Section 7.
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continuous, for it is a process in relation to man; 
the former, the alone objectively, and therefore 
universally, true.1* 1
Such a note reveals clearly the double strain in Coleridge's 
thought and his attempt to seek an integration. It reveals 
also how the one checked and influenced the other. In redemp­ 
tion, God acts through the Word. Here is his Platonism. In 
redemption, God has acted through the Word Incarnate. Here 
is his Christian faith.
1. Aids p.209n.
Of. Notes Theol.. Pol, and Misc.. p.145. n the mosl 
important division.....is, whether the essence of 
Christianity be to make us better men only, or to 
make us other men,—'create in us a new heart.'"
CHAPTER IX.
The Immortality of the Soul
I. Early Discussion.
Shortly after the death of Coleridge in July 
1834, his friend, Charles Lamb, wrote of him, "He had a 
hunger for Eternity."* No better description of Coleridge 
during the latter part of his life could be given. As far 
as can be determined, Coleridge never, at any time in his 
life, doubted the immortality of the soul. It was not a 
belief to which he came by any avenue of proof. It was at 
every point an essential part of his religion. Eternity was 
set in his heart. But, as with each article of his belief, 
he strove constantly to give it more adequate expression.
As a youth, he sang of happiness continuing
"Till Death shall close thy tranquil eye 
While Faith proclaims 'Thou shalt not die 1. 1 " 2
In 1794, on the death of a friend, he asked:
"Is this piled earth our Being's passless mound? 
Tell me, cold grave 1, is Death with poppies crown*d?" 3
1. Monthly Magazine, February 8, 1845. Printed in Watson: 
Coleridge at Highgate. p.164.
2. Poems. pTgg. (1791)
3. Poems, p.77
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And in 1796, Coleridge answered his own question.
"To my more natural Reason, ..... (The death of a young 
person) .... .appears like a transition; there seems an 
incompleteness in the life of such a person, contrary 
to the general order of nature; and it makes the heart 
say, 'this is not all. 1 " 1
This argument from "incompleteness," to which both head and 
heart gave assent in IV 96, was one to which Coleridge con­ 
stantly returned. It appears in the Aids of 1825. The
appearance of the argument in writings separated so widely
p 
indicates its importance in Coleridge's mind."
Again, if the soul be immortal, life in some 
sense or other is essential. As early as 1796 he rejected 
the idea of annihilation. 3 The death of his son, Berkeley, 
in 1799, served to confirm this. Life does not cease. "I 
will not believe that it ceases — in this moving, stirring, 
and harmonious universe — I cannot believe
Priestley's argument from the words and mir­ 
acles of Jesus affords Coleridge no satisfaction. His argu­ 
ment is otherwise, as the lines of 1801 indicate;
"God is with me, God is in me 1.
I cannot die, if Life be Love.M&
1. Unpublished Letters I. p.64.
2. Cf. a note of 1806-1807, Anima Poetae. p.184. - "Our
mortal existence," he notes, "what is it but a stoppage 
in the blood of life, a brief eddy from wind or con­ 
course of currents in the ever-flowing ocean of pure 
Activity."
3» Letters. I. p.211.
4. Ibid: I. p.285.
5. Poems, p.360.
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This argument, from the nature of personal relations, a 
nature that differentiates man from the beasts, is another 
basic principle in Coleridge 1 s doctrine of immortality. 
It is expanded in 1808, when the appeal is made to conscience 
as the differentia of man. Conscience, in this case, is 
known in personal relations. Quoting the lines written in 
1801, he comments:-
"And now, that I am alone and utterly hopeless for my­ 
self, yet still I love—and more strongly than ever 
feel that conscience or the duty of love is the proof 
of continuing, as it is the cause and condition of 
existing consciousness......And for what reason, say
rather for what cause, do you believe in immortalityv 
Because I ought. therefore I must 1." 2
This appeal to conscience appears again in 1806 in the import­ 
ant letter to Clarkson. The growth of consciousness is the 
end of our earthly being. Conscience has no meaning if 
existence ceases suddenly at a jpoint. The very idea of con­ 
sciousness implies n a recollection after the Sleep of Death 
of all material circumstances that were at least immediately
n
previous to it." It appears once more in 1811, where it is 
related to Coleridge's refutation of the materialist's argu­ 
ment that, because the soul is influenced by the body, there­ 
fore the break-up of the body means the death of the soul. 
"The influence of the body on the soul," Coleridge states,"will 
not prove the common destiny of both." Man is not the slave 
of nature, but uses nature for his own ends. In an
mmm ^^ ^^ ^^ *^ »_- —————— ^^ •• -"^ ———— ^» «^™ «^™ ^™ ™^ "•" ^"" ————— ^™ ^~ ™• ^™• "^ ••••• ————— ^——— ————— ——~ ^——— ^MM
1. Cf. Letters. I. pp.364-365.
2. Anima Poetae. pp.201-203.
3. Unpublished letters, I. pp.358-359.
4. Omniana. pp.418-419.
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unpublished note this point is strongly emphasized:
"Death—sudden or otherwise, but having no other 
demonstrable Action or Consequence than that of 
removing or incapacitating the means and existing 
conditions of the Manifestation of Life and Mind; 
and of course therefore, suspending the Manifesta­ 
tion itself."1
In 1814, at the period of his greatest dis­ 
tress, Coleridge has some striking remarks on the question 
of punishment and universal restitution. Writing to his 
Unitarian friend, Dr. Estlin, Coleridge comments on the latter 1 s 
work on universal restitution. Universal restitution is true, 
he says, if it be granted that punishment is remedial only. 
At this time, Coleridge needed above all things a remedy for 
his ills. Gladly would he have undergone any remedial punish­ 
ment. Yet his moral sense revolted at the thought. In view 
of his own condition, his words are to be noted carefully.
"I believe," he writes, "that punishment is essentially 
vindictive, i.e. expressive of abhorrence of Sin for its 
own exceeding sinfulness: from all experience (N.B.), as 
well as a priori from the constitution of the human Soul, 
I gather tnat without a miraculous intervention of Omni­ 
potence the Punishment must continue as long as the soul, 
which I believe imperishable. God has promised no such 
miracle, he has covenanted no such mercy, I have no right 
therefore to believe or rely upon it. It may be so, but 
woe to me I if I presume on it. There is a great differ­ 
ence.......between the assertion 'It is so. and 1 I have
no right to assert the contrary. "2
1. British Museum Manuscript, Egerton EbOl, folio 94. 
Cf. Notes on English Divines, I. p.259.
2. Miscellanies of the Philobibl'on Society, Vol.XV. pp.109-112 Letter of April 5, 1814.——————————
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Crabb Robinson reports Coleridge as suggesting, in 1819, that 
"possibly the punishment of a future life may consist in 
bringing back the consciousness of the past." Such a con­ 
sciousness was a daily punishment for Coleridge. It is not 
difficult to see how such a suggestion as repcrted by 
Robinson arose. The point is, that though Coleridge was ready 
to discuss the kind of punishment, he did not alter his opinion 
concerning the meaning of punishment. Here, as elsewhere, his 
fine moral sense carried him to the heart of the problem.
Coleridge's interest in the question of immort­ 
ality never flagged. The poem on Human Life, on the Denial of
o
Immortality was written probably in 1815. It echoes the argu­ 
ments from M incompleteness" and from the supernatural character 
of man. If man's life ceases at death, then he is
"Surplus of Nature's dread activity." 
Life loses all meaning.
"Be sad', be gladfc be neither', seek, or shun'. 
Thou hast no reason why'. Thou canst have none; 
Thy being's being is contradiction."
In 1816, belief in the immortality of the soul 
is included in the first half of his Confession of Faith. The 
influence of Kant is clear. "I believe in the life to come, 
not through arguments acquired by my understanding or discursive 
faculty, but chiefly and effectively, because so to believe is 
my duty,and in obedience to the commands of my conscience/1 ^




A letter to Allsop in 18EO reveals Coleridge's interest in 
the nature of existence after death: what differences may be 
expected for different individuals, what analogies throw 
light on the problem, and how the balance between other- 
worldliness and this-worldliness may best be preserved. This 
continued interest in the problem indicates to what extent the 
doctrine was basic to Coleridge.
II. Immortality and Ethics.
Not only was belief in the immortality of the 
soul an essential part of Coleridge's religion, it was funda­ 
mental also in his conception of a rational ethics. In a 
sense this is to be expected, in view of his claim for the 
religious foundation of morality, and the close connection of 
the religious and moral sanctions that is a constant feature
of his writings. Explicit evidence is afforded in a note
2 written in a copy of Kant's Yermischte Schriften.
"I cannot conceive a supreme moral Intelligence, unless 
I believe in my own Immortality—for I must believe in 
a whole system of apparent means to an end, which end 
had no existence—my Conscience, my progressive faculties, 
&c—But give up this and Virtue wants all reason—Away 
with Stoic Hypocricy: I know that in order to (?) the 
idea of Virtue, we must suppose the pure good will, or 
reverence for the Law as excellent in itself—but this 
very excellence supposes consequences, tho 1 not selfish 
ones. Let my maxim be capable of becoming the Law of all 
intelligent Beings—well 1, but this supposes an end poss­ 
ible by intelligent Beings—?or if the Law be barren of
1. Allsop: Letters, Conversations & Recollections, p.60.-
Letter of August 8, 1820.
2. Kant: Vermischte Schriften in Ottery St. Mary Marginalia.
I. pp.33-35. 
Cf. MuirheadJ Coleridge as Philosopher,, pp. 154,233.
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all consequences, what i s it but words? To obey the 
Law for its own sake is really a mere sophism, in any 
other sense—ycu might as well put Abracadabra in its 
place. I can readily conceive that I have it in my 
nature to die a martyr, knowing that annihilation 
followed Death, if it were possible to believe that all 
other human Beings were immortal and to be benefited 
by it—but any benefit that could affect only a set of 
transitory Animals, (for) which I could not deem myself 
worthy of any exertion in my behalf, how can I deem 
others (worthy) of the same lot? Boldly should I say— 
0 Nature 1. I would rather not have been—let that which 
is to come so soon, come now—for what is all the inter­ 
mediate space, but sense of utter worthlessness?
This strong protest against the attempt to separate ethics 
from a belief in immortality finds poetic expression in the 
lines already quoted,
"Be sad 1, be glad 1, be neither 1, seek, or shun'. 
Thou hast no reason why 1. Thou canst have none; 
Thy being's being is contradiction." 2
Such a protest is directed not only against Paley's ethical 
doctrine, based on consequence as the sole criterion, but 
runs counter to Kant's stoicism. Immortality is more than 
a mere postulate. This divergence from Kant will become more 
evident in the discussion of Coleridge's developed doctrine.
III. The Developed Doctrine.
It is evident that by the time Coleridge came 
to place his views before the public in the Aids of 1825, the 
main lines of his approach to the question had been firmly 
established. The familiar positions appear once more in his 
comments on Jereray Taylor's argument that the disproportion 
between the prosperity of the wicked and that of the good in
1. Vide Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher. pp,137 7161, for 
a discussion of Coleridge's ethical theory.
2. Poems, p.426.
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this life makes it necessary to believe in nanother state of 
things, where justice should rule, and virtue find her own 
portion." Such an argument closely resembles Kant's. In 
view of Coleridge's acceptance of the Kantian emphasis on 
conscience in his earlier years, it is all the more surpriz­ 
ing to see him breaking loose from the German thinker at this 
point, and asserting, in addition, other grounds for the be­ 
lief. As Dr. Muirhead remarks, "Here, as elsewhere, the
2 
appeal, though not explicitly, is from Kant to Plato."
While giving full credit to Taylor's argument 
from the disparity between moral worth and worldly prosperity, 
Coleridge argues that such an argument does not stand by it­ 
self, but points to something deeper, to the contradiction in 
human nature itself, "The Riddle of Fortune and Circumstance 
is but a form or effluence of the Riddle of Man/' 3 This con­ 
tradiction in man is two-fold;—first, the lack of harmony be­ 
tween mind and will, n a struggle of jarring impulses;" and 
second, "the utter incommensurateness and the unsatisfying 
qualities" of the objects which the senses discover, and appe-
A
tite desires. The solution therefore must be sought in the 
"something of human nature which is exclusively human." 5 Senses 
and appetite are related to perishable things. But mind and 
will ally themselves with whatever has the character of
1. Aids, p.234.




permanence amid continual flux, enduring n unchanged like a 
rainbow in a fast-flying shower.'1 In short, such things 
as beauty, order, harmony, finality, law, are all akin to 
the "peculia of humanity," are allncongenera of Mind and 
Will, without which indeed they would not only exist in 
vain, as pictures for moles, but actually not exist at all." 
The soul of man, therefore, as the subject of mind and will, 
"must likewise possess a principle of permanence, and be
n
destined to endure. 11 *
.Again, Coleridge points to the universality
of belief, the presentiment, the pre-assurance, of a life
3 
beyond. Such a pre-assurance cannot prove delusive, if all
other prophecies of nature have their exact fulfilment. "In 
every other ingrafted word of promise, nature is found true 
to her word; and is it in her noblest creature, that she tells 
her first lie?" 4
Such arguments, he readily admits, cannot 
amount to conclusive proof. Indeed, the immortality of the
1. Aids, p.236.
2. Ibid: p.236. Of. Table Talk, p.19. "Either we have an 
immortal soul, or we have not. If we have not, we are 
beasts; the first and wisest of beasts, it may be; but 
still true beasts."
3- Aids, pp.236-238.
. Of. Notes on English Divines I. p.352. "The argument 
from the mere universality of the belief, appears to me 
far stronger in favour of a surviving soul and a state 




soul, as an idea, is indemonstrable. The weight of the 
arguments count, however, in a "balance "where there is no­ 
thing in the opposite scale." "In the scale of immortality" 
slight reasons are weighty in proportion to the lack of counter­ 
weights. On the other hand, there are "no facts in proof of 
the contrary, that would not prove equally well the cessation 
of the eye on the removal or diffraction of the eye-glass, 
and the dissolution or incapacity of the musician on the frac­ 
ture of his instrument or its strings." 2
17. Christianity and Immortality.
In the light of the above it is not to be
wondered why Coleridge should have scorned the arguments of 
Priestley and of Paley. 3 The object of the Christian dispensa­ 
tion was not to satisfy man that there is a future state; 
neither is belief in immortality the exclusive attribute of 
Christianity. As a fundamental article of all religion it is
A
necessarily an article of the Christian Faith. Coleridge's 
appeal to the authority of the New Testament, at the close of 
the argument in the Aids, is accordingly to the Epistles to
1. Aids, p.236.
2. Ibids p«£56. This is repeated in a note in Tennemann: 
Qeschicjbe der Philosophic. Vol. II. pp.76-78, 
British Museum Copy. 
Cf. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher. p.235n.
3. Cf. Notes on English Divines, II. pp.51-52.
4. Aids, p.233.
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the Romans and to the HeDrews. Here the emphasis is 
spiritual, rather than physical, 2 the whole argument turning, 
not on the proof of immortality afforded by Jesus, but on 
the salvation offered in Christ. This salvation is not from 
temporal death, or the penalties and afflictions of the pres­ 
ent life. It is rather redemption from the condemnation to
ijr
death to which the law sentences all sinners. This death 
Mmust be the same death, from which they were saved by the 
faith of the Son of God." That is to say, it is spiritual 
death.
The question, Coleridge holds, is not whether 
there is a judgment to come, "and souls to suffer the dread 
sentence,** but where grace and redemption may be found. That 
is to say, immortality is assumed. The question then concerns 
the content of this immortality.
"Not therefore, that there is a Life to come, and a 
future state; but what each individual Soul may hope 
for itself therein; and on what grounds; and that 
this state has been rendered an object of aspiration 
and fervent desire, and a source of thanksgiving and 
exceeding great joy; and by whom, and through whom, 
and for whom, and by what means and under what condi­ 
tions—these are the peculiar and distinguishing funda­ 
mentals of the Christian Faith 1." 5
1. Aids, pp.238-241, It is difficult to understand Muirhead's 
remark in this connection, Coleridge as Philosopher, p.235 
"It (the appeal to St. Paul) is not, as we might otherwise 
have expected, to the argumentation of I Corinthians, 
Chap.xv. that we are referred." In view of his own exposi­ 
tion of Coleridge 1 s thought, why "might we otherwise have 
expected" such an appeal?





In its final form Coleridge's argument connects intimately 
the whole question of immortality with that of redemption. 
And, as is the case with both doctrines, the specific 
Christian element is prominent.
Dr. Muirhead's usually fine criticism is at 
fault at this point. He notes the relation between redemp­ 
tion and immortality in Coleridge's thought, holding that 
in Coleridge's hands the argument "turns from one for the 
survival of the soul in another life, into one for its salva­ 
tion in this life by rising through grace to communion with 
God."* But this again is only half the truth. Salvation for 
Coleridge commences in this life and concerns itself with this 
life. But this is not the end of the matter. Redemption in 
this life points beyond to salvation in the life everlasting 
and "what each individual Soul may hope for itself therein."
Again the redemption of which Coleridge writes 
centres in Christ. Dr. Muirhead fails to appreciate this 
fully, as he omits from his concluding quotation from Cole­ 
ridge certain significant words. The words "and by whom, and 
through whom, and for whom, and by what means and under what 
conditions" are omitted from the quotation that speaks of "the 
peculiar and distinguishing fundamentals of the Christian Faith." 2 
It would appear that here, as elsewhere, Dr. Muirhead's own 
particular idealistic view of Christianity prevents a full appre­ 
ciation of the specific Christian strain in Coleridge's thought.
1. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.236.
2. Ibid: p.236:Cf. Aids/ P.24J. ——
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There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Coleridge's final 
word in this instance—"I believe Moses, I believe Paul; but
I believe in Christ." It cannot be dismissed as mere verbal
2 rhetoric, or explained away on the grounds of morbidness.
It reflects a genuine element in his experience and thought.
V. Some Additional Considerations.
(a) The Nature of the After-Life.
Coleridge is not concerned with the phenomenal 
conditions of the life everlasting. Self-consciousness, at 
least, is essential. "Without self-consciousness there is 
no subject for immortality." 3 And this implies growth in 
some manner, some "continued progression," some development 
"into the perfected Spirit." 5 But aside from this, he dis­ 
claims any knowledge of how self-consciousness functions.
(b) Eternal Punishment.
In a letter to Cottle Coleridge discusses the 
question of eternal punishment. After commenting on the New 
Testament use of <*'»*»VK»« ^ an,i on the declarations in 
Scripture that all flesh shall be saved finally, Coleridge
1. Aids. p.E4l.
2. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, pp.36,255.
3. Southey: Life of Wesley. II. p.91n.
4. Ibid: II. p.91n.
5. Letters, II. pp.762-763. - Letter of August 13, 1852.
6. Cottle: Early Recollections, I. pp.204-208. In criticism 
of a passage in Religioas""Musings as "far too bold," 
and "easily misconstrued into Spinosism," Coleridge 
writes, "I was very young when I wrote that poem." This 
indicates a date when Coleridge's opinions were fairly 
mature. Cottle places the letter, quite arbitrarily, be­ 
tween one dated October 18,1796, and one of 1807.
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holds: first, "that it would be more pious to assert nothing 
concerning it (the doctrine of eternal punishment) one way 
or the other; 11 second, that if men cannot be diverted from 
wickedness by the offer of eternal blessedness, by the love 
of God, by gratitude, by the fear of punishment unknown as 
to extent and duration, but "unimaginably great," then the 
term eternal holds little significance by itself; third, that 
"scarcely any" believe ineternal punishment with any practical 
reference to themselves. "They all hope in God's mercy, till 
they make it a presumptious watchword for religious indiffer­ 
ence." Fourth, Coleridge holds that a Christian stands in a 
perilous state "if he has gotten no further than to avoid evil 
from the fear of hell." "To him who but for a moment felt 
the influence of God's presence, the thought of eternal exclus­ 
ion from the sense of that presence would be the worst hell his 
imagination could conceive." finally, there is the relation 
that exists between man and God, as creature and Creator.
"I admit of no right," he concludes, "no claim of a 
creature on its Creator. I speak only of hopes and of 
faith deduced from inevitable reason, the gift of the 
Creator; from his acknowledged attributes. Above all, 
immortality is a free gift, which we neither do, nor 
can deserve."
That this is a mature opinion is confirmed by a
1. Of. Table Talk, p.113. - September 28, 1830, where he 
rejects the idea of "a fiery hell," and suggests 
that for a spiritual being no other hell could equal 
the "anarchy of our powers," the "conscious madness" 
resultant from the divorce. 0f will from memory, 
fancy, understanding and reason.
234.
note, dated July 28, 1826, in his Semina Herom. in which 
Coleridge discusses the self-condemning nature of sin.
"The Scriptures more than announce and affirm the 
great Law of the Spiritual World, that Sin generates 
misery and weakness, and that these instead of remov­ 
ing Sin, add to the Strength of the Habit and diminish 
the Power of resistence; and this process of destruc­ 
tion has no other end or limit but that of the Subject, 
in which it is set up, and therefore if the one be im­ 
perishable, the other must be everlasting/1
The note concludes in a similar vein to that of the letter to 
Cottle.
"Is there no difference between the positions—God 
will put in force the law of everlasting Death on such 
and such men—and—It has not been revealed to us,that 
God will not: Surely, this is one most striking in­ 
stance of the propriety of a negative Belief—it's sure 
as you have an immortal Soul, so certain is your ever­ 
lasting damnation if God does not interfere: and God 
has given you neither promise or assurance that he will. 
The impenitent Sinner that is proof against this, is a 
rock which no force can make feel."
The whole discussion reveals clear insight into the problem. 
With his insistence on fellowship with God through God's 
grace, Coleridge dares not make any dogmatic statement that 
would limit the grace and action of God. On the other hand, 
he admits there is a possibility, at least, of self-exclusion 
from the fellowship of God.
(c) Conditional Immortality.
The doctrine of conditional immortality receives 
scant attention from Coleridge. In view of the close connection 
between Immortality and redemption in his thought, some dis­ 
cussion of the question might be expected. But there are few
1. MS.C, pp.88-90. -----____
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explicit reference in his writings. The most important is a 
note in Baxter's Autobiography. Here Coleridge rejects 
definitely the whole conception, after admitting the attract­ 
iveness of certain aspects of the theory. 2 He criticizes 
sererely the attempt to ground the belief in immortality on 
objective proof from miracles, whereas n in the very essence 
of religion and even of morality the evidence, and the pre­ 
paration for its reception, must be subjective/' This is 
derived from the conscience and the "holy instinct" of the 
race. Coleridge continues as one who has found, "in the im­ 
possibility of not looking forward to consciousness after the 
dissolution of the body (corpus phenomenon) , Tt next to divine 
grace
"the strongest, and indeed only efficient support against 
the still recurring temptation of adopting, nay, wishing 
the truth of Spinoza's notion, that the survival of 
consciousness is the highest prize and consequence of 
the highest virtue, and that of all below this mark the 
lot after death is self-oblivion and the cessation of 
individual being." 3
On the whole, however, Coleridge is content with the enuncia­ 
tion of the positive aspects of the connection between immort­ 
ality and redemption. This is based on the conviction of the 
immortality of the soul. "Immortality is one thing, a happy 
immortality another."4
"Deeply am I persuaded of Luther's position," he writes, 
"that no man can worthily estimate, or feel in the depth
1. Notes on English Divines. II. p.52.
2. Cf. Ibid: I. pp.51, 253.
3. Ibid: II. p.52.
4. Ibid: I. p.265.
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of his being, the Incarnation and Crucifixion of the 
Son of God who is a stranger to the terror of immort­ 
ality as ingenerate in man, while it is yet unquelled 
by the faith in God as the Almighty Father.1* 1
(d) Universal Itestoration.
There is some evidence to indicate that Cole­ 
ridge came to adopt, not indeed as a dogma, but rather as an 
optimistic hope, the theory of universal restoration. He 
rejects the Roman Catholic theory of Purgatory, 2 but leans 
to belief in progress of some sort. The note 3 in which this 
hope is set forth has never been published and may therefore 
be given at length.
"As far, therefore," he writes, "as a firm faith in 
a redemptive process never suspended, tho 1 not always 
apparent, may be called Optimism, so far I still remain 
an Optimist. But that the process consists in a moral 
and intellectual progression of the Mass of Mankind, or 
of a whole People or Nation—this no longer appears to 
me so clear a point as it did during that period of 
Life when the Head took the Heart for its' Chief Coun­ 
sellor, and when whatever of Good was stirring within 
me I supposed myself to have in common with all men. But 
I have since then been made to reflect tho 1 I have out­ 
lived the Optimism of my Youth and early Manhood, when 
my fancy and my ingenuity were strained to find good in 
everything, and I strove to think even
Guilt and anguish and the wormy Grave 
Shapes of a Dream.
I still retain, I dare not forego, the faith in a con­ 
tinued tho 1 Spiral Ascent of Humanity. How indeed in 
the absence of this faith could we without mockery pre­ 
fer the prayer—Thy Kingdom come 1. Thy Will be done on 
Earth as it is in Heaven 1. Evil is not eternal, it
began, and not from God. Therefore it must end and by 
God."4
1. Notes on English Divines. II. p.58.
2. Ibid: I. pp.64, 251.
3. British Muaeum MS., Egerton 2801, folio 858a b.
4. Or "by God's Will" or "God's Act." The MS. is torn here
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Coleridge does not rest merely in this assurance 
of the ultimate triumph of God. There is something to he added 
God is already in action against evil. That evil "must end 
and toy God" might "be inferred "from the idea of a supreme and 
holy Will." The second truth has been revealed by Revelation.
"Revelation has taught us a further truth and one which 
rightly understood might perhaps conduct us to con­ 
clusions of a less general character—this awful truth 
that in order to act, as a renewing principle of moral 
life, on the fallen nature in us, God first assumed the 
humanity in himself. The Word that was in the beginning, 
in whom was Life and that Life the Light of Men (i.e. the 
ground of that Reason, which,con8titutes > our proper 
Humanity) became flesh ( *** <«-Knv^>«-ev *v 4,^7* ) that 
'as by Man came Death, so also by Man might the Resurrec­ 
tion come. 1 He dwelt among men as a man, thenceforward 
(for as many as received him) indwells in men as the 
Spirit of Truth. (John xiv. 17,18)."!
This last reveals how closely connected in 
Coleridge's mind were the two doctrines of immortality and 
redemption. That is to say, immortality in the last resort, 
is a religious idea. Moreover, in his hands, it becomes a 
specifically Christian idea.
1. British Museum MS.. Egerton 2801, folio 257. There are 
two versions of tnis note. The longer is given aoove.
CHAPTER X.
The Theory of Society and the Church.
I. Introduction.
Two of the chief features of Coleridge's later 
thought are: first, his firm belief in the necessity of the 
religious foundation of society; and second, an equally firm 
belief in the corporate nature of Christianity. The 1830 
publication, On the Constitution of the Church and State 
according to the Idea of Each, is not to be regarded as an 
isolated product of his variegated mind. Rather, it expresses 
a theory of society intimately connected with his whole relig­ 
ious philosophy. Moreover, it embodies much of the material 
proposed for the concluding section of the Opus Maximum, the 
main labour of his life, as outlined in 18E8. The outline reads:
"Gives the Philosophy, and a philosophic Abstract of the 
History of the Visible Church & of Christendom from the 
Apostles to the present times—and ends with a view of 
the Church of England as an estate of the Realm (ev*xn«r.'.. ) 
and the two-fold Function of it's Ministers, as Preachers 
& Members of the Church of Christ (i""X^«r.'o. ) and as 
Trustees and Functionaries of the States—with the equal 
and opposite Evils of Confounding and of dividing the 
Functions—Closes with an Exhortation to the Clergy and a 
solemn Appeal to the (orthodox) Dissenters." 1
1. M8.C, printed in Snyder: op.cit., pp.7-8.
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Coleridge's 1816 belief in the Church of England as "the most 
Apostolic Church" is seen here in further development. His 
naivete need arouse no comment. The point of interest is the 
place assigned to the Church in his all-embracing scheme.
Before turning to the consideration of his
mature views, as found in Church and State, two things may be 
said. First, these views are the result of a long process of 
development; and second, this development took place against a 
very definite social and political background. The second of 
these two considerations may be dealt with briefly.
By the time Coleridge came to write his Church 
and State he had lived through the upheaval in social and 
political thought caused by the French Revolution, the Napoleon­ 
ic Wars, the Irish troubles and the growth of mechanized industry. 
He had seen the movement for reform grow among the new working 
classes, created by industry, and among the Dissenters and Roman 
Catholics — in the case of the first group directed towards polit­ 
ical recognition, and in that of the second towards the attain­ 
ment of equality of status with members of the Established Church. 
By 1830 the movement for reform was in tidal flood. The Catholic 
Emancipation Act was already a thing of the past, and the Reform 
Bill was but two short years away. The waves of reform were 
beating with insistent force against the foundations of the Church, 
established, wealthy, inefficient, corrupt, and set for the de­ 
fence of the status quo.
Aids, p.257.
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The Church was in imminent danger of being engulfed by the 
new Liberalism. The protest of Newman and his colleagues, 
after the passing of the Reform Bill, is a matter of history. 
Previous to this, however, the Catholic Bnancipation Act 
had afforded Coleridge the occasion for his particular pro­ 
test. It was on altogether different grounds from those of 
the Oxford scholars that Coleridge based his defence of the 
Church. Nevertheless, he did much to revive the conception 
of the Church as something other than a department of the 
State on the one hand, and a voluntary association on the 
other. In this respect, at least, Coleridge prepared the way 
for the High Church Party that followed.
II. Early Tiews.
With regard to the first of the two considera­ 
tions noted above—the development of his mind on the social 
aspects of his religious philosophy—it is essential to notice 
that Coleridge had not only witnessed, but he had lived in 
sympathy with, much of the new spirit. His enthusiasm for the 
ideas of the French Revolution blossomed into the scheme of 
Pantisocracy. Previously, however, in his ode on the Destruc­ 
tion of the Bastile. he had bidden England follow Prance's 
example. With the growth of the new tyranny in France his 
sympathy waned, and by 1798 his hopes were completely dashed.
1. Poems, pp.10-11, written probably, 1789.
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His disgust and disillusionment are clearly revealed in his 
Francet An Ode. During these years his sense of social in­ 
justice flamed high. In Religious Musings he prophesies the 
overthrow of wrong and of intrenched power,^ including 
"mitred Atheism." 3 A footnote to the 1797 edition makes it 
clear that he contemplated the early disestablishment of the 
Church. The footnote reads:-
"This passage alludes to the French Revolution: and 
the subsequent paragraph to the downfall of Religious 
Establishments. I am convinced that the Babylon of 
the Apocalypse does not apply to Rome exclusively; but 
to the union of Religion with Power and Wealth, wherever 
it is found/' 4
This note was repeated in the 1803 edition, but dropped subse­ 
quently.
This view is reflected again in the Allegoric 
Vision which served as an introduction to Coleridge's first 
theological lecture in Bristol, in August 1795. Coleridge 
was at the time a thorough-going Unitarian. Ee saw in Unit- 
arianism the via media between the orthodox and moribund 
Church, on the one hand, and infidelity and materialism, on 
the other. The Church of England is symbolized by the figure 
of Superstition in the Vision. ® Coleridge considered the 
connection between the Church and the State one of the chief 
evils of the day.
1. Poems, pp.243-247.
2. Ibid: pp.118-121, lines 260-322.




"As far as I am able to decide," he wrote early in 1798, 
"the most pressing evils and those of which the speedy 
removal is the most practicable, are these—the union 
of Religion with the Government, and those other 
political Institutions and abuses which I need not name."
The Coneiones ad Populum of 1795 reveals his 
mind further. Religion, he is convinced, is the cure for the 
social ills of the day. As a crusading Christian Socialist, 
he voices his platform:
T"Go, preach the Gospel to the poor. 1 By its simplicity 
it will meet their comprehension, by its benevolence 
soften their affections, by its precepts it will direct 
their conduct, by the vastness of its motives ensure 
their obedience."2
The religion he advocates is not a churchless Christianity. 
"Religion and reason are but poor substitutes for church and 
constitution." 3 But he is no less sure that the religion is 
not that of the Church as constituted and established. He 
inveighs against the conservative Churchmen who support war 
for fear of the loss of their positions, and prophesies with 
youthful vigour, "The age of priesthood will be no more—that 
of philosophers and of Christians will succeed and the torch 
of superstition be extinguished for ever." The Watchman of 
March 9th, 1796, carries on the crusade with a satirical 
article entitled, WA Defence of the Church Establishment from
its Similitude to the Grand and Simple Laws of the Planetary
5 System."
1. Unpublished Letters. I. p,86.
2. Essays on His Pwn Times. I. pp.22-23.
3. Ibid: I. pp.13-14.
4. Ibid: I. pp.46-47.
5. Ibid: I. pp.128-129.
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In 1800 Coleridge is still proud of his Dissent­ 
ing principles. He writes harshly of Anglican pride and con­ 
tempt of Dissenters. In 1801 he voices the typical Dissenting 
principle that the state should regard all religions equally.
"The state should be to the religions under its protection as
g a well-drawn picture, equally eyeing all in the room/'
The change in Coleridge's attitude to the
Establishment dates from 1802, and may be said to follow closely 
upon the great revolution in his metaphysical and theological 
thought that marked this period of his life. A letter to 
George Coleridge, dated June 3rd, 1802, carries the first ex­ 
pression of the new viewpoint. The recently concluded French 
Concordat, which he considers a "wretched business," has the 
merit that it "first occasioned me to think accurately and with 
consecutive Logic on the force and meaning of the word Estab­ 
lished Church. Tt
"The result of my reflections," he continues, "was 
very greatly in favour of the Church of England main­ 
tained as it at present is, and those scruples, which, 
if I mistake not, we had in common when I last saw you, 
as to the effects and scriptural propriety of the 
(supposed) alliance of Church and State were wholly 
removed."3
He reveals also that his study of the question has taken him
to William Warburton, whose Alliance between Church and State
4 appeared in 1736.
T.~ Unpublished Letters. I. p.136. ~~ ~~
2. Anima Poetae p.18. Cf. Omniana. p,353.
3. Unpublished Letters. I. p.198.
4. H.N.Coleridge in the 1839 edition of Church & State remarks 
on the relation between Coleridge's views and those of 
Warburton. Vide 1839 edition, pp.xx-xxix. In the letter 
of 1802, Coleridge refers to Warburton 1 s system as one 
"which I rather dislike and suspect.n
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By 1611 his study has carried him to Hobbes 
and Locke. An article in The Courier of September 26th is 
of interest. The problem of the relations of Church and 
State, "perhaps the most difficult problem in the whole 
science of politics," is one which the efforts of centuries 
have failed to solve. In practice compromise has prevailed. 
No exact definition of the boundaries which separate Church 
and State has been reached.
"We still want a complete table of all those points, 
with which the magistrate has no right to interfere, 
as well as those which the teacher of religion may 
be rightfully prevented from meddling with." 1
The immediate occasion of the article was the "Catholic Claims." 
Coleridge has now diverted his early attack on the Establish­ 
ment to direct it against the Church of "Rome. The Allegoric 
Vision of 1795 re-appears, slightly altered. 2 The Vision
appears once more. As an introduction to the Lay Sermon of
« 
1817, it serves to illustrate Coleridge's principle of the
reconciliation of opposites. Insistent on the falsehood of 
extremes, he points out that as religion is the golden mean 
between superstition and atheism, so the righteous government 
of a righteous people is the mean between a selfish and 
tyrannous aristocracy and the unbridled rule of the mob.
1. The Courier, September 26, 1811. Printed in Essays on His 
Own Times. III. pp.925-932. The Article is entitled— 
"On the Catholic Claims, as matter of absolute Right; 
with a Critique on the Systems of Toleration and Religious 
Rights, of Hobbes, Locke, and Warburton." This particular 
article carried the discussion only as far as Hobbes. The 
prophecy, "To be continued," was never fulfilled.




In The Friend of 1818, among the avowed objects 
of which was the inculcation of right principles of political 
philosophy, as well as of religion and morality, Coleridge 
offers a classification of social theories on the basis of 
his distinction between sense, understanding, and reason. 
from his criticism of the theories of Hobbes and Rousseau his 
own views become clear. In the first place, he is certain that 
no theory of political obligation, based wholly and exclusively 
on one of the three—sense, understanding or reason—is ade­ 
quate. It is therefore necessarily false. This is all the 
more surprizing, in view of Coleridge 1 s usual insistence on 
the primacy of reason. But in matters of social theory, as in 
psychology, he is quite clear.
^Distinct notions do not suppose different things. When 
we make a threefold distinction in human nature, we are 
fully aware that it is a distinction, not a division, 
and that in every act of mind, the man unites the pro­ 
perties of sense, understanding, and reason."^
With this in mind f Coleridge is ready to reject 
Hobbes 1 theory of fear as the source of political obligation, 
based as it was on a sensationalist psychology. 2 As against 
fear, Coleridge claims that the spirit of law is "the true 
necessity, which compels man into the social state, now and
always, by a still-beginning, never-ceasing force of moral
g cohesion."
1. The Friend. Section I. Essay II. p.H7n.
2. Ibid, Section I. Essay II. pp. 110-117.
3. Ibid, Essay II. p.114.
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He is equally ready to reject Rousseau's theory, 
based on a misapplication of the principle of reason. He con­ 
tends for "the actual man" as against Rousseau's "abstract 
reason.11 The true starting-point for any theory of society 
must be man as a moral, responsible being. The groundwork
of all law and justice is the principle "that a person can
2 
never become a thing, nor be treated as such without wrong."
This is the foundation. To Coleridge property is also sacred, 
and "the chief object for which men first formed themselves 
into a state was not the protection of their lives but of their 
property." If climate and soil conditions preclude property, 
except in a personal sense, men remain in the domestic state
rjL
and "form neighbourhoods, but not governments."
The aims of the State are of two kinds, nega­ 
tive and positive. The negative ends consist in "the protection 
of life, of personal freedom, of property, of reputation, and 
of religion, from foreign and from domestic attacks." The 
positive ends are four in numbers first, "to make the means of 
subsistence more easy to each individual;" second, to provide a 
just distribution of "the comforts and conveniences which human­ 
ize and ennoble" human nature; third, to ensure the hope of 
betterment for the individual and his children; fourth, education- 
moral, religious and intellectual. This four-fold conception of
1. The Friend, Essay IV. pp.124-136.
2. The griencT. Section I. Essay IV. p.IE7. The influence of 
Kant is apparent.
3. Ibid: p.134.
4. Ibid: Section I. Essay IX. p. 171.
5. Ibid: pp.l71-17E. For a fuller treatment see Muirhead: 
Coleridge as Philosopher, pp.165-176.
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the positive aims of the state becomes a three-fold one in 
the Lay Sermon of ISlV^and a two-fold one in Church and 
State of 1830, But the conception of the State as dependent
a
upon a proper balance of the ends remains constant in all his 
later writings.
This sense of balance is nowhere better re­ 
vealed than in the 1817 Lay Sermon. The "existing distresses 
and discontents" are due to the "overbalance of the commercial 
spirit in consequence of the absence or weakness of the counter-
IT
weights.*' These counterweights are three: first, "the ancient
4 6 feeling of rank and ancestry;" second, philosophy; 0 third,
religion. Economic interests must not overbalance ethical 
and religious interests. In the light of the final aims of 
the State, Coleridge is hopeful that "the spirit of commerce is
itself capable of being at once counteracted and enlightened by
7 the spirit of the State, to the advantage of both." His
Christian Socialism comes to the fore as he pleads, "If we are 
a Christian nation, we must learn to act nationally, as well as
D
individually v as Christians.1' Industry must be subject to
1. Lay Sermon. Biog. Lit, p.432.
2. Coleridge uses the word and its sjmonyms constantly, e.g. 
43 times in the short Lay Sermon.
3. Lay Sermon. 1817, Biog.Lit. p.4027 Cf. Gloyn: Coleridge's
Theory of the Church in the Social Order. Church History. 





8. Ibid: p.439. Cf. His remarks on Sir Robert Peel's 1818 Bill 
regulating the conditions and nours of work of factory 
children. Watson: op.cit., pp.171-187.
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regulation, and men must regard their positions as "offices 
of trust" for God and the country. 1 It was this last con­ 
sideration that had prompted the lay sermon of the previous 
year, The Statesman's Manual. In this Coleridge had pressed 
the points: first, that by its emphasis on the universal and
eternal the Bible enabled men to see the particular and temp-
P oral in their true perspective; second, that historically
the Bible had been "the main lever" by which the moral and
<j^
intellectual character of Europe had been determined.*-
Coming to the final presentation of Coleridge's 
views in Church and State—written in 1629—it is at once 
evident that a great deal has been anticipated in the earlier 
works. With his mind filled with the doctrine of ideas, Cole­ 
ridge brings the whole question of State and Church to the 
touchstone of the idea of each. What Coleridge means by the 
term idea in this instance is the ultimate aim of the State 
and ot the Church. An idea may exert a powerful influence 
on a man's thought and action "without his being distinctly 
conscious of the same." 5 This Coleridge illustrates by an 
appeal to the history of England.
1. Lay Sermon. 1817, Biog. Lit, p.440.
2. Statesman's ManualTBiog. Lit, p.322.
3. Ibid: p.323.
4. Church and State, p.5. "By an idea. I mean, (in this in- 
stance) that conception of a thing, which is not ab­ 
stracted from any particular state, form, or mode, in 
which the thing may happen to exist at this or that time; 
nor yet generalized from any number or succession of 
such forms or modes; but that which is given by the know­ 
ledge of its ultimate aim."
5. Ibid: p.6.
249.
The theory ox conception of an original social 
contract, which, as treated by Rousseau, is a n pure fiction," 
"an idle fancy," "at once false and foolish," and "incapable 
of historic proof as a fact," and therefore "senseless as a 
theory," takes on new significance if regarded from the stand­ 
point of the idea of "an ever-originating social contract." 2 
Thus regarded, "it constitutes the whole ground of the differ­ 
ence between subject and serf, between a commonwealth and a 
slave plantation."^ TChat has happened in England is that the 
Constitution, as an idea, has impressed itself on the mind of 
the nation.4 In thus proving historically the reality of an 
idea, Coleridge paves the way for his contention that "the final 
criterion by which all particular frames of government must be 
tried" is in fact the idea of the State.
Coleridge uses the term state in a double sense: 
"a larger, in which it is equivalent to Realm and includes the 
Church, and a narrower, in which it is distinguished quasi per 
antithesin from the Church, as in the phrase Church and State."
The State, in the larger sense, is defined as a"body politic,
7 having the principle of its unity within itself." To
T.~ Church~and~S'ta'teT ppTv-97 -----------------
2. Ibid: p.9. This reflects the statement in The Friend that 
"an original (in reality, rather an ever-originating) con­ 
tract is a very natural and significant mode of expressing 
the reciprocal duties of subject and sovereign." It is a 
means of expressing the"ever-continuing causes of social 
union."—op.cit., p.116. Cf. the similar use of original 







Coleridge's dialectic mind, the idea of the State, in the 
larger sense, presents two poles: the State proper, and the 
National Church. "These are two poles of the same magnet; 
the magnet itself, which is constituted by them, is the 
CONSTITUTION of the nation." 1 Further, the major interests 
of the State—the realm, the nation2—are two: permanence
and progression. Tinder these two all the other interests
g of the State may be comprized. Coleridge holds that perman-
4 ence is connected with the land and the landed property,
while progression is connected with the four classes: the
mercantile, the manufacturing, the distributive, and the pro-
5 fessional. These four classes he designates the Personal
Interest, as distinct from the Landed Interest. If, then, 
permanence be accounted for by the presence of a Landed Inter­ 
est, and progression by the presence of a Personal Interest, 
and if under these two heads all the interests of the State 
be comprized, there would seem to be little room for any 
third element, such as a National Church. Coleridge holds, 
however, that both permanence and progression depend on a
necessary anticedent condition: namely, a "continuing and
7 progressive civilization." The object of the National Church
1. Church and State T p.33.
2. Coleridge uses the words as equivalents. Cf. op.cit.,pp,19 33.






is "to secure and improve that civilization, without which 
the nation could be neither permanent nor progressive."
To examine the general theory more closely— 
Coleridge holds that the unity of the State may be achieved 
either by a concentration of forces, as in a pure monarchy, 
or by "equipoise and interdependence of the forces, "the 
lex eguilibrii. the principle prescribing the means and condi­ 
tions by and under which this balance is to be established and
CJ
preserved, being the constitution of the state." The first 
type is unknown in history, however. An example of the second 
is the constitution of England. 3 The health of the body 
politic depends upon the proper balance between permanence and 
progression, between the Landed and Personal Interests. His­ 
torically, this has been accomplished in the establishment of 
the two houses of Parliament. 4 The King, in whom the executive
1. Church and State p.51.
2. Ibids p.20. Cf. Table Talk, p.108. "All temporal govern­ 
ment must rest on a compromise of interests and abstract 
rights."
3. This double appeal to history and to philosophy has led to 
some discussion. Cobban, (Edmund Burke and the Revolt 
against the Eighteenth Century, p+179) writes, "Though 
Coleridge's intention was to make philosophy and not hist­ 
ory the foundation of his theory of the State, a conflict 
exists between his philosophic and his historical appeal, 
and he turns more and more to the positive facts of hist­ 
orical evolution in the development of his theory." Cobban 
therefore rejects Coleridge's idea of the State as pseudo- 
philosophy. As against this view, Muirhead credits Cole­ 
ridge's use of the term, in the sense of "the intuitively 
apprehended meaning of experience" as one of philosophic 
value. (Coleridge as Philosopher.p.lSEn.) The weight of 
evidence appears to be on Muirhead 1 s side. Gf. Coleridge's 
words, "a principle, existing in the only way in which a 
principle can exist,—in the minds and consciences of the 
people whose duties it prescribes, and whose rights it 
determines. rt —Church and State, p.14
4. Church and State, pp.28-32.
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power is vested, serves as "the beam of the constitutional 
scale." 1 Thus have the interests of permanence and pro­ 
gression been reconciled and the interest of the State as
oa whole been preserved.
Coleridge elaborates two conditions for the 
proper working of the constitution. 3 Seizing on the term 
body politic as a "metaphor so commensurate, so pregnant," 
he draws the analogy between the body politic and the 
body natural. 4 In the first place, the health of the living 
organism depends on a proper proportion between the "impond­ 
erable agents, magnetic or galvanic," and the fluids in the 
glands and vessels. Similarly, the health of the body politic 
depends on a "due proportion of the free and permeative life 
and energy of the Nation to the organized powers brought with­ 
in containing channels." A proper relation must exist between 
"the indeterminable, but yet actual influences of intellect, 
information, prevailing principles and tendencies" and "the 
regular, definite, and legally recognized Powers." The analogy 
does not tun "on all four legs," as Coleridge admits, the 
difference being that in the case of the body politic the
1. Qf. Notes on English Divines. II. pp.V-8.
2. Again the double appeal to history and to philosophy is made 
Coleridge insists that he is not giving an historical 
account of the legislative body, but is merely asserting 
that "the line of evolution, however sinuous, has still 
tended to this point, sometimes with, sometimes without, 
not seldom, perhaps, against the intention of the indivi­ 
dual actors, but always as if a power greater and better 
than the men themselves, had intended it for them." — 
Church and State, p.32.
3. Cf. Muirhead. Coleridge as Philosopher, p.185 seq.. for a 
fuller treatment of this.
4. Church and State, pp.105 seq.
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permeative forces are capable of being transformed into the 
regular, by "attaching a measured and determinate political 
right, or privilege, thereto." A disproportion of the two 
elements results in disaster. The Greek democracies 
collapsed by an excess of the permeative power, Venice by
the contrary extreme.
The second condition of political health, accord­ 
ing to Coleridge, is "a due proportion of the potential (latent,
P dormant) to the actual Power." The first condition, the
balance of the permeative and the organized, may really amount 
to a "polarization" of the actual power. 3 Together they form 
the actual power, in toto. The second condition deals with 
actual and potential, and thus touches the central problem of 
sovereignty. By means of his double argument from history 
and philosophy Coleridge shows that the Constitution of England, 
according to the idea, differs radically from both an absolute 
monarchy and a democratic republic, in both of which the people 
delegates its whole power. "Nothing is left obscure, nothing 
suffered to remain in the Idea, unevolved." This results in
the whole will of the body politic being in act at every
4. moment. In contrast, the English nation has delegated its
power, but "not without measure and circumscription." "The
1. Church and State, p.108. The burden of Coleridge's 1817 
message had been the threat to the nation's permanence 
and progression if the balance continued uneven, due to the 
under-representation in Parliament of the new industrial, 
mercantile and professional classes. Cf. Muirhead, 





Omnipotence of Parliament" is therefore only a lawyer's 
bombastic phrase for the fl restraints and remedies within 
the competence of our Law-courts." Taken in an absolute 
sense, it is sheer hyperbole. The precise extent of this 
reserved potentiality, "not contained within the rule and 
compass of law," is, by its very nature, indeterminable
a
a priori. The principle exists and works only as an idea, 
seen only by the historian in the "rare and predestined 
epochs of Growth and Reparation" when the nation in travail
voices its "unific mind and energy," "that Voice of the
4 People which is the Voice of God."
In the last resort, therefore, sovereignity 
must go back to that intangible, but very real, national 
consciousness. This, in turn, as will become evident, rests 
ultimately on a religious foundation. 5 This theory of 
sovereignity marks a new achievement in English political
e
thought, anticipating much that is best in later thinkers. 
Dr. Cobban's recent study of Coleridge has brought this out 
clearly. His conclusion is:
"Coleridge was one of the first to denounce the theory 
of sovereignty in so many words, and that not because 
of the rival claims of any other association inside 
or outside the State, but because of the inherect ex­ 
travagance of the conception itself. To overthrow




5. Cf. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.190.a  
., p.l6. Muirhead: op.cit. 189 mentions Green and Bosanquet.
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State sovereignty and substitute for it the sovereignty 
of a thousand and one petty groups, as some political 
thinkers have attempted to do, is mere multiplication 
of evil, Coleridge goes on different principles. 
Against the Imperial and Papal theory of sovereignty, 
he asserts the national and Protestant principles of 
the individual conscience and national consciousness, 
things which cannot be defined in terms of institutional 
sovereignties."1
IV. The National Church.
It is only in the light of Coleridge's social 
theory that his conception of the National Church can be 
Judged. It is, in fact, the necessary corollary of such a 
theory. Conscience, both individual and national, must be 
created, stimulated and maintained. Only thus can the national 
existence be preserved. Here, then, is the raison d'etre of 
the National Church. It is the other—and the necessary— 
pole in the idea of the realm.
In practice, this idea of the National Church
c>
means the existence of a third estate in the realm." The 
support of this third estate is derived from the nationality. 
By this Coleridge means that reserve which, according to his 
reading of history, was set aside for the benefit of the nation
when the division of the land into hereditable estates first
3 took place. This third estate is set over against the first
estate of the Landed Interest and. the second estate of the 
Personal Interest. These two latter, with their respective 
interests of permanence and progression, constitute the State,
1."" CobbanT op7crt7.p.T83.~" Quote"d~MUirhe'ac[:~op.c'ir.7pp.T8"5-T9U,
2. A note of June 1820 indicates that the conception of the 
Church, as a third estate was one of Coleridge's early 
"fixed points." Notes on English Divines, II. pp.114-116.
3. Church and State, pp.34-59.
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in the narrow sense. The interest of the third estate,which 
Coleridge names the clerisy. is the "cultivation? n the 
harmonious developement of those qualities and faculties 
that characterize our humanity." 1 Its interest may be said 
to comprize two of the great ends of Coleridge's State, as 
laid down in The Friend. Here the third great positive end 
is to ensure for the individual
"the hope of bettering his own condition and that of 
his children," seeing that," his Maker has distin­ 
guished him from the brute that perishes, by making 
hope and instinct of his nature and an indispensable 
condition of his moral and intellectual progression."^
The fourth positive end is defined as:
"The development of those faculties which are essen­ 
tial to his human nature by the knowledge of his moral 
and religious duties, and the increase of his intell­ 
ectual powers in as great a degree as is compatible 
with the other ends of social union, and does not in­ 
volve a contradiction." 3
In The friend Coleridge is quite emphatic that education is 
one of the chief ends of government.
n lt is that only which makes the abandonment of the 
savage state an absolute duty; and that constitution 
is the best, under which the average sum of useful know­ 
ledge is the greatest, and the causes that awaken and 
encourage talent and genius, the most powerful and 
various."4
In Church and State all this is re-emphasized. 
The National Church is "the especial and constitutional organ 
and means: n first, of securing to the subjects of the realm
1. Church and State, p.49.
2. The Friend. Se"cTion I. Essay IX. p. 171.
3. Ibid: Section I. Essay IX. p. 172.
4. Ibid: p.172.
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w the hope, the chance, of bettering their own or their child­ 
ren's condition;** second, of developing in every nature those 
faculties, and providing that knowledge and those attainments 
which are "necessary to qualify him for a member of the State, 
the free subject of a civilized realm." 1 Historically, trade, 
commerce and the arts have aided the National Church in the 
discharge of her first duty.
"Yet still the nationality, under all its defalcations, 
continues to feed the higher ranks by drawing up what­ 
ever is worthiest from below, and thus maintains the 
principle of Hope in the humblest families, while it 
secures the possessions of the rich and noble."2
Again, the second great object, "civilization 
with freedom," is achieved by the National Church. It assures 
a continuing and progressive civilization by binding the 
national life together in its past, present and future; by 
the communication to every citizen of the knowledge necessary 
for the understanding of their rights and the discharge of 
their corresponding duties; and the securing for the nation 
a "character of general civilization" equal, if not superior, 
to that of other nations. This character, Coleridge adds,
"equally with, or rather more than, fleets, armies and revenue,
2 
forms the ground of its defensive and offensive power." The
duty of the National Church is fulfilled in "the communication 
of that degree and kind of knowledge to all, the possession of




which is necessary for all in order to their CIVILITY." 1
By civility, Coleridge means n all the qualities essential to
a citizen, and devoid of which no people or class of the people
can be calculated on by the rulers and leaders of the state
2 
for the conservation or promotion of its essential interests."
Hence the State has a right to demand of the National Church, 
that its instructions should be fitted to diffuse legality 
throughout the people.
To accomplish this rork of civic and cultural 
education, the National Church is comprized of two orders. The 
first, or smaller, serves to instruct the second, or larger. 
Its members are "to remain at the fountain heads of the human­ 
ities, in cultivating and enlarging the knowledge already 
possessed, and in watching over the interests of physical and 
moral science." 3 It, in point of fact, constitutes the 
universities.4 The larger group, on the other hand, is to be 
so distributed throughout the realm as not to leave "even the 
smallest integral part or division without a resident, guide, 
guardian and instructor 7! 5 Every parish would thus have a 
parson and a school-master.
This educative class, the clerisy, is not, 
strictly speaking, an ecclesiastical or religious order. In







its primary and original intention it comprehended "the learned 
of all denominations—the sages and professors of..... all the 
eo-called liberal arts and sciences, the possession and appli­ 
cation of which constitute the civilization of a country, as 
well as the Theological." 1 Lawyers, doctors, musicians, 
architects, scientists and mathemathicians are included in 
Coleridge's comprehensive list. He holds that religion, though 
an "indispensable ally," is not "the essential constitutive 
end" of the National Church. 2 Nevertheless, the theological 
order is given precedence, since under the head of theology 
language, history, logic, ethics and philosophy were originally 
comprized. Its importance is due to the fact that
"the SCIENCE of Theology was the root and the trunk of 
the knowledges that civilized man......it gave unity and
the circulating sap of life to all other sciences.....
Under the name theology, were comprised all the main 
aids, instruments, and materials of NATIONAL EDUCATION, 
the nisus formativus of the body politic, the shaping 
and informing spirit, which educing, i.e. eliciting, the 
latent man in all the natives of tne soil, trains them up 
to be citizens of the country, free subjects of the realm." 3
Theologians are also given precedence because
"to divinity belong those fundamental truths, which are 
the common ground-work of our civil and our religious 
duties, not less indispensable to a right view of our 
temporal concerns, than to a rational faith respecting 
our immortal well-being. (Not without celestial obser­ 
vations can terrestrial charts be accurately construed)." 4
Coleridge is quite emphatic on this point that 
a stable society must rest ultimtely on a religious foundation.





He will not separate the educational and civic functions of 
the National Church from religion. Education is not 
synonymous with mere enlightenment or instruction. These 
alone will not accomplish the aim of the State.
"The morality which the state requires in its citizens 
for its own well-being and ideal immortality, and with­ 
out reference to their spiritual interest as indivi­ 
duals, can only exist for the people in the form of 
religion:.....In fine, Religion, true or false, is and 
ever has been the centre of gravity in a realm, to 
which all other things must and will accommodate them­ selves. 1**
Coleridge is equally certain that this does not necessarily 
imply or require two functionaries, although the National 
Church has this double function. "Nay," he writes, "the per­ 
fection of each may require the union of both in one. 3
Two things further must be noted regarding
the National Church. First, its head is the King. The King 
is "Head of the National Church, or Clerisy, and the Protector 
and Supreme Trustee of the NATIONALITY."4 He is bound by his 
coronation oath to protect "the safety and independence of 
the National Church."^ Second, as the National Church derives 
its support from the nationality, the clerisy must be "fully 
and exclusively citizens of the State, neither acknowledging 
the authority, nor within the influence of any other State in






the world... .owning (no) other earthly sovereign or visible 
head but the king." It is on this ground that Coleridge 
argues that the Reran Catholic clergy have no right to a 
share in the nationality. Their allegiance to the Pope con­ 
stitutes their first disqualification. A second disqualifi­ 
cation is their celibacy. Under the command and authority 
of the Pope they have abjured "that bond, which more than all 
other ties connects the citizen with his country; which be­ 
yond all other securities affords the surest pledge to the 
state for the fealty of its citizens?2 The arguments need
not detain us. Regarded from the standpoint of Coleridge's
J3 idea of the National Church, they are perfectly sound.
7. The Christian Church,
In contrast to the National Church, the third 
great estate of the realm, stands the Christian Church. It 
is distinguished by four characters, 4 First, 5 the Christian 
Church is not a kingdom, realm or state of the world, nor an 
estate of such. It is, in fact, opposed to earthly states 
collectively by its other-worldly character. It is "the sus­ 
taining, correcting, befriending Opposite of the world." Its
"paramount aim and object, indeed, is another world, 
not a world to come exclusively, but likewise another 
world that now is; and to the concerns of which alone 
the epithet spiritual can, without mischievous abuse 
of the word, be applied."
1. Church and State, p.94.
2. Ibid, pp.95-96. Of. Table Talk, p.313.
3. Cf. further Church and State, pp.169-186.
4. Coleridge devotes a whole section to this subject. 
Church and State, pp.145-166.
5. Ibid: pp.146-149.
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Moreover the Christian Church cannot be opposed to any parti­ 
cular state "without forfeiting the name of Christian." 
As the Christian Church, it has no nationality entrusted to
it. Therefore, it cannot be considered a counterbalance with-
P in the state to "the collective heritage."
Second, 3 the Christian Church is not a secret 
community. Although it is the ecclesia proper, "the communion 
of such as are called out of the world," 4 it is nevertheless 
"most observable." It is an institution, "consisting of 
visible and public communities." It is objective both in 
nature and purpose; that is to say, not "like reason and the 
court of conscience, existing only in and for the individual." 
Its visibility, its publicity, constitutes its second charact-
er> 5
Third, the Christian Church is characterized
by the absence or non-existence of "any local or personal 
centre of unity, of any single source of universal power." 
This third character reconciles the first two and gives "the
condition under which their co-existence in the same subject
7 becomes possible." Authority in the Christian Church derives
"immediately from Christ." Coleridge quotes the New Testament 
verse, "Where two or three are gathered together in my name,
1. Church and State, p. 150,





7. Ibid: p. 149.
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there am I in the midst of them," as indicative of the 
true nature of the Christian Church. Unity of the particular 
visible churches is thus both actual and ideal; the latter
o
term meaning wmystic and supersensual."
Fourth, 3 the Christian Church is catholic or
universal. This is the necessary consequence of the first and 
third characters. It is "neither Anglican, Gallican, nor 
Roman, neither Latin nor Greek/' 4 The Church universal is 
spiritually perfect in every true Church. On this basis, 
Coleridge objects to the designation "Catholic and Apostolic 
Church of England." "The true Church of England is the Nation­ 
al Church, or Clerisy." 6 He suggests, and prefers, the design­ 
ation "the Catholic Church under Christ throughout Great Britain 
and Ireland."
Coleridge does not develop a complete doctrine 
of the Christian Church in Church and State. 6 For his purpose 
at this point such a development is not necessary. What is 
of import is the relation between the National Church and the 
Christian Church as outlined in antithesis.
1. Matt. XVIII. 20.
2. Church and State, pp.154-155.
3. Ibid; pp.160-166.
4. Cf. Table Talk, pp.29-30, where Coleridge holds that the 
term Roman Catholic is an anomaly. "Catholicism is not 
capable of degrees or local apportionments."
5. Church and State, p.161.
6. See Appendix E. for & fuller discussion of the Christian 
Church.
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71. Relation of the Christian Church to the National Church.
Religion, it must be borne in mind, is not
"the essential constitutive end" of the National Church, al­ 
though it must be considered an "indispensable ally." Many 
grievous practical errors and much unchristian intolerance 
have ensued from a confusion of the Christian and the National
o
Churches.
The term church is, in fact, unfortunate when 
applied to the clerisy. "It is at least an inconvenience in 
our language, that the term Church, instead of being confined 
to its proper sense.....the ecclesia....(should be) likewise... 
our term for the clerical establishment." 3 The name, "in its 
best sense," is exclusively appropriate to the Church of Christ. 
In contrast to the ecclesia of the Christian Church, Coleridge 
suggests enclesia for the National Church, "an order of men, 
chosen in and of the realm."
But this aside, the relation of the one Church 
to the other is of some concern. Coleridge puts it thus:
"In relation to the National Church, Christianity, or 
the Church of Christ, is a blessed accident, a provid­ 
ential boon a grace of God, a mighty and faithful friend, 
envoy indeed and liege subject of another state, which 
can neither administer the laws nor promote the ends of
1. Church and State, p.52.
2. Ibid; p.165.5?. Notes on English Divines. I. p.3.




this other State, which is not of the world, without advantage direct and indirect, to the true interests of the States, the aggregate of which is what we mean 
by the WORLD." l
Elsewhere, Coleridge emphasizes the necessity of distinguish­ 
ing between the two churches, while at the same time maintain­ 
ing their inter-relation,
"This is no Theory — to be superseded by another, as soon as a new fact or two is discovered, which had escaped the attention of Theorist the first. It is either a Principle on which all must be grounded: or it is a Falsehood. No third is possible! But that a National Church may include a Christian Church, I more 
than admit ."2
By maintaining its other-worldly character, the 
Christian Church becomes "the sustaining, correcting, befriend­ 
ing Opposite of the world." 3 In the act of laying its own 
foundations the Christian Church "completes and strengthens 
the edifice of the state, without interference or commixture."4 
For these services the Christian Church receives neither wages 
nor honours. "She asks only protection, and to be let alone."
1. Church and State, p.67. Cf. Table Talk, p.286, Note of May 31, 1834, where the opposite position is taken. Tt The National Church requires, and is required by, the Christian Church for the perfection of each. For if there were no national Church, the mere spiritual Church would either become, like the Papacy, a dreadful tyranny over mind and body;—or else would fall abroad into a multitude of enthus­ iastic sects, as in England in the seventeenth century, It is my deep conviction that, in a country of any religion at all, liberty of conscience can only be permanently pre­ served by means and under the shadow of a national Church,— a political establishment connected with, but distinct from, the Spiritual Church."
2. Hote on p«23 Blomfield: A Charge delivered to the Clergy of his Diocese. British Museum Copy.




She asks nothing for members as Christians, "which they are 
not already entitled to demand as citizens and subjects."
VII. Some Practical Conclusions.
We have seen on what grounds Coleridge ex­ 
cludes the Roman Catholic clergy from participation in the 
nationality. In the light of the distinction drawn between 
the Christian and the National Churches, the grounds on which 
Coleridge defends the Anglican claim for endowment become 
equally clear. It is only as the National, not as the Christ­ 
ian Church, that the claim can be established. The nationality 
had been created as a perpetual trust for the maintenance of 
the clerisy. It cannot be alienated from its original purposes 
without foul wrong to the nation. 2 This does not mean that the 
proceeds from the nationality are to be vested only in the es-
3tablished clergy. Indeed, he suggests universities, parsons
4 and schoolmasters as worthy recipients. On Coleridge 1 s own
grounds, it would seem that the so-called Free Churches should 
receive also from the nationality, discharging as they do the 
functions of a national church. Actually, the Church of England 
possesses the endowment. Coleridge comes to the rescue of his 
case for Anglican Establishment by asserting that earlier 
secessions from the clerisy—in this case, lawyers and doctors,—
1. Church and State, p.149.
2. Ibid: p.60.
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"can in no way affect the principle, nor alter the tenure, 
nor annul the rights of those who remained." This may be 
cited as an example of the conflict of the philosophic and 
historical in Coleridge. His National Church had little 
connection with the Established Church of the period.
On the other hand, it must be remembered that 
the Liberals of Coleridge's day were bent on separating the 
Christian and the National Churches, while the Tories went 
to the opposite extreme of defending the Establishment on 
the grounds of property rights or of sacerdotal character. 
Coleridge goes on different principles. He is anxious to 
point out the error of confounding the functions of the
o
National Church.
Coleridge's opposition to the Catholic Emanci­ 
pation Act was not based on opposition to the principle of 
emancipation, but because it was, to Coleridge, a sop "to 
tranquilize Ireland." 3 He held that any such bill must be 
based on principles not derived from theology,^ but on grounds 
"derived and inherited from our ancestors before the Reforma­ 
tion." Such a bill he would support. With this, Coleridge 
concludes the argument of Church and State. We can see how 
far removed he was from the heats and passions engendered by 
the bill.
1. Church and State p.£9.
2. Ibid: pp.69-70, Cf. ibid: pp.74. Cf. Table Talk, pp. 11 67, 149, 286. ————————




looking back over Coleridge's theory of Church 
and State, one is impressed by his clear grasp of the truth 
that social health is religiously conditioned. From thie 
standpoint Hort regarded Church and State as Coleridge's most 
important work. 1 Hort saw in it a guiding practical principle: 
"the distinctness and mutual necessity of law and religion, 
the forbidding, correcting, restraining power, and the guiding, 
informing, inspiring power/* The application of such a prin­ 
ciple in all the changing conditions of human life and society 
Hort considered one of the chief problems of the nineteenth 
century. It still remains, it may well be added, one of the 
chief problems of the twentieth century,
.Again, one is forced to admire the magnificence 
of Coleridge's conception of the National Church. Coleridge's 
theory differs both from the semi-Erastian theory of Hooker, 
and the alliance theory of Warburton. By his distinction be­ 
tween the Christian and the National Churches, Coleridge was 
able to preserve the idea of the Christian Church intact as a 
spiritual reality; and, at the same time, to recall the 
National Church to her heritage as the mother of the arts, of 
philosophy and of learning, as well as of faith and of piety. 
In one sense, then, Coleridge may be said to be a fore-runner
1. Cambridge Essays, pp.348-249. Tulloch: op.cit., p.31 
regards the work as one of the least satisfactory from 
the literary standpoint.
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of the Oxford Movement. As a complete working theory, however, 
the scheme suffered from lack of contact with the contemporary- 
Established Church. In this respect, Church and State may be 
said to have failed to achieve the original purpose of its
author.
On the other hand, the work was not without 
influence. Gladstone paid tribute to it in his own book, The 
State in its Relations with the Church, as a nmasterly sketch," 
"alike beautiful and profound/' Together with Palmer 1 s 
Treatise on the Church of Christ. Coleridge's Church and State 
stands behind Gladstone's book as the dominating influence. It 
is, as Morley notes, 2 and Hope-Scott testifies, 3 the mainspring 
of Gladstone f s contribution. Thus, Coleridge may be said to 
stand between Burke and Gladstone as a connecting link.
1. Gladstone: The State in its Relations with the Church pp.17, 19.————————————————————————————————'
2. Morley: Life of William Ewart Gladstone.I. p.123.
3. Memoirs of Hope-Soott. 1884. I. p.176. Letter of March 1st 
1839. Quoted in E.R.E. ' 
Cf. Hetherington: Coleridge and his Hoilowers, p.36.
CHAPTER XI .
Christianity and the Scriptures.
1. Introduction.
Nothing illustrates more clearly Coleridge's 
fine sense of religious reality than his work on the doctrine 
of the Inspiration of the Scriptures. At the same time this 
work reveals his deep interest in the Christian faith. An 
outline of his work in this connection is therefore of real 
interest in this study of his religious philosophy. Moreover, 
his work in this field is of great historical significance. 
It is necessary therefore to indicate "briefly the nature of 
the problem that confronted him.
The view of the Scriptures prevailing in Cole­ 
ridge's day postulated a book, dictated in its entirety "by an 
Infallible Intelligence, and therefore infallible and inerrant 
in its original form. The Bible thus conceived was the Word 
of God. Whatever was contained in the Bible was revealed of 
God. This position assumed the importance of an article of 
belief. 1
1. Vide Storr: op.cit., pp.178-180, for a treatment of this 
point.
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But forces were already at work to undermine 
thie theory. In Germany, Herder and Leasing, as the 
creators of the historical method, together with Niebuhr 
and Savigny, had prepared the way for its application to the 
special subject-matter of the Scriptures. This work was 
taken up by Eichhorn, G-ieseler, Griesbach, Schleiermacher, 
Semler, De Wette, Gesenius, Ewald and Ilgen. The climax of 
the critical movement was reached in 1835 with the publica­ 
tion of Strauss' Leben Jesu. Vatke's Biblical Theology, and 
Baur's Uber die sogennanten Pastoral-briefe . In Britain, 
men were also astir in the same direction.^ There was the 
Roman Catholic Geddes in Scotland, and the Anglican Bishop 
Marsh in England—the latter the first in Britain to raise 
clearly the Synoptic Problem; there was Thirlwall with his 
introduction to his translation of Schleiermacher's Essay on 
St> Luke in 1625; there was Thirlwall's friend and Coleridge's 
friend, Julius Hare, who, with Thirlwall, translated Mebuhr' s 
History of Home in 1827; there was Henry Hart Milman with his 
History of the Jews in 1829; and there was the Oriel School 
of Whateley, Arnold and Hampden. But among these pioneers, 
Coleridge's place is unique. To him, as Principal Tulloch 
points out, "belongs the honour of having first plainly and 
boldly announced that the Scriptures were to be read and
1. Vide Storr: op.cit., pp.160-176 for the material of the 
following.
2. Vide Ibid, pp.177-198; and Tulloch: op.cit., pp.40-85.
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studied, like any other literature, in the light of their
continuous growth, and the adaptation of their parts to one
another."
II. Coleridge as a Critical Scholar.
In 1927, the French scholar, Nidecker, sug­ 
gested that an exposition of Coleridge's critical views on 
the matter of the Scriptures was a desideratum in Coleridgean 
criticism. 2 Since then, no such exposition has appeared. To 
attempt here a complete exposition is obviously impossible. 
It is of value, however, to indicate something of Coleridge's 
work in this field, for it lies at the foundation of his general 
theory.
Coleridge owed his first introduction to Biblical
criticism to Eichhorn. This introduction occurred during his
a 
visit to Gottingen; and to the end of his life, Coleridge
retained his interest in Eichhorn. From Lessing, whose works 
he read thoroughly while in Germany, Coleridge obtained certain 
phrases, notably the term Bibliolatry. for his Confessions.4 
Benn has argued, in the light of this, that Coleridge's whole 
stock of Biblical criticism was drawn from these two sources.^
1. Tulloch: op.cit., p.35. Cf. Shairp: Studies in Poetry and 
Philosophy, p.233.
2. Revue de lltterature compared. VII. p.528.
3. Vide Haney: A Bibliography of Samuel Taylor Coleridge.
4. Vide Introduction by J.E.Green to t&e 1849 edition or the 
Confessions for the parallel passages in Lessing and 
Coleridge.
5. Benn: op.cit,, p.271.
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The evidence, however, indicates a wider range of reading.
The names of Schleiermacher, Heinrichs, Jahn, appear in
2 the bibliographies of Coleridge. In addition, Paulas of
gJena and Sender are singled oat for comment,
A note in the Semina Rerum indicates his
interest in the Synoptic Problem. The occasion of the note, 
dated February 8th, 1826, is the perusal of Schleiermacher 1 s 
Essay on St. Luke, which had appeared in an English transla­ 
tion the previous year. The translator, Thirlwall, had in­ 
cluded an introduction giving an account of the counter- 
theories of Eichhorn and Schleiermacher, together with a dis­ 
cussion of the controversial works from Eichhorn down to 
Bishop Marsh in England. This interest in the Synoptic Pro­ 
blem reveals that Coleridge was alive to the vital questions 
of criticism of his day.
Coleridge had little use for the ordinary
commentary. He had, however, two favourites among the older
5 commentators. The one was Cocceius, the other was Leignton,
whose Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Peter he ranked
g next to the Scriptures themselves.
1. J.D. Campbell offers the comment that Jahn 1 s History of the 
Hebrew Commonwealth was "probably the main source of the 
frequent illustrations which he drew from the idea and 
development of the Hebrew Commonwealth. 1 ' The Athanaeum » 1888, I. p. 795, —————————
2. Notes on English Divines. II. p. 324.
3. MS. C,
4. MS.C, p. 52. Cf. Letters II. pp .707-708. -May 25,1820.
5. Table Talk, p. 69" Cf. Unpublished Letters. II. pp. 401-402
6. Omniana, p. 400.
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Coleridge's main interest centred in the New 
Testament. Bat, unlike Marcion and Schleiermacher, he would 
not divorce the Old Testament from the New. He learned 
Hebrew in order that he might read the Old Testament in the 
original, and attained sufficient knowledge to satisfy him­ 
self on certain critical points. One result of this was that
he was able to appreciate the difference in the Hebrew of such
2 books as Isaiah, Ecclesiastes and Daniel. He accepts the
n
Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, but does not interpret
the books literally. The first chapters of Genesis are to be
4 5 interpreted symbolically. The history of Adam is a mythos.
The question of cosmic creation does not interest him. Will 
is always creative. In another instance Coleridge avoids the 
danger of literalism by an appeal to allegory. "I have 
learned to interpret for myself the imprecatory verses of the
Psalms of my inward and spiritual enemies," he writes in a
7 note.
The patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, are 
historical figures. They are not sacrosanct; their strengths
Q
and weaknesses are judged impartially. Coleridge has an
1. Cf. Israel's Lament. Poems, pp.433-434. Cf.Table Talk.p.86n
2. Table Talk, p.41.
3. Table Talk, p.81.
4. Aids, p71T3n.
5. Notes on English Divines. I. p.E67.
6. Cf. ibid, II. p.142 .
7. Notes Theological Political and Miscellaneous, p.51.
8. Table Talk, pp.76-77.
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ingenious interpretation of the Witch of Endor story as 
n a trick of Ventriloquism." 1 The Book of Job is held to 
be pure Arab poetry of the highest and most antique cast, 
antecedent to the Mosaic dispensation. 2 He recognizes that 
the Satan of the Book of Job is not the devil of mediaeval 
theology. Coleridge characterizes him as a "dramatic 
attorney-general." The Psalms are Davidical rather than 
David's own compositions,4 The question of pre- or post- 
exilic Psalms apparently does not occur to him, although 
he expresses a wish for a fresh translation of the Psalms, 
inasmuch as "scores of passages are utterly incoherent as 
they stand." 5 In like manner the Book of Proverbs is
Solomonian. 6 Along with Ecclesiastes, the book was probably
7written or collected about the time of Nehemiah.
The Book of Jonah he holds to be an apologue
0
or parable in which Jonah means the Israelitish nation. The 
Book of Daniel aroused his interest for several reasons. In
the first place, the critical questions involved made the 
book a kind of test case. Secondly, the whole question of 
prophecy came immediately to the fore. With regard to the 
second point, there is some evidence to indicate that, although 
Coleridge did not recognize the so-called proof from prophecy








8. Aids. p.!74n. Cf. Notes Theological. Political and 
Miscellaneous, p.48.
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as valid for Christianity, yet he did not rale oat the possi­ 
bility of prediction. His interest in the psychology of 
prophecy is seen in the Appendix to the Statesman's Manual. 
and in the Table Talk. A note in the Table Talk reads:-
"It is impossible to say whether an inner sense does 
not really exist in the mind, seldom developed, indeed, 
"bat which may have a power of presentiment......The
power of prophecy might have been merely a spiritual 
excitation of this dormant faculty."2
fhe place of music in this connection is noted. Coleridge 
discasses the association of music with prophecy in the Old 
Testament, 3 Elsewhere he holds that "if the prophecies of 
the Old Testament are nois rightly interpreted of Jesas oar 
Ohrist, then there is no prediction whatever contained in it 
of that stapendoas event—the rise and establishment of 
Christianity.4 His interest in the spiritual aspects of pro­ 
phecy is seen by his insistence—whether exegetically correct 
or not is beside the present point—that, with the exception 
of the Book of Daniel and "an obscure text of Jeremiah," 
"there is not a passage in all the Old Testament which favours 
the notion of a temporal Messiah."
Coleridge grasps clearly one aspect of the
meaning of prophecy, namely, that prophecy is concerned with 
social conditions and moral relations rather than with events.
1. Appendix to the Statesman's Manual. Biog. Lit, p.348.
2. fable Talk. p.sTT
3. Ibid, p.31.
4. Table galk. pp.57-58.
5. Ibid, pp.57-58.
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Thus he finds in Isaiah "the true philosophy of the French 
Revolution,'1 '1" at the same time denying that prophecy is to 
be applied to particular events.
"To the man who has habitually contemplated Christianity 
as interesting all rational finite beings, as the very 
spirit of truth, the application of the prophecies as 
so many fortune-tellings and sooth-sayings to parti- « 
cular events and persons, must needs be felt as childish.'^
rjL
A long note in the Semina Rerum^ reveals his 
mind on the critical questions of the Book of Daniel. He 
holds the book to consist of two parts, a biographical preface 
and the prophecies beginning at Chapter VII. The biographical 
section is a late work, proved by the language "which could 
not have been in use till after the conquests of Alexander the 
Great." It belongs to the same group as Susannah and the 
Elders, and Bel and the Dragon. And, elsewhere, he states 
explicitly that this section dates from the time of Antiochus 
Epiphanes.4 He holds that this does not affect the historicity 
of a person called Daniel, contemporary with Ezekiel. The 
biographical section contains nothing "that can interest us 
as Christians." In fact, these half-dozen chapters contain 
"more temptations to disbelief, more and more prima facie 
improbabilities than all the rest of the Old Testament collect­ 
ively." Coleridge does not extend his criticism to the rest of 
the book and his belief in the possibility of prediction allows 
him to date the latter half from the time of the Exile. 5 In
1. Statesman's Manual Biog. Lit. p.325. Quotes Isaiah 47 1 7
2. flotes on Sngllsn Divines. I. p. 150. Cf. ibid, II. p.32 9.
3. MS.C, pp.22-35.
4. Jahn: History of the Hebrew Commonwealth^ note printed in 
The Athenaeum, 1888. I. p.796.
5. Cf. Notes on English Divines. I. p.152; II. p.333.
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this, Coleridge as a critic of the Old Testament stands 
revealed—partially equipped, and leaning to the new critical 
positions; half-hesitant, and retaining the old. He was as 
much a creature of the age, in this respect, as he was in ad­ 
vance of it.
The heart of Coleridge's interest lay, however, 
in the New Testament. It is to fee expected that his critical 
views would display more firmness and would cover a wider range 
This is found to be the case. His interest in the Synoptic 
Problem has been indicated. Although there is no direct ex­ 
position of his own views extant, a note on a sermon of Bishop 
Hacket indicates that he had adopted Eichhorn's theory in 
general.
nAs the Temptation is found in the three Gospels of 
Matthew, Mark, and Luke, it must have formed part of 
the Prot-evangelion, or original Gospel;—from the 
Apostles, therefore it must have come, and from some 
or all who had heard the account from our Lord him­ self." 1
Elsewhere, he writes of the "nominal Matthew." 2 Again, he 
suggests,
"It would lessen, if not remove,.....not a few diffi­ 
culties in the three first Gospels, if we might ven­ 
ture to suppose that in some instances the Evangelists 
(for I cannot forget that the explaining the words 
according to St. Matthew as equivalent to written by 
Matthew, is a purely arbitrary interpretation, and 
highly improbable to boot) had misconceived the 
Apostles, or the Apostles whose preaching, K^poV«.Ta- 
they had collected (taken notes of, as we now say)have 
not comprehended their divine Master."^
1. Notes on English Divines^ I. pp.147-148.
2. MS.C, note at end.
3. MS.C, pp.95-96. (Edited)
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In line with this, he holds Matthew XII. v.40 to be a gloss 
of some "unlearned, though pious, Christian of the first 
century."* His handling of this text reveals some insight 
into the nature of internal evidence in connection with dis­ 
crepancies between the Gospels. A final note on the problem 
is of interest:-
"I must lose all power of distinction, before I can 
affirm that the genuineness of the first Gospel, 
that in its present form it was written by Matthew, 
or is a literal translation of a Gospel written by 
him, rests on as strong external evidence as Luke's, 
or on as strong internal evidence as St. John's." 2
These quotations illustrate the trend of his mind on the pro­ 
blem. There is not sufficient evidence to suggest that he 
had a complete theory of the Synoptic Problem, or rather— 
for it is almost certain that he had some theory, as he had 
of everything else—there is no record of what his exact theory 
really was.
He gives 120 A.D. as the outside date for all
the New Testament writings, 3 although he does not feel himself 
that any were written that late. He recognizes the ending of 
St. Mark's Gospel to be later than the rest of the book.4 He 
confesses ignorance as to the "when, why, and for rhom" of his 
favourite Gospel of St. John. 5 He argues that the object of
1. Statesman's Manual, Appendix B. Biog. Lit, pp.337-538.
2. Notes on English Divines. II. p.237.
3. Confessions, p.293.
4. Notes on English Divines. I. p.26.
5. Ibid: I. p.290 .... Nor is his favourite sacrosanct.
I. John 7.7 is held to be a gloss. 
Cf. Table Talk, p.23; and Notes on English Divines II.p.207
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St. John in his Gospel and his Epistles is to prove: first, 
the divinity; and second, the actual human nature and bodily 
suffering of Christ. 1
The authenticity of St. Paul's Epistles is
incomparably clearer than that of the Synoptics.^ An excep­ 
tion is made in the case of the Pastoral Epistles, which he 
is inclined to ascribe to a disciple of St. Paul, rather than 
to the Apostle himself. The arguments as to unpaalinity he 
rejects as unsound. Elsewhere he calls these Epistles e^ 
-mm A o *,£*?.$ and remarks on the difference in style between
A
them and the Epistle to the Romans. The reasons he cites 
for ascribing the Epistles to a disciple of St. Paul are cer­ 
tain biographical and chronological difficulties and the ab­ 
sence of the books from Marcion's Apostolicon. On the basis 
of this theory, difficulties in connection with the history 
of the early church would be cleared,—since "it does not seem 
quite probable" that the prohibition of remarriage to deacon­ 
esses, the separation of the Elders from the Deacons and the 
Bishop from the Elders, occurred as early as the accepted dates- 
66 for II Timothy, 55 for Titus.
The Epistle to the Romans is to Coleridge "the
5 most profound work in existence." Ephesians is a Catholic
^^^ ^__ ^^ ^__ ^^ ^__ ^M ^^ ^v «w ^B M ̂ B •« ———— «w ^V ^V MM «W ••* ——" ——— ——— ——— -^ ——— ——— ^l~ ^~ m-m
1. Table Talk, p.23.
2. Notes on English Divines, II. p.291
3. MS. C, pp.45-46.
4. Table Talk, p.228.
5« Table Talk, p.228. Coleridge has an interesting remark to
the effect that, were St. Paul writing today, he would
have cast his parentheses into notes.
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Epistle addressed to the whole of St. Paul's churches. It 
is "one of the divinest compositions of man," and embraces 
every doctrine of Christianity. 1 Colossians is "the over­ 
flowing, as it were," of St. Paul's mind on the same sub-
o
3ect as Ephesians.
Again, Coleridge holds that there are serious 
difficulties affecting the authenticity of the Petrine
IX
Epistles. He ascribes them to the Apostolic Age, suggest­ 
ing as a solution that St. Peter, "no great scholar or 
grammarian," had dictated them to an amanuensis, leaving 
diction and style to him. This amanuensis had been an auditor 
of St. Paul and Coleridge suggests either Luke or Mark as pro­ 
babilities. The references to the Day of the Lord in the 
Petrine Epistles present a difficulty to Coleridge's mind. "Are 
we bound to receive them as articles of faith?n4 Elsewhere 
he asks whether such passages are to be regarded as apocalyptic 
and a part of the revelation of Christ, or are they, "like the 
dogma of a personal Satan, accommodations of the current popular 
creed which they continued to believe,"
The Epistle to the Hebrews is ascribed to Apollos, 
following the lead of Luther. This is a private opinion only,
1. Table Talk, p.83.
2. Ibid: p.83.
3. Notes on English Divines. II. p.344; I. p.201.
4. Ibid; II. p.344.
5. Ibid: I. p.318.
6. Ibid: I. p.201.
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asserted against the popular ascription of the book to St. 
Paul. "And what," he asks, "though it was written by 
neither?" He holds it demonstrable that the book was com­ 
posed before the siege of Jerusalem, and that the internal 
evidence indicates an Alexandrian origin. The doctrine of 
the Book is Pauline "at large."
The Book of Revelation, with its bizarre 
symbolism, appealed greatly to Coleridge's poetic immagina-
tion. His interest is seen in his marginal notes on the
1 2commentaries of Eichhorn and Heinrichs, and in his frequent
references to Cocceius. Coleridge declines to find in the 
book any reference to Pope, Turk or Napoleon, as against the 
extravagant claims of his friend, Edward Irving. 3 He describes
Athe book as a "sacred Oratorio," a "drama sui generis." At 
one time in his life, he characteristically suggests a metrical
R
translation of the Apocalypse. Following the lead of Eusebius, 
he is inclined to find the author in John, "an Elder and Con­ 
temporary of the Church of Ephesus." 6
Coleridge has a true conception of New Testament 
eschatology.
"If any one contends that the kingdom of the Son of Man, 
and the re-descent of our Lord with his angels in the
1. Ottery St. Mary Marginalia II.
2. Notes on English Divines, I. p.137 seq.
3. British Museum MS., Egerton 2801, folio 204.
4. -Ibid, folio 205.
5. Letters. II. p.773.
6. British Museum MS., Egerton 2801, folio 205.
	Cf. Notes on English Divines. I. pp. 131-132.
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clouds, are to be interpreted spiritually, I have no 
objection; only you cannot pretend that this was the 
interpretation of the disciples. It may be the right, 
but it was not the Apostolic belief." 1
Several instances of Coleridge's views on the 
question of New Testament miracles may be given. The true 
miracle at Pentecost consisted in the descent of the Holy
Spirit. The so-called gift of tongues is wholly secondary,
P and need not be ascribed to miraculous sources. The Virgin
Birth of Christ is not a "point of religion" with Coleridge,—
rt
"it is enough for me to know that the Son of God became flesh. 
The conversion of St. Paul supplies Coleridge with a test case. 
A long note in the Semina Rerum indicates his distinction 
between the recorded details and the essential truth of the 
narrative. He does not expect to find in Luke a "scrutiniz­ 
ing philosophic historian," who has cross-examined every auth­ 
ority and witness. Luke thought more of spiritual edification 
than mere historical precision. Coleridge launches a funda­ 
mental criticism at the work of the "Neo).ogical School from 
Semler to Schleiermacher."
"The original sin of the German School is the comparing 
of this or that extraordinary narrative in the Gospel 
with some other analogous fact in recent or profane 
History, instead of taking the complexus of the New 
Testament Story and seeking for an analogy to this, in 
any other series of events allowed not to be miraculous. 
In imagination, they snap each single Hair, with ease;.... 
No! You must try your strength on the Whole Tail."
1. Notes on English Divines, I. p.2Vl.
3. Ibid: I. p.37.
3. Ibid: I. pp.73-74.
4. MS. C, pp.50-51.
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Elsewhere, he stresses the same point:
"Now on this last point.... .viz. the object, the occasion,
the importance, the results, St. Paul himself, the 
Apostle of the Gentiles, and the enduring Oracle of the 
pure Faith, I should rest my vindication of the 
miraculous character of the Incident..........1 should
begin by protesting against the fallacy and unfairness 
of detaching any single part from the Gospel History, 
and reasoning on it as if it stood alone......The credi­ 
bility of the Gospel Facts—each must be appreciated by 
the credibility of the Whole/'
The question therefore is not whether the conversion of St.Paul 
may not "be explained by an accidental concurrence of natural 
causes, supposing it an insulated fact.11 Rather, the right 
question is:-
"Bearing in mind the time, the occasion the results, 
the life and character of the Individual, and the close 
and organic connection of this Event with the whole 
History of Christianity, from the Baptism of John to 
the close of the Apostolic Age, and again the no less 
intimate connection of Christianity vith the History, 
Laws and Prophecies of the Hebrew Nation, can we ration­ 
ally refuse our assent to the Apostle's own inward Assur­ 
ance and persistent assertion of its' miraculous—i.e. 
supernatural origin?"^
Such statements reveal not only the literary 
critic, but the Christian critic, thoroughly alive to the 
nature of the New Testament problem. At a time when Biblical 
criticism was a closed book to the vast majority of Christian 
leaders in England, Coleridge was reaching out a -elcome hand 
to the new learning. It was the vrelccme, not of an ardent young 
disciple eager to believe all, but the welcome of a fellow- 
scholar, ready to point out flaws in any extreme theory. His 
main concern was the general principles to be borne in mind.
1. MS. C, pp. 94-95.
2. Ibid: p.95.
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IPoremost among these principles was that criticism, granted 
full liberty to pursue its literary researches, must remember 
also the nature of the Christian revelation. This is put 
strikingly in his remark, "The only fit commentator on Paul 
was Luther."
III. The Doctrine of the Inspiration of the Scriptures.
Aside from any particular critical problem,
there was another question that claimed Coleridge's attention,— 
that of revelation in relation to the Scriptures. The prevail­ 
ing view of the Bible affronted not only Coleridge's fine 
literary sense, it was in direct opposition to his conception 
of the nature of spirituality, of faith, and of Christianity. 
The problem, therefore, of the inspiration of the Scriptures 
was one to the consideration of which he was logically driven.
Coleridge faced the problem squarely, his
conclusions finding expression in the Confessions of an Inquir­ 
ing Spirit. The Confessions takes the form of seven letters 
addressed to a friend. Coleridge proposes to discuss two ques­ 
tions: first, whether a belief in the divine origin and author­ 
ity of all and every part of the canonical Scriptures is necess­ 
ary as the first principle or condition of the Christian faith; 
and second, whether the true appreciation of Scripture may not 
be the result and consequence of the belief in Christ.
1* Table Talk, p.229. 
2, Confessions, p.289.
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Mention is made in the Semina Herum of an 
eighth and of a ninth letter, but no trace is to be found 
of these extra letters. Their probable contents are, how­ 
ever, indicated. As they stand, the Confessions comprizes 
one of the few complete and homogeneous works of the "myriad- 
minded" Coleridge. The Confessions, written probably in
21824, was not published until 1840, after the author's death.
The reason for this delay in publication is given by Coleridge 
in a note in the Semina Rerum. As has been seen, Coleridge 
was sufficiently acquainted with the results and conclusions 
of German criticism to sense, like Arnold, the impending shock 
to the English religious mind. The letters were Coleridge's 
attempt to lessen this shock.
"I had long foreseen," he writes, "that this Disclosure 
must take place: and that no Cordon Sanitaire could 
exclude the infection; and from this conviction I wrote 
the 8 letters on the religious and superstitious venera­ 
tion of the Scriptures, in the hope of preparing the 
minds of theological Students for the discussion by 
shewing that, whatever the final result might be, the 
truth of Christianity stood on foundations of Adamant, 
and that this conviction emancipating the believer from 
the Spirit of fear, would tend to render the result it­ 
self, in no point of real and practical importance, 
different from the common Belief on the Subject actually 
entertained by any man of learning, in the Church during 
the last half-century. Anxious, however, that the 
momentous Truths and vindication of the Mysteries of 
our faith from unscriptural perversions and distortions 
set forth in the Aids to Reflection should have fair play, 
I suspended the publication of the Letters—and do not, 
on the whole, regret it ."3
1. MS.C, p.47.
2. Campbell: op.cit., p.254n. Cf. Watson: op.cit., p.100.
3. MS.C, p.52. Cf. Watson: op.cit., p.102.
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Turning to the Confessions, it is at once 
evident that Coleridge not only states his own views, but 
lays bare the weaknesses of the popular theory. That is to 
say, there is both a negative and a positive side to the 
question. Attacking the theory of verbal inspiration, 
Coleridge inquires, first, on what authority the doctrine 
rests. The Biblical writers give no indication of being 
merely stenographers, but refer to other documents. Further,
the attempt to prove Scriptural infallibility by an appeal
2 
to Scripture itself involves a petitio principii.
Again, the theory of infallibility turns the
Bible into one plane of revelation. "In infallibility there
25 are no degrees. But the prima facie evidence is that there
is a difference in style and content. The doctrine of infalli­ 
bility thus blurs the distinction between "Law, and Truth, and
Example, Oracle and lovely Hymn, and choral Song of ten thous-
4 and thousands, and accepted prayers of Saints and Prophets."
The doctrine allows of no distinction between what is histor-
5 ical fact and what is traditional and legendary, and does not
account for discrepancies of detail. The books of Esther and
1. It is possible also to amplify the argument of the
Confessions by notes and ex officio jottings. In order to 
avoid repetition, it has been considered advisable to 







of Daniel assume the same importance as the Gospels and 
Epistles. The theory thus means that proved inaccuracy in
the historical parts would vitiate the Gospels and Epistles
2 as vehicles of truth.
The doctrine of verbal inspiration gives no 
answer to the question involved in the facts of diverse lang­ 
uages, and of language itself. "For how can absolute infalli­ 
bility be blended with fallibility? Where is the infallible 
criterion? How can infallible truth be infallibly conveyed 
in defective and fallible expressions?" 3 Further, it ignores 
the fact of figurative and symbolical language, and leads to 
literalism on the one hand and forced and fantastic interpreta­ 
tions and arbitrary allegories on the other.
The dictation theory makes nonsense of the
c /•
story and song of Deborah, of the Book of Job, and of such
7 Psalms as the 109th and 137th. Such a theory results in the
practice of bringing into logical dependency "detached sentences
Q
from books composed at the distance of centuries." By this 
practice of wrenching texts from their contexts and elevating 
the resulting mosaic into independent theses, purgatory, popery,












A farther difficulty is presented to the theory 
of infallibility by the facts of science.
"I challenge these divines and their adherents to estab­ 
lish the compatibility of a belief in the modern astron­ 
omy and natural philosophy with their and Wesley's 
doctrine respecting the inspired Scriptures, without. 
reducing the Doctrine itself to a plaything of wax." 1
Coleridge points out that the doctfine may be 
traced to the rabbinical worship of the Mosais books. But 
though the rabbis were careful to distinguish between the 
Pentateuch and the Hagiographa, the founders of the Christian 
doctrine had extended their notions and phrases to the Bible 
throughout.^ He, therefore, rejects the doctrine. Such a 
doctrine, he claims,
"Petrifies at once the whole body of Holy Writ with all 
its harmonies and symmetrical gradations......This
breathing organism, this glorious panharmonicon. which 
I had seen stand on its feet as a man, and with a man's 
voice given to it f the Doctrine in question turns at 
once into a colossal Memnon f s head, a hollow passage for 
a voice, a voice that mocks the voices of many men, and 
speaks in their names, and yet is but one voice, and the 
same;—and no man uttered it and never in a human heart 
was it conceived." 3
Such a doctrine evacuates all sense and efficacy from the fact
4 of the growth of the Bible itself through the centuries.
Turning to the positive aspect, Coleridge admits 
in the first place, the difficulty involved in the prepossession 






Claims of reverence and gratitude set the Bible apart from all 
other books. On the other hand, he relates his own experience,
"that the more tranquilly an inquirer takes up the Bible 
as he would any other body of ancient writings, the 
livelier and steadier will be his impression of its super­ 
iority to all other books......difficulty after difficulty
has been overcome from the time that I began to study the 
Scriptures with free and unboding spirit, under the con­ 
viction that my faith in the Incarnate Word and his Gospel 
was secure, whatever the result might be,"2
The key to Coleridge f s doctrine is to be found
in his idea of the Word. "There is a Light higher than a 11,even 
the Word that was in the beginning;—the Light, of which light 
itself is but the shechinah and cloudy tabernacle;—the Word
that is light for every man, and life for as many as give heed
13? 
to it.n The Word stands back of any written document*
"If between this lord and the written Letter I shall 
anywhere seem to myself to find a discrepance, I will 
not conclude that such there actually is; nor on the 
other hand will I fall under the condemnation of them 
that would lie for God, but seek as I may, be thankful 
for what I have and wait." 4
This distinction between the Sternal Word and the written 
Scriptures is fundamental. It is emphasized constantly. "Alas 1." 
he writes, "for the superstition where the words are made to be 
the Spirit 1. Oh 1, might I live but to utter all my meditations 
on this most concerning point." The Word is above and dis­ 
tinct from the written Scriptures. St. Peter's statement, tf The 
word of the Lord endureth for ever," (I Peter 1,35) provides a




5. Notes Theological. Political and Miseellanepoe^ pp.7-8.
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perfect illustration. 1 Elsewhere, he states, "The written 
words must be tried by the Word from the beginning." 2
In a long note in the Semina Rerum dealing with 
the doctrine and practice of the Reformers his o^n position 
becomes clear. His commendation is implicit testimony.
"So that in those parts only, in which the Spirit in 
the Letter revealed itself to the Spirit in the Heart, 
were guiding Scriptures for each individual—and no­ 
thing mere was imposed on him than the duty, which 
both Humility and Charity dictated, of presuming that 
all other parts of Scripture might have been for other 
Christians and might become for himself at some future 
time and in other moods and states of spiritual insight, 
the transparent Shrines of the same Spirit of Truth." 3
It could not be expressed better.
Returning to the argument of the Confessions, 
Coleridge holds, that "whatever finds me, bears witness for 
itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit." 4 The Bible 
in reaching to the inmost shrine of man's being, carries its 
ov/n evidence of divine origin. Coleridge testifies that
"in the Bible there is more that finds me than I have 
experienced in all other books put together; that the 
words of the Bible find me at greater depths of my 
being; and that whatever finds me brings with it an 
irresistible evidence of its having proceeded from the 
Holy Spirit ."5
Given the same Justice granted to all other
books of grave authority, Coleridge is convinced that the Bible 
will make its own appeal. Like Christianity, it is self-evidenc' 
ing. This question of the evidences of Scripture is crucial.
1. Hotes on English Divines. II. p.130.





Coleridge is emphatic that "the true evidence of the Bible 
is the Bible," even as the evidence of Christianity is the 
"living fact of Christianity itself." "The Bible and 
Christianity are their own sufficient evidence."^
Although stressing the intrinsic witness of 
the Bible to its own authority, Coleridge feels that it is 
legitimate to adduce certain historical evidence.* The fact 
of the moral influence of the Bible upon society is a demon­ 
stration that stands above particular testimony.^
"In every generation, and wherever the light of 
Revelation has shone, men of all ranks, conditions, 
and states of mind have found in this Volume a corres­ 
pondent for every movement toward the Better felt in 
their own hearts."5
"For more than a thousand years the Bible, collectively 
taken, has gone hand in hand with civilization science, 
law,—in short, with the moral and intellectual cultiva­ 
tion of the species, always supporting, and often lead­ 
ing the way."°
Good and holy men, "the kingly spirits of history," have borne 
witness to its influences. It is the "most perfect instrument, 
the only adequate organ, of Humanity;—the organ and instrument 
of all the gifts, powers, and tendencies, by which the indivi-
7dual is privileged to rise above himself." Such evidences, 
historical and external, are not to be considered lightly.
Coleridge finds further proof of the authenticity 
of the books of the Bible in the selfsame discrepancies which
1. Notes Theological, Political and Miscellaneous, p.6. 
	Of. Notes on English Divines, I. pp.~201. 350.
2. Confessions, p.500.
3. Ibid: p.319.





he claims are so great a stumbling-block to the theory of 
verbal inspiration. Such discrepancies form,
"a characteristic mark of the genuineness, independency, 
and (if I may apply the word to a book) the veracious- 
ness of each several document; a mark the absence of 
which would warrant a suspicion of collusion, invention, 
or at best of servile transcription." 1
Between the two positions, "The Bible contains 
the religion revealed by God," and "Whatever is contained in 
the Bible is religion, and was revealed by God," there can be 
no question to Coleridge's mind. 2 He is not, however, pre­ 
pared to draw an arbitrary line between what is and what is not 
the Word of God. In cases of difficulty he is content to "wait."3 
Nor will he draw a line between the Bible and the Church in 
the propagation of the Christian faith. Thie forestalls the 
objection that his own views lead directly to complete indivi­ 
dual subjectivism. He points out that as a Christian he cannot 
stand alone.4 He shrinks from all
"question respecting the comparative worth and efficacy 
of the written Word as weighed against the preaching of 
the Gospel, the discipline of the Churches, the continued 
succession of the Ministry, and communion of Saints, lest 
by comparing I should seem to detach them." 5
Both Bible and Church take their place in Coleridge's famous 
Pentad of Operative Christianity, as thesis and antithesis.
1. Confessions p.309.






There is an interdependence of the Scriptures and the Church,
a "co-ordinate authority of the Word, the Spirit and the Church/'
Coleridge therefore holds that knowledge and 
belief in the Christian faith should precede study of the 
Scriptures. To make the Bible, !*apart from the truths, doct­ 
rines, and spiritual experiences contained therein," a separate
o
article of faith is an abstraction. There is a divine recipro­ 
cal ity of faith and Scripture. The Scripture, taken in conjunc­ 
tion with the institution and perpetuity of a visible Church, 
are revered as "the most precious boon of God, next to Christian­ 
ity itself." In the Scriptures the Christian finds all the re­ 
vealed truths in addition to examples of faith and disobedience, 
the lives of men, their affections, emotions and conflicts,— 
in all of which he recognizes the influence of the Holy Spirit,
with a conviction increasing with the growth of his own faith
g and spiritual experience. Coleridge's stress on instruction
in the Christian faith, prior to study of the Bible, is under­ 
standable in the light of his distinction between the Eternal 
Wprd and the written Scriptures. The Scriptures, if they are
to be read "to any good and Christian purpose, rf must be read
4 in the faith which comes from higher sources than history.
1. Notes on English Divines, I. p.308. Cf. ibid: I. p.324. 
Cf. Herrmann: Communion of the Christian with God, p.3, 
where the same point is brought out. Cf. James Moffat: 
The Context on Theology, The Christian World, - Feb.28,1935. 
p.7, where again the interrelation is emphasized.
2. Confessions, p.321.
3. Ibid: pp.321-322.
4. Notes on English Divines. I. p.189.
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W 0'." he notes in the Semina Rerum. "the gathering storm 
of sense, the sense of the exceeding importance of the 
Position, that the Belief and the Study of the Bible 
ought to be consequent on the Knowledge and Belief of 
Christianity—and not the ordinary means of acquiring 
that Knowledge, or of grounding that Belief l" 1-
The authority of the Scriptures depends, in one
oinstance, on the unity of the impression it conveys.** 
Criticism of a separate passage, for example, the Books of 
Esther and of Daniel, and the last verse of Psalm 137, does 
not affect this. This is in line with the criticism launched 
at the German School. Coleridge points to the case of Shakes­ 
peare, whose authority does not depend on critical questions 
concerning Titus Andronicus or the parts of Henry VI., but on 
the unity or total impression. The lives of Bacon and of Sir 
Thomas More afford similar examples. To draw a line between 
the Bible and Shakespeare, in this respect, is to beg the
whole question. "This is the very petitio principii of which
g I complain."
Hence the canon of interpretation of the Bible
is "that each part of Scripture must be interpreted by the
4 spirit of the whole." Viewed in this light, a new meaning
is attached to infallibility. "It is the spirit of the Bible,
and not the detached words and sentences, thut is infallible
g and absolute." Coleridge asks what knowledge other than
c
practical and spiritual are we entitled to seek in the Bible.
1. MS. C, p.121.
2. Confessions, p.302.
3. Ibid:pTsCfe.




In an unpublished note, he states,
"We may congratulate ourselves on the now universal 
admission that the Sacred Writings were never intended 
to supersede Human Industry in the investigation of 
Nature, or to anticipate the discoveries of Reason 
by Revelation." 1
And again, he holds:-
"It is a rule of infinite importance that the Scriptures 
always speak, not ad rem in seipsa, sed quo ad hominem. 
It is a moral and religious, not a physical, revelation, 
and in order to render us good moral agents, not accurate 
natural speculators, to make us know ourselves and our 
relations to the present and future, not to make us know­ 
ing in nature without industry or intellectual exercita- 
tion."2
Hence, "the astronomer, the chemist, mineralogist, must go
elsewhere; but the Bible is the book for the man."3
Coleridge concludes his argument, in the final 
letter, by drawing attention to another aspect of his funda­ 
mental principle of the Word of God. There is a distinction 
between revelation by the Eternal Word and actuation by the 
Holy Spirit. The source of error in the doctrine of verbal 
inspiration may be traced to an ambiguity in the term 
inspiration.4 This term has a double sense. The first mean­ 
ing has the sense of "information miraculously communicated 
by voice or vision."^ In the second sense, inspiration means 
that the writer or speaker "uses and applies his existing 
gifts of power and knowledge under the predisposing, aiding,and
1. British Museum MSS., Sgerton 2801, folio 201.
2. Note in Stillingfleet: Origenes Sacrae. p.438. British 
Museum Copy. Notes edited by Richard Garnett.




directing actuation of God's Holy Spirit. Between these 
two meanings there is a positive difference. He holds, 
"It is my profound conviction that St. John and St. Paul 
were divinely inspired; but I totally disbelieve the 
dictation of any one word, sentence, or argument throughout 
their writings." 2 According to Crabb Robinson, Coleridge 
extended the category of inspiration to include extra-Biblical
17
writers such as George Fox and certain mystics. This was in 
1810 and reveals an early interest in the whole question. In 
one sense, such an extension is logically understandable. On 
the other hand, Coleridge is ever ready to stress the historic 
influence of the canonical Scriptures. The Scriptures are 
not to be believed because affirmed to be inspired.
"They are worthy of belief, because excellent in so 
universal a sense to ends commensurate with the whole 
moral, and therefore the whole actual, world that as 
sure as there is a moral Governor of the world, they 
must have been in some sense or other, and that too an 
efficient sense, inspired." 4
To return to the argument of the Confessions.— 
Coleridge characteristically asserts that the Christian 
Religion has two poles—the objective and the subjective. The 
one is historic and the other spiritual and individual. Both 
are necessary. In the Scriptures, "there is proved to us the 
reciprocity, or reciprocation, of the Spirit as subjective and 
objective." 5
1. Confessions, p.333.
2. Table Talk, p.153.
3. Robinson: op.cit., I. p.308.
4. Notes on English Divines. I. p.193.
5. Confessions, p.335.
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"No Christian probationer, who is earnestly working out 
his salvation, and experiences the conflict of the 
spirit with the evil and the infirmity within him and 
around him, can find his own state brought before him and, 
as it were, antedated, in writings reverend even for their 
antiquity and enduring permanence, and far more, and more 
abundantly, consecrated by the reverence love, and grate­ 
ful testimonies of good men through the long succession 
of ages,....and not find an objectiveness a confirming 
and assuring outwardness, and all the main characters of 
reality, reflected therefrom on the spirit, ^orking in 
himself and in his own thoughts, emotions, and aspirations."
This concludes the argument of the Confessions as it stands.
The object of one of the proposed extra letters— 
in this case, the ninth—is revealed in an unpublished note. 
Coleridge proposed to compare
"the Objective, or philological, and (in the narrower 
sense of the word) historical handling of Scripture: and 
the Subjective, and historical in the large and most 
philosophic sense of History, namely, that which the 
Scriptures have by divine Providence become, as a mighty 
Agent, and into which they may be realized subjectively, 
i.e. in the mind and heart of the Reader and Hearers ."*
The material for this chapter is indicated elsewhere in the 
Semina Rerum. Both the objective and the subjective method 
of treating the Scriptures are necessary. The first is "commend­ 
able for all Christians who have the means of so doing, and a 
duty for the Doctors of the Church." In this method, all the
1. Confessions, p.336.
2. MS.C, p.47.
3. Ibid: p.65. Cf. Hermann: op.cit., p.x. - "The Holy Scriptures 
are truly reverenced when they are, first of all, investi­ 
gated in their historically determined reality; and when, 
in the second place, these books are used, just as they 
offer themselves to us, so that in them we may seek out 
the revelation of God. M 
Cf. Herrmann: op.cit., pp.43, 76.
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critical methods of rightly interpreting ancient writers are 
requisite, and these are such that no single age is capable 
of making final decisions. Each generation hands on its re­ 
sults, to be corrected by the next. But this method is dis­ 
tinct from the other, the use of the Scriptures in devotion 
and wor ship.
It remains to consider the reservation to the 
general theory which has occasioned some comment on the part 
of later critics. Coleridge is prepared to waive the right 
to criticism in such cases where the Biblical writer claims 
to voice the words of God Himself.
"In the books of Moses, and once or twice in the pro­ 
phecy of Jeremiah, I find it indeed asserted that not 
only the words were given, but the recording of the 
same enjoined by the special command of God, and 
doubtless executed under the special guidance of the 
Divine Spirit. As to all such passages, therefore, 
there can be no dispute; and all others in which the 
words are by the sacred historian declared to have 
been the Word of the Lord supernaturally communicated, 
I receive as such with a degree of confidence propor­ 
tioned to the confidence required of me by the writer 
himself and to the claims he himself makes on my 
belief/ 2
Such a reservation is all the more puzzling in the light of
his idea of the Word of God, and of his grasp of the fact of
^ a progressive growth in the reception of this Word by men.''
His hesitancy may, perhaps, be accounted for as indicating 
a dssire to lessen the shock impending to the religious mind 
of England. Taken at its face value, it indicates the power
1. Of. Webb: A Century of Anglican Theology, p,4E.
2. Confessions, p.297. Cf. Ibid: p.2
3. Ibid: p.306.
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of traditional belief even over such a mind as free as that
of Coleridge.
In conclusion, Coleridge's doctrine of the 
Inspiration of the Scriptures may be summed up best in the 
definition which he suggests as a working formula for the 
Church of his day.
"In all things profitable to our true welfare, the 
Bible is an infallible Guide for every sincere 
Inquirer, who reads the Letter by the light of the 
Spirit for spiritual purposes and with spiritual 
desires."
It is evident that, with the exception of the reservation 
noted in the Confessions. Coleridge's theory of the Inspira­ 
tion of the Scriptures is thoroughly modern in tone. It is 
easily understandable how the Confessions could be ranked 
among the great formative books of the nineteenth century. 
As Archdeacon Storr has said, "The Confessions was the very 
book to meet the needs of an age which was catching the spirit 
of historical inquiry, and awaking to larger views of the meaning
MS.C, p.65. The formula is given in two other forms:-
1. "The Bible is the sole and sufficient Canon of
Christian Faith and Practice because whoever seeks 
therein with a right spirit that which is requisite 
for his spiritual welfare and final salvation, will 
infallibly find what he seeks."
2. "The Bible contains all revealed truths necessary 
to Salvation and for all men in all times: and 
every true believer has the promise of God that 
whatever he seeks in the spirit of Love and filial 
Trust, the Spirit of Truth will enlighten him to find 
as far as it is profitable for him." 
Mather, J. Marshall: The Young Man, Vol. XIII. p.17. 
Cf. Great Thoughts. 18997 7. pp. 99-100.
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of Revelation. 1 Asserting the spiritual authority of the 
Bible, it still remains one of the best books on the subject. 
The treatment on the whole anticipates much that is best in
this regard in Herrmann.^ Some of Coleridge's statements
i* 
take rank with the classic utterance of Robertson Smith."
Finally, in its constant emphasis on the Eternal Word of God, 
distinct from, yet revealed by and through the Scriptures, it 
sounds the note familiar in its most recent expression in the 
teaching of Karl Barth. Of Coleridge's work in this field it 
is difficult to speak too highly.
1. Storr: op.cit., p. 195. Of. Sanday: Inspiration, pp.145-155
2. Cf. The Communion of the Christian with God.
3. 7ide T. M» Lindsay; Professor Robertson Smith's Doctrine
of Scripture. (The Expositor. Fourth Series. Yol.X. 1894. 
pp. 241-2 64.)
p.250: TI If I am asked why I receive Scripture as the Word 
of God, and as the only perfect rule of faith and life, 
I answer with all the fathers of the Protestant Church, 
because the Bible is the only record of the redeeming 
love of God, because in the Bible alone I find God draw­ 
ing near to man in Jesus Christ, and declaring to us in 
Him His will for our salvation. And this record I know 
to be true by the witness of His Spirit in my heart, 
whereby I am assured that none other than God himself is 
able to speak such words to my soul." (from: Answer to 
the form of Libel, p.21.)
CHAPTER XII.
Conclusion.
I. Influence on Philosophy.
To estimate the value of a man's thought, it 
is helpful, and at times necessary, to trace the influence 
of this thought. We have seen that in the case of Coleridge, 
there are two sides to his thinking. Of his contribution to 
the technical philosophy of the succeeding generation, there 
is little to record. Green, Coleridge's disciple, inherited 
the manuscripts of which he had been the amanuensis. It was 
not, however, until 1865 that Green published his own Spirit­ 
ual Philosophy, while Coleridge's own manuscripts remain to 
this day unedited and unpublished.
Green, however, was only one of the group of 
admiring disciples who sat at the feet of the "Seer of High- 
gate." But even through these followers who, like John 
Sterling, were men of undoubted capacity, Coleridge failed 
to influence immediately the current of philosophical thought 
Muirhead, seeking reasons for this "lag" in influence, finds
it: first, "in a certain unripeness of the time for the 
acceptance by philosophers of these ideas;" and second, in
1. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.259.
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"the innate conservatism, which often prevented Coleridge 
from following out to the bitter end the principles he had 
the ge«iius to seize."
II. Influence on Theology*
If Coleridge's immediate contribution to tech­ 
nical philosophy may be said to be insignificant, it is other­ 
wise in the field of Christian theology. This fact alone 
would indicate the importance of this side of Coleridge's 
thought. "Coleridge," writes Dr. H. R. Mackintosh, "poured 
a stream of fresh life into English divinity."2 In general, 
this stream found its main channel through the work of the 
so-called Broad Church School, in its liberalizing tendency 
and reaction to dogmatic evangelicalism on the one hand and 
dogmatic ecclesiaticism on the other. In particular, Coleridge's 
influence may be traced in the members of this school.
A. Some Typical Examples in England. 
(a) Frederick Denison Maurice 11805-1872)
Foremost among these Broad Church thinkers
stands Frederick Denison Maurice, noted alike for his Christ­ 
ian Platonism and for his Christian Socialism. Maurice entered 
Cambridge in 1823, to have Hare for his tutor and Sterling for
rzhis friend. He had read Coleridge before he went up, and at 
Cambridge took the opportunity to defend him against the
1. Muirhead: Coleridge as Philosopher, p.259.
2. Mackintosh: The Doctrine of the person of Jesus Christ. 
p.275.
3. Maurice: The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice. I,p.176.
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prevailing Benthamite criticism. In his early literary efforts 
at Cambridge, his biographer tells us that "Coleridge alone 
receives unbounded praise." 1 Although he never met Coleridge, 
Maurice pays him the tribute of having preserved him from in-
2 1fidelity. He was deeply impressed with Church and State. 
Both Maurice and Coleridge drank deep of the same Platonic 
springs, although Maurice at one point, did not consider Cole­ 
ridge "a thorough Platonist."4 At another time he deplores 
Coleridge's "tendency to abstraction."^ Nevertheless his sym­ 
pathies were with him. There can be no question as to the sound­ 
ness of his judgment that Coleridge "besides being a philosopher/ i /• 
"was a penitent."
There are obvious points of contact in the teach­ 
ing of the two men. There is the emphasis on the will, both in 
sin and in redemption. 7 There is the rejection of inadequate 
commercial theories of the Atonement ®and the emphasis on the 
reconciliation by God through the Living Word. 9 And there is 
the protest against Paley's methods.
There is finally, the deep-rooted Christian 
Socialism of both men. Maurice, like Coleridge, desired to
1. Maurice: The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice. I, p.65.
2. Ibid: I. p.177.
3. Ibid: I. p.178.
4. Ibid: I. p.251.
5. Ibid: I. p.510.
6. Ibid: II. p.194.
7. Ibid: II. p.479. Cf. Wardrop: loc. cit.
8. Ibid: II. p.272.
9. Ibid: op.cit., II. pp.272, 365-368.
10. Ibid: II. p.450.
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see Christianity not only a faith, but a deed. The cure for 
the evils of society is religion, moral discipline, Christian
ethics and faith. Beer finds in Coleridge the fount of
2Maurice's Christian Socialism.
(b) Charles Kingsley. (1819-1875)
Kingsley read Coleridge's Aids while at Cam­ 
bridge in 1841. 3 His contact with the Coleridgean stream may, 
however, be traced to his deep friendship with Maurice. Not 
as great a theological thinker as his friend, his humanitarian 
instincts found expression in their joint work for Christian 
Socialism. In Kingsley, Coleridge's social passion lived on.
(c) Julius Charles Hare. (1795-1855)
Coleridge's influence on Julius Charles Hare, 
another of the Broad Church School and co-translator with 
Thirlwall of Niebuhr's History of Rome, is seen in Hare's per­ 
sonal testimony. His Mission of the Comforter (1846) is dedi­ 
cated to Coleridge. Hare describes himself as tt one of the many 
pupils whom his writings have helpt to discern the sacred con­ 
cord and unity of human and divine truth."4 He found Coleridge's 
writings "full of seeds." Coleridge's break with the empiricism 
of the day awake a welcome response in Hare.
These three examples serve to illustrate Cole­ 
ridge's influence on the men of the succeeding generation.
1. Beer: History of British Socialism. I. p.272, II. p.180 seq. 
Cf. Maurice: The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice.II.p.44.
2. Beer: op.cit., II. p.180.
3. Charles Kingsley: His Letters and Memories of his Life, p.17.
4. Hare: The Mission of the Comforter t dedication.
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Through them his thought has been melted into the theology 
of the nineteenth century and has coloured all subsequent 
thinking.
In addition to Coleridge's definite influence
upon the Broad Church School, his influence was felt in England 
by three men of totally different stamp.
(d) Edward Irving. (1792-1834. )
There is, in the first place, Coleridge 1 s
younger contemporary, Edward Irving, the brilliant, but erratic, 
Scottish preacher. Coleridge's influence on Edward Irving may 
be traced to the personal friendship of the two men and the 
latter*s attendance at the Thursday evening "salons" at High- 
gate. Irving f s millenarian emphasis in his later years found 
little sympathy in Coleridge, but of Coleridge's influence in 
other aspects there can be no question. Like Hare and Bushnell, 
Irving pays personal tribute to Coleridge. Addressing Cole­ 
ridge in a dedicatory epistle, he says,
nYou have been more profitable to my faith in orthodox 
doctrine, to my spiritual understanding of the Word of 
God, and to my right conception of the Christian Church, 
than any or all the men with whom I have entertained 
friendship and conversation."1
(e) John Henry Newman. (1801-1890)
Newman's first acquaintance with Coleridge's
works came in the spring of 1835. He records his astonishment 
at certain similarities between his own thought and that of
1. Oliphant: Life of Edward Irving, I. p.205.
Quoted Henderson: The Religious Controversies of 
Scotland, p.125.
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Coleridge. nl am surprised how much I thought mine, is to 
be found there." What this is, Newman does not tell us here; 
but in a later note to a sermon on The Influence of Natural 
and ReTealed Religion Respectively, he remarks on certain
passages in Coleridge's Biographia Literaria as anticipating
gcertain portions of the sermon. It is not difficult to dis­ 
cover the point of contact as Newman writes,
"While, then, Natural Religion was not without provision 
for all the deepest and truest religious feelings, yet 
presenting no tangible history of the Deity, no points 
of His personal character (if we may so speak without 
irreverence), it wanted that most efficient incentive to 
all action, a starting or rallying point, - an object on 
which the affections could be placed, and the energies 
concentrated."3
Newman, with his mind centred on the moral attributes of God,
finds in Coleridge the same insistence on the personal char-
4 acter of God. Newman*s reading of Coleridge was not, however,
thorough. It seems remarkable that he should class Coleridge
K 
with the Socinians. Wilfrid Ward, the biographer of Newman,
c
has only one reference to Coleridge, and is silent regarding
TJ
the influence of Coleridge, and Newman 1 s reading of him. We 
may take it that the influence did not extend to a great depth. 
The course of Newman's later life and thought lay altogether 
outside the circle of the liberalizing influence of Coleridge.
1. Letters and Correspondence of J.H.Newman t II. p.39.
2. Oxford University Sermons, p.23.
3. Ibid: p.23 - Sermon preached April 13, 1830.
4. Cf. Biographia Literaria. pp.95, 125 seq..
5. Letters and Correspondence. II. p.93.
6. Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman. I. p.49.
7. Barry, in the Catholic Encyclopaedia, writes that Newman
"took some principles from Coleridge, perhaps indirectly." 
Op.cit., Vol.X. p.800.
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Newman recognized in the philosophy of Coleridge 
a reaction from the "superficial character of the religious 
teaching" of the preceding age. In 1839, he acknowledged that 
Coleridge had laid a "philosophical basis" for "Church feelings 
and opinions. n Newman writes,
"While he indulged a liberty of speculation, which no 
Christian can tolerate, and advocated conclusions which 
were often heathen rather than Christian, yet after all 
instilled a higher philosophy into inquiring minds, than 
they had hitherto been accustomed to accept. In this 
way he made trial of his age, and succeeded in interest­ 
ing its genius in the cause of Catholic truth." 2
B. Influence in America.
(a) Ralph Waldo Emerson. (1803-1882)
Coleridge*s influence on American thought was 
remarkable. Emerson visited Coleridge at Highgate in 1830. 
According to Emerson the meeting was "rather a spectacle than 
a conversation, of no use beyond the satisfaction of my curios­ 
ity." if this personal visit was of little account, it was 
otherwise with Emerson's reading of Coleridge. Buckham writes 
that Emerson and the New England Transcendentalists "were more 
indebted to Coleridge than to any other modern philosopher."^
(b) James Marsh. (1794-1842)
Coleridge was introduced to American readers 
by James Marsh, President of the University of Vermont. Marsh 
read the Aids during his early period as president, that is to
1. Bertram Newman: Cardinal Newman. p.50.
2. British Critic, April 1839, printed Essays: Critical and 
Historical, I. pp.268-269. Apologia pro vita sua. p.97.
3. Emerson: Works. Vol. II. p.9. (York Library edition.)
4. Btlckham: Progressive Religious Thought in America, p.48.
Vide Thompson: Emerson's Indebtedness to Coleridge.(Studies 
in Philology, Vol.XXIII. #1, January 1926.)
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say, sometime after 1826. The book, says Buckham, n came to 
him as the message of a kindred and greater soul speaking from 
the housetops truths which had been but whisperings to him­ 
self." Marsh set himself to place the book before the American 
public. This took place in 1829 with his edition of the Aids,
together with a Preliminary Essay, the writing by which Marsh
Pis best known. "Unless I distrust my own feelings and con­ 
victions altogether," wrote Dr. Marsh, "I must suppose, that 
for some, I hope for many, minds, it (the Aids) will have a 
deep and enduring interest."^ Marsh's hope was not without 
realization. There was much comment and criticism in the re­ 
ligious Journals. 4 In 1839, another edition of the Aids 
appeared, edited this time by Professor McVi'kar of Columbia 
College. Interest in Coleridge continued to grow. In 1853, 
the first complete edition of Coleridge's works, edited by 
Shedd, was published in New York, prior to any such edition in 
England. In 1847, Noah Porter, Jr. contributed a notable article 
to The Bibliotheca Sacra dealing with Coleridge and his American 
disciples.
"The influence of Coleridge on the philosophy and theology 
of New England," wrote Porter, "has been in some respects,
1. Buckham: James Marsh and Coleridge. (The Bibliotheca Sacra, 
Vol.LXI. #ccxlii, April 1904, p.308.) Vide Marjorie 
Niaolson: James Marsh and the Vermont Transcendentalists. 
(Philosophical Review, 34, 28-50. 1925.)——————————-
2. Vide Aids, pp.xxiii-lxxvi.
3. Aids. Preliminary Essay, p.xxiii.
4. Vide Snyder: American Comments on Coleridge a Century Ago, 
in Studies by Several Hands etc., pp.201-221.
5. Vide Snyder: op.cit., pp.215-219 re the controversy between 
Marsh and McVickar over these rival editions.
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what President Marsh desired it should be. It has 
opened new fields of inquiry, and put us in possession 
of other modes of viewing religious truth." 1
(c) Horace Bushnell. (1802-1876)
By far the most remarkable example of Cole­ 
ridge's influence is seen in the case of Horace Bushnell, the 
great American theologian. The full extent of this influence 
is realized only by reference to Bushnell himself. Bushnell 
began the reading of Coleridge during his college days at Yale 
at a time when his model was Paley. The result of this intro­ 
duction is given best in his own words:
"By and by it fell to me to begin the reading of Cole­ 
ridge. For a whole half-year I was buried under his 
Aids to Reflection, and trying vainly to look up 
through. I was quite sure that I saw a star glimmer, 
but I could not quite see the stars. My habit was only 
landscape before; but now I saw enough to convince me 
of a whole other world somewhere overhead, a range of 
realities in higher tier, that I must climb after, and, 
if possible, apprehend."^
The book stayed by him to the end. Bushnell T s criticism of 
certain books is given to us by J. H. Twickell:- "He mentioned 
two or three, but finally demolished them all, save Coleridge. 
I have often heard him say that he was more indebted to Cole-
rz
ridge than to any extra-Scriptural author." This remarkable
tribute is attested by Bushnell f s work. Hunger gives the
4credit to Coleridge for Bushnell f s Nature and the Supernatural:
1. Porter: Coleridge and his American Disciples. (The Biblio- 
theca Sacra, Vol. IV. p.163.)
2. Life and Letters of Horace Bushnell. pp.208-209.
3. Ibid: p.499.
4. Hunger: Horace Bushnell: Preacher and Theologian, pp.209-210
311.
which strikes the familiar note of Coleridge that will is 
creative and above nature. Bushnell T s theory of language has 
its roots deep in Coleridge. Finally, the work of Bushnell 
on the Christian doctrine of Atonement clearly is indebted 
to Coleridge. Hunger, Bushnell's biographer, gives his judg­ 
ment regarding the influence of the Aids on Bushnell:- "It
may be said that it is to this book we are indebted for
2 Bushnell."
From all this it can be seen how Coleridge's 
thought passed by way of Marsh, Bushnell and thence through 
Washington Gladden into the blood-stream of American theology.
"Coleridge, w concludes Buckham, "may be said to be the philo-
3 sopher of the progressive school of theology in America."
His influence, both in England and in America, may be summed 
up in words which Stopford Brooke wrote describing F.W.Robert- 
son:- "A living source of Impulse, a practical direction of 
Thought, a key to many of the problems of Theology, and, above 
all, a path to Spiritual Freedom."4
III. Contribution.
As the pioneer in nineteenth century English
theology, Coleridge deserves credit, first, for his attempt to 
make theology philosophical and to weave from the materials of 
speculation and Christian faith a garment of truth without 
seam.
T."~Vide "On the Nature of Language as related to Thought and 
Spirit," in God in Christ, pp.9-117.
2. Munger: op.cit., p.46.
3. Buckham: Progressive Religious Thought in America, pp.48-49.
4. Life and Letters of Frederick W. Robertson^ preface to 
first edition, Vol.1, p.xxiv. 1878 edition.
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"Coleridge," writes Archdeacon Storr, "made Christian­ 
ity live, not only as a perfect wr:r of life, but as 
the perfect truth, the supreme and satisfying philosophy. 
He vitalised the dead bones of religion, and made ^ 
theology once more a living and progressive science."
Thus Coleridge may be said to stand in the succession of 
Origen and Aquinas. Second, as a Christian apologist, Cole­ 
ridge was filled with, a sense of the breadth and universality 
of Christianity. It was the crown of religion. It bore with­ 
in itself the witness to its truth. "In order to an efficient 
belief in Christianity, a man must have been a Christian," 
Coleridge wrote at the close of the Biographia Literaria.^ 
There is no mistaking what he means. He shifted the apolo­ 
getic emphasis from the external to the internal, from "proof" 
to "experience." In this, as Stewart remarks, he had "the 
eye of a seer for the new direction which apologetic in the 
nineteenth century must take." His treatment of the inspira­ 
tion of the Scriptures is the finest instance of his work in 
this field.
Coleridge's fine sense of religious reality is 
seen clearly in his epistemology, where the organ of knowledge 
is the total man; and in his predication of personality of 
God. Sin and redemption become realities in his hands. Man 
does not, however, dwell in solitary communion with God. He 
lives among his fellow-men. Coleridge did not hold simply a 
pure theory of God. His theory involved practice. To this
1. Storr: op.cit., p.331.
2. Biographia Literaria, p.300.
3. Stewartt The Place of Coleridge in English Theology.
,('Harvard Theological Review, Vol. Xl7#I. January 1918.)
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may be traced his pioneering work for socialism. Beer finds 
in the Lay Sermon of 1817, "the first voice of Christian 
Socialism." To it may also be traced his work for the Church. 
Coleridge bade the Church believe in herself and stand for her 
spiritual independency.
Steeped in the Platonic realism he shows a
tendency to speak of principles rather than of persons in his 
treatment of Christianity. It may be said that his theology 
is "Logocentric" rather than Christocentric. To note this, 
however, is only to emphasize the double strain of his thought 
and to illustrate once more how he spent himself in seeking 
unity,—a unity that would build all knowledge into one temple 
of truth.
Lamb's "Logician, Metaphysician, Bard" has a 
place secure in the history of nineteenth century thought. 
From this review of Coleridge's religious philosophy, it is 
clear that his work, long recognized as of value in determin­ 
ing a new standpoint, was in fact more systematized and nearer 
completion than has been realized. It becomes evident that 
his place is a larger one than has hitherto been assigned. That 
the eighteenth century technique and ideas were inadequate to 
meet the problems of the new age is clear enough now. To Cole­ 
ridge, however, belongs the credit of being the first to real­ 
ize the demands of the new situation, and to attempt to meet 
them by a positive philosophy. This philosophy, comprehensive
1. Beer: op.cit., I. p.137
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in its aim and vital at its core, was the spiritual realism 
which has been reviewed. Man is a unity and a spiritual 
being. He reaches his highest level and reveals his true 
nature in fellowship with God.
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Appendix A. 
Prospectus of Coleridge's Bristol Lecture Course. 1795.
Six Lectures will be given by Samuel Taylor
Coleridge, on Revealed Religion, its Corruption, and its Polit­ 
ical Views.
These Lectures are intended for two classes of 
men, Christians and Infidels; to the Former, that they may be 
able to give a Reason for the hope that is in them: to the latter, 
that they may not determine against Christianity, from arguments 
applicable to its corruptions only.
The subjects of the FIRST LECTURE, are:-
The Origin of Evil. The Necessity of Revelation 
deduced from the Nature of Man. An Examination and Defence of 
the Mosaic Dispensation.
SECOND LECTURE.
The Sects of Philosophy, and the Popular Supersti­ 
tions of the Gentile World, from the earliest times to the Birth 
of Christ.
THIRD LECTURE.
Concerning the Time of the Appearance of Christ. 
The Internal Evidence of Christianity. The External Evidences 
of Christianity.
FOURTH LECTURE.
The External Evidences of Christianity continued. 
Answers to Popular and Philosophical objections.
FIFTH LECTURE.
The Corruptions of Christianity, in Doctrine. 
Political Application.
SIXTH LECTURE.
The grand Political Views of Christianity - far 
beyond other Religions, and even Sects of Philosophy. The Friend 
of Civil Freedom. The probable state of Society and Governments, 
if all men were Christians.




"It is a fact, that there are certain doctrines, 




A fragmentary note in the British Museum 
bearing the heading, "God," is of interest. (British 
Museum MS., Egerton 2801. ff.116-119. Watermark 1817.) 
Coleridge notea:-
1. An impulse quasi a tergo discoverable in early child­ 
hood—a darkness felt in the day-light but the 
tendency instantly forced into a false direction, 
soared by authority, then grounded in a bodily sensa­ 
tion, in a reality indeed, but a reality c-< c<*<> a-* vo5 
by association; (as with the voice and touch and 
countenance of the Mother &c) and finally Custom presses 
with a weight heavy as ?
2. Hence positiveness for certainty—anger kindled by 
opposition, but early perplexity left behind. The 
Man asks support of the Notion identified as with his 
blood in childhood—.
3. Shall he begin with sense? The African's fetisch and
the Brahman's Pantheism. (See Bhagavat-geeta,p.90-95.)
4. The understanding—Paley's Natural Theology as the Wart 
of conscience—Berkeley 1 s Minuta Philosopher .........
the finest—»but sophisme both.
6. The reason—necessary existence—ontological proof. Kant.
6. The Judgment, as the understanding substrated by the 
Reason.
7. The conscience—as evidence of free-will—incompatible 
with the non-existence of God—but this is rather a 
proof that God is presupposed in the Conscience,—and 
therefore purely subjective,—besides, will it answer 
regressively as well as it seems to do usque ad Deum?
8. The Idea—Cartesian,* Mendelssohn's.
9. Review of the Whole—Is the craving satisfied? If so, 
there is no Philosophy. The science of Theology suf­ 
fices. If not, which is the residuum of Darkness,then 
final defection? For here must be the commencement of 
Philosophy—Is the World? Is God? Is the affirmation 
of the seconcf"Question an answer to the First? For 
these Questions answered adequately, all others meet 
the solutions in the several Sciences. This proved to 
be the original tendency from which the child is forced.
*In Blackwiood's Magazine. October, 1821. Coleridge rejects this 
argument on the ground that "existence is no idea but a fact, 
no property of a thing but its reality itself."
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Appendix D. 
Additional Material re Coleridge's Doctrine of the Trinity.
MS.C, p,26: "Brief Exposition of the Trinity in Unity, or 
of the Tri-unity."
1. In discoursing of the eternal Verities it is 
indifferent whether we name the second Eistinctity in the 
Godhead Reason, or Being: for the Logos is the Identity of 
Knowing and Being.
Will, Reason, Act, in the form of the Absolute Will self- 
affirmed s the I AM, the gather.
Will, Reason, Act in the form of Reason, living and sub­ 
stantial = the Son.
Will, Reason, ana ACT in the form of Act, vivificare et ipse 
vivens - Holy Ghost.
And these three Absolute Forms by the Eternal Presupposition 
of the immanifestible Identity are the Absolutely One God.
8, Coleridge's favourite formula for the Trinity 
is found frequently throughout his notes. One form is 
found in the Semina Rerum and is as follows:-(MS.C, p,162) 
Cf. Notes Theological.Political & Miscellaneous«pp«g95-396.
Identity.
The Absolute Will, the Good.
Ipseity Alterity. 
The I AM. Be ing, Truth, the 
the Father. Supreme Mind,the 
the Supreme Will. only-begotten Word.
Community. 
Life, Love, the Holy Spirit.
Another form is also suggested:- MS.C, p.163.
Prothesis.
The Absolute Subjectivity = the Absolute Will,
the one only Absolute Good.
Thesis. Antithesis, 
The relatively Subjective The relatively Objective, 
The Eternal I AM the Supreme Being, o «&* i* 
the Father, the T*«» KoXn-^o -TO -rrWr$s 
Supreme Will. the Supreme Reason,the only
begotten Word, ̂ &t~ ffvrpo$ 
pleroma et unitas Idearum. 
Synthesis.
The relatively subjective-Objective; Subjective in relation 
to the relatively Objective, objective in relation to the 




"Wonderful even to myself is the pregnancy of the 
Ideas respecting the Absolute and the three Forms 
in each of which it exists integrally yet in all 
onely (wunly) Father, Son, Spirit - Ipseity, Alterity 
Community • *»'>» > Xo^o* ^y^** » the Supreme Will, 




It is possible to amplify Coleridge's doctrine 
of the Christian Church from certain marginal notes and 
ex officio comments. Coleridge's bi-polar mind conceived the 
Christian Church under two forms: the idea and the historical 
community. "I contend," he writes in a note on Jeremy Taylor, 
"that the Church in the Christian sense is an idea;—not there­ 
fore a chimera, or a fancy, but a real being, and a most powerful 
reality." 1 This is Coleridge's ideal Church, "the members of 
which are recorded only in the book of life at any one moment." 2 
On the other hand, this idea needs historical expression. The 
idea works itself out historically in the Christian community. 
A note in the Semina Rerum makes this clear. 3
"But tho 1 History of Christians, which cannot be rendered 
intelligible without the History of Men in general History 
be the proper real exponent of the Christian Idea, still a' 
focus is wanting, to collect the scattered rays of a Multi­ 
tude of individual Subjects, and above all to present their 
Unity, and as the Objective Form of the Idea, in which as 
permanent in all succession and entire in each and every 
Individual, this Unity is grounded. Such is the Church; 
and as the History of Christians requires the light of 
general History, so neither can the Church be understood 
aright without reference to the Christendom, during each of it's periods." ———————
1. Notes on English Divines, 1, p.225.
2. Ibid, 1, p.226.
3. MS.C, p.45.
321.
The famous "Pentad of Operative Christianity" 
combines these two conceptions. The Church takes her place 
in the scheme over against the Scriptures as antithesis to 
thesis, both based on Christ the Word and illuminated by the 
Holy Spirit. Their synthesis is the Preacher, who is the 
"sensible voice of the Holy Spirit." 1 In this sense, there is 
a "co-ordinateness" of the Church and the written Word.2 This, 
Coleridge admits, is high churchism. 3 It is not, however, a 
high churchism based on an appeal to creeds, orders, ritual 
and sacraments.
Although towards the close of his life, Coleridge 
was ready enough to subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles,4yet 
for creeds, as such, he had little use. "The full-grown 
Christian needs no other Creed than the Scriptures themselves." 6 
He was quite prepared to criticize the Apostles' Creed 6 and the 
Nicene Creed, 7 and to reject the Athanasian Creed as superfluous 
and unauthentic. 8
1. Notes on English Divines. 1, p.66. Of. ibid, 1, p.334. 
	Cf. Aids. p.288.
2. Ibid, I. p.66.
3. Ibid, I. p.66.
4. Notes on the Book of Common Prayer Aids, p.359.
5. Notes on English Divines. 11. p.151.
6. Ibid. II. pp.73. 104; Omhiana. p.423.
7. Ibid, II. pp.151, 154, 212.
8. Ibid, II. p.150.
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Again, although a devout Anglican and a pro­ 
fessed lover of the Church of England,* Coleridge did not 
hold that episcopacy is of the ease of the Church. Even 
granting the establishment of Bishops by St. Paul—a moot 
question in view of the New Testament usage of presbyter and 
episcopos—"yet was this done Jure Apostolico for the 
universal Church in all places and ages; or only as expedient
o
for that time and under those circumstances?" Confirmation 
by a bishop is neither a scriptural necessity, nor of apostolic 
origin, 3 Bishops are not requisite for the reception of the 
Spirit. 4 Episcopacy can be understood historically, without 
rash statements being made in its support.
"Nothing more rational or indeed inevitable," he writes 
in a manuscript fragment, "than the commencement and con­ 
tinuance of Superintendents or Bishops, in the Christian 
Churches from the Apostolic Age—For who would not have 
their Founder in the Chair?5
The Church does not mean the clergy exclusively.
7Priests are not necessary for salvation. In fact, "the Gospel
Q
has no Priests, can have no Priests." Nor is any particular 
church necessary for salvation. Coleridge stresses this with
1. Table Talk, p.67.
2. Notes on English Divines. I. p. 172.
3. Ibid, I. p.322.
4. Ibid, I. p.327.
5. British Museum Copy, Egerton 2801, folio 255.
6. Notes on English Divines, I. p.325.
7. Ibid";II. p.4.
8. Note on p.11 of Blomfield: A Charge delivered to the Clergy 
	of his Diocese. Btitish Museum Copy.
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characteristic hyperbole. "I know of no church,'1 he writes, 
"Jewish, Turkish or Brahman, in which, and in spite of which, 
a man may not possibly be saved. Who dares limit the Spirit 
of God." The position, it must be noted, is a negative 
one.
Ritual to Coleridge is a circumstantial, not
2 3 an essential. It is an aid to decency and dignity in worship.
The liturgy is lf a grand composition of devotional music," 
expressing the natural language of the feelings.
The question of the constitution and discipline 
of the Christian Church gave him some concern. In a note in 
Southey ! s Life of Wesley. he writes,
"The constitution of a Christian Church I have found 
a problem of exceeding difficulty,—increased by the 
difficulty of satisfactorily determining the period to 
which our Lord's few declarations on this head refer... 
and second, by certain perplexities respecting the 
Paulinity of the Epistles to Timothy and Titus." 6
Elsewhere, he feels that Christ's words with regard to the 
Church apply 'wholly to the Synagogue or church then existing." 17 
He agrees with Baxter "as to the necessity of Church discipline
Q
in a Christian Church." The passage in the Aids is emphatic 
in its declaration that the Church must exercise authority;
1. Southeys Life of Wesley. II. p.95n.
2. Notes on English Divines', II. p.20. Cf. ibid. I, p.123.
3. Ibid, II. pp.H-19.
4. Ibid, II. p.2V.
5. Ibid, I. pp.92-93.
6. Southey: Life of Wesley. I. p.!54n.
7. Notes on English Divines. I. p.176. Cf. ibid, II. p.98.
8. Ibid, II. p.6.
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"My fixed principle is: that a Christianity without a Church 
exercising Spiritual Authority is Vanity and Dissolution." 
Authority—it is to be noted—is qualified by spiritual. 
Coleridge is clear as to the authority. He is not quite so 
clear as to the meaning of spiritual in this connection. The 
power of a bishop is spiritual only. 2 Discipline in religious 
matters cannot be entrusted to magistrates for the same reason. 3 
He approves of the Presbyterian system of lay elders as "con­ 
stituting a medium and conducting link between the priest and 
the congregation, so that all may be one well-organized body 
spiritual without discontinuity." 4
The authority of the Church is qualified by 
that of the Scriptures. "The Church on earth can in no sense 
be such in and through itself, that is, its component parts,
but only by their common adherence to the body of truth made
5 
present in the Scripture." The condition of membership is
also spiritual. It is faith, with its "proper and primary 
seat in the moral will." Excommunication is thus "merely 
declarative" of a state already existing. 7 Discipline must 
be in keeping with the fact that the flock, whether of
1. Aids, p.EOOn.
2. fiotes on English Divines. I. pp.171-172.
3. Ibid, II. pp.13, 19, 59.
4. Ibid, II. p.10.
5. Notes on English Divines, I. P.62.
6. Ibid, I. p.62.
7. Ibid, I. p.63.
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Presbyter or Bishop, is composed of men and not of sheep, 
"not of a natural, generic, or even constant inferiority of 
judgment; but Christians, co-heirs of the promises, and 
therein of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and of the inter­ 
pretation of the Holy Scriptures." "How then," he asks,
"can they be excluded from a share in Church Government."
2 Discipline must not sink into "mere club-regulations."
Christian discipline is a spiritual matter. It is discip­ 
line "enforced only by spiritual motives, enacted by spiritual
g authority, and submitted to for conscience 1 sake." He claims
that though Church government is an ordinary thing in some
form or other, "it does not follow that one particular form
4 is an ordinary thing."
Several late entries in the Table Talk indi­ 
cate that Coleridge's mind was working towards the idea of 
a "spiritual" democracy with regard to the government of the 
Christian Church. On May 18th, 1830, he is reported as say­ 
ing, "A democracy, according to the prescript of pure reason, 
would, in fact, be a church. There would be focal points in 
it, but no superior." A little later in the same year, dis­ 
coursing on Church and State, he holds, "A church is, therefore, 
in idea the only pure democracy." From December of the follow­ 
ing year comes a third note. A church is "the only pure
1. Notes on English Divines, II. p.98.
2. ibid; ii. p.yy.
3. Ibid: II. p.EE9.
4. Ibid: II. p.59.
5. Table Talk, p.78.
6. TbiTpTT07.
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democracy, because in it persons are alone considered, and 
one person a priori is equal to another person." He adds 
that even to a church, discipline is an essential condition
. 1 
Coleridge finds in Quaker discipline something akin to what
 
he has in mind ?
The conflict between this stress on the
spiritual and his love of the Established Church was appare
nt 
to Coleridge. "There are few subjects," he writes, "that n
eed 
more investigation, yet require more vigour and soundness 
of 
judgment to be rightly handled, than this of Christian dis­
 
cipline in a Church established by law." 3 Again he notes,
Ch^h^SffS?? 1^ 1} 1^ ?f Christia* discipline with a 
S l^^lablished by Law, and all the permitted acts 
of which have the force of penal or compulsory Laws 
has always appeared to me the objection that bears 
hardest on Church Establishment,"*
And again, in 1829, he asks, "Is a national Church, establi
shed 
by law, compatible with Christianity?" 6 Coleridge claims t
hat 
it was this matter that led him first to his distinction b
e­ 
tween the ecclesia and the enclesia. 6 In an essay on 
"Establishment and Dissent,"—not now, if ever, extant- 
Coleridge claims to have met the difficulty by pointing to 
the 
fact of the discipline of the Church of Scotland. Punish­
 
ment in this case is ignominy; the enforcing magistrate, th
e 
clergy. He is not clear whether this would be either wise 
or
1. Table Talk, p. 147.
2. Notes on English Divines. II. x>.100.
3. Ibid, II. p.228.
4. Ibid, II. p.20.
5. Ibid, II. p.99.
6. Notes on English Divines, II. p.228.
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expedient in England. But the matter was never clarified 
further and Coleridge takes refuge from his difficulties 
in the distinction between the ecclesis and the enclesia,
between the Christian and the National Church.
Nor does Coleridge's view of the Christian
Church rest upon any particular theory of the sacraments.
He had certain well-defined convictions with regard to the
nature of the sacraments. During his Unitarian days, the
sacraments had little place in his life.
"I cannot as yet reconcile my intellect to the sacra­ 
mental Rites; ....I never even state my dissent..... 
I omit the rites, and wish to say nothing about it; 
.....I cannot, I must not, play the hypocrite. If I 
performed or received the Lord's Supper, in my pres­ 
ent state of mind, I should indeed be eating and 
drinking condemnation."2
Coleridge's sincerity in this conviction is attested by the 
fact that none of his children were baptized at birth. It 
was not until November 1803, when Coleridge had returned to 
the orthodox faith, that Hartley, Derwent and Sara were 
baptized. 3
Coming to his later thought, it is clear that 
his view of the nature of the sacraments depends on the mean­ 
ing which he assigns to symbols. As defined in the Statesman's 
Manual, a symbol differs both from a metaphor and an allegory.
1. Notes on English Divines. II. p.229.
2. Unpublished Letters," I. p.79. - Letter of July 1797
3. Ibid, I. p,155n.
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inasmuch as it is "an actual and essential part of that, the 
whole of which it represents." 1 To Coleridge the sacraments 
are symbols. A long entry in the Semina Rerum makes this
clear.
MA Sacrament is a Symbol or Mystery consisting of 
a sensible sign and a spiritual substantiative (sic/ 
Act, the predicate spiritual distinguishing the act 
from a physical, and even from a moral act, unless 
in the latter case the act of the soul shall be 
correlative to an act of the Divine Spirit, and the 
medium thro 1 which the gracious influence of the 
Divine Spirit is conveyed to the Believer—while the 
Act, and the substantiative Act, is in distinction 
from a doctrine or office, or an event, however 
aweful and important."
On the basis of this definition, Coleridge 
excludes penance, ordination and marriage from the list of 
sacraments. 3 The definition also goes beyond the Zwinglian 
view of the Lord's Supper as exclusively a signum commemorans 
Coleridge does not elaborate what he means by the "spiritual 
substantiative act." However, from his definition of a 
symbol, his position is clear. In the sacraments, God actu­ 
ally does something. In other words, he construes the sacra­ 
ments in a genuinely religious sense. This is emphasized 
further in the same note in the distinction drawn between a 
sacrament and a ceremony. Every sacrament is a ceremony, but
1. Statesman's Manual, Biog. Lit, p.348. Cf. Notes on EnglishDivines, I. p.80, ——————————
2. MS.C, p.71. 5?T Notes Theological.Political and Mis­ 
cellaneous, p,84.
3. Cf. Notes on English Divines. I. p.307.
4. Cf. Table Talk, p.79"
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every ceremony is not necessarily a sacrament. The ceremonial 
part of the sacrament has several distinct purposes, "one 
outward, another inward, one general and public, another 
personal." Again, the outward purpose may be divided into 
a public purpose "in relation to a more distant" circle, and 
a "special and household purpose in relation to a close circle." 
In both divisions the outward purpose is effected by the cere­ 
monial part of the sacrament alone; the ceremony being the 
means to the endl Abstracted from the spiritual act, the 
sensible sign is a ceremony. The substantiative act is hidden 
and "confined to the Soul of the individual Agent and Patient." 2 
The Eucharist is the epiphany for as many as receive it in 
faith. 3
There is a long passage in the Aids dealing 
with the question of Infant Baptism. 4 Here Coleridge rightly 
rejects any argument drawn from the silence of the New Testa­ 
ment, Baptism is not essential for salvation, and is there­ 
fore not to be enjoined as an article of faith. 6 The Church, 
however, exercised a sound discretion in baptizing infants. 7
1. MS. C, p.71.
2. Ibid, p.71.
3. Notes on English Divines. I. p.79. Cf. Table Talk, pp.79 272.
4. Aids, pp.845-267. ————————
5. Cf. Notes on English Divines. I. x>.10.
6. Cf. ibid, I. p.237.
7. Cf. ibid, I. p.24.
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In the first place, it made publicly manifest those indivi­ 
duals who were to be regarded by the world as belonging to 
the Christian community. Secondly, it marked out for the 
Church itself those who were entitled to especial care. 
Distinguishing between the outward and the inward purposes, 
Coleridge holds that the Church continued to affix the out­ 
ward sign where the effect was to be produced on the con­ 
sciousness of others.
"while to the substantial and spiritual purpose, 
where the effect was to be produced on the indivi­ 
dual's own mind, she gave its beseeming dignity 
by an ordinance not figurative, but standing in , 
the direct cause and relation of means to the end."
For a period, he admits, he had felt that baptism should be 
reserved until confirmation, but feels that such a position 
is not sufficient to warrant schism. It is impossible to 
state what precise spiritual efficacy Coleridge actually 
ascribed to Infant Baptism. His ethical realism held him to 
a belief that "spiritual influences suppose capability." 3 
There is a passage in the Aids that hints at a belief in 
some eense in prevenient grace in connection with Infant 
Baptism. 4
1. Aids p.252.
2. Cf. Notes on English Divines. I. p.234; II. pp.11, 48.
3. Ibid, I. p.241. Cf. ibid, II. p.30.
4. Aids, p.251. Cf. Notes on English Divines. I. p.329.
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"What more expressive of the true character of that 
originant yet generic stain, from which the Son of 
God, by his mysterious incarnation and agony and 
death and resurrection, and by the Baptism of the 
Spirit, came to cleanse the children of Adam, than 
the exhibition of the outward element to infants 
free from and incapable of crime, in whom the evil 
principle was present only as potential being, and 
whose outward semblance represented the Kingdom of 
Heaven?"
After his Unitarian days, Coleridge was ready enough to 
appear as sponsor for the children of his friends. The 
assertion of regeneration in the Baptismal Service he holds 
to be symbolical and prospective.
The Lord's Supper was of more interest to
Coleridge, both intellectually and devotionally. It was the
3 4 "sacrament of love and life," the "symbol of all our religion."
The devotional notes on preparation for the sacrament advocate 
the reading of the Gospel of St. John, "with a kneeling and 
praying heart," as the surest antidote to the "lethargizing 
hemlock" of the merely commemorative view. The Eucharist 
is a symbol and representative instance of an act of assimila­ 
tive faith in which "Christ is our spiritual food and substance."
1. Letters, II. pp.775-776.
2. Memorials of Coleorton, Vol. II. p.248. March 18, 16S6.
3. Table Talk. p.gTTT
4. Ibid, P.79.
5. Notes on Book of Common Prayer, Aids, p.350.
6. Ibid, p.353.
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Coleridge holds that controversy respecting 
the Eucharist may be traced to a confusion of corporeal and 
spiritual, of phaenomenon and noumenon. A manuscript 
fragment reveals his mind on this point.
"This contra-distinetion of corporeal from spiritual 
is the leaven of error that pervades the whole con- 
troversy respecting the Eucharist, and is partaken 
of by Romanist, Calvinist and Lutheran. If instead 
°^ corporeal they had substituted the word, phenomenal 
or corpus phaenomenon. in antithesis to corpus noumenon 
or reale. how many sanguinary conflicts would have been 
prevented, and how different a judgment .would Philosoph­ 
ers have passed on the mystery itself.
A marginal note elsewhere expresses the same judgment,
"The nature of the contrary errors respecting the 
Eucharist seem to me abundantly clear. - First, and 
Common to both Parties, the confusion of the 
Phaenomenon with the Noumenon or thing in itself; 
2. The substituting a select Symbol.....to the ex­ 
clusion of the universal Verity symbolized. (Romish 
Plethora) 3. The De-substantiation of the mysterious 
Symbol into a grotesque hollow Metaphor (Arminian 
Marasmus, or Sacramentarian Atrophy1.a
Thus Coleridge feels that much of the controversy over tran- 
substantiation and consubstantiation is beside the point. 3
Church Union.
Coming to the final proposal of the 1828
sketch—the exhortation to the Clergy and a solemn Appeal to 
the (Orthodox) Dissenters—it is evident that already
1. British Museum Manuscript. Sgerton 2801, folio 263.
2. Note in Blanco White: Practical and Internal Evidence 
against Catholicism, pp.234-235. London, 1825. 
British Museum Copy. Printed by Taylor: Critical 
Annotations by S.T.Coleridge, p.86. 
Cf. Notes on English Divines. I. p.289.
3. Notes on English Divines, I. p.519; II. p.74. 
——Cf. ibid, I. pp.52, 54, 282, 284.
333.
Coleridge had given expression to this proposal. In the 
Aids of 1825, his concluding Aphorism on Spiritual Religion 
ends with a quotation to which Coleridge £eartily gives his
assent.
"That all Christians in the world that hold the same 
fundamentals ought to make one Church, though differ­ 
ing in lesser opinions; and that the sin, the mischief, 
and danger to the souls of men, that divide into those 
many sects and parties among us, does (for the most of 
them) consist not so much in the opinions of themselves, 
as in their dividing and separating for them. ff l
A note of April 1, 1826, in the Semina Rerum indicates 
Coleridge's large-visioned scheme. It is in the nature of a 
personal memorandum and reads,
"Mem. To conclude the Essay or Dialogue on the Church 
with an earnest expostulation and Scheme of Union be­ 
tween our Establishment and the really pious and 
orthodox Dissenters who have the interests of our common ? 
Christianity more at heart than the ''Dissenting Interest". ft
But the note, which commences in so promising a vein, ends in 
a semi-historical, semi-philosophical discussion of the origin 
of the various churches. The scheme of union remains among 
the Coleridgean proposals, never carried to completion, but 
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The Bibliography of Coleridge. 
London, 1900.
A Bibliography of the Writings in 
Prose and Verse of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge. London, 1913.
Two Lake Poets. A catalogue of 
printed books, manuscripts and auto­ 
graph letters by W. Wordsworth and 
S. T. Coleridge, collected by 
T. J. Wise, London, 1927.
Primary Source Material:-
I. Coleridge's Works:- (N.B. Where more than one edition is
mentioned, the first refers to 
the original, the last named 




(Bonn's Popular Library, London,1913)
Ed. Ernest Hartley Coleridge. London. 
1895.
Biographia Literaria. London, 1817. 2 Volumes.
(Bonn's Standard Library. London,1889)
"Blessed are ye that sow beside all waters.1 n .. .A Lay Sermon,
Addressed to the Higher and Middle 
Classes. London, 1817. I Bonn's 
Standard Library. Printed with Bio­ 
graphia Literaria. 1889)
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Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit.1st edition, London, 1840. 
Popular Library. Printed with Aids 
to Reflection, London, 1913.)
Constitution of the Church and State, according to the Idea
of Each, London, 1830. (2nd edition, 
London, 1830.)
Essays on His Own Times.
Ed. Sara Coleridge. London, 1850. 
3 7ols.
Friend, The 1st edit., Penrith, 1809-1810.
2nd edit., London, 1812. 1 vol. 
3rd edit,, London, 1818, 3 volumes. 
(The York Library, London, 1904.)
Lectures and Notes on Shakespeare and Other English Poets.
Ed. T. Ashe, London, 1897. 
(Ed. T.M.Raysor. London, 1930. 2 vols.)
Life, The Theory of Ed. Seth B. Watson. London, 1848.
(Printed in Miscellanies. Aesthetic and 
Literary. London, 1685.)
Literary Remains. Ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge. London,
1836-1839. 4 volumes.
Monologues. (No. 1, "Life:" No. 2, "The Science and System
of Logic.")
Eraser's Magazine, November and December, 
1835. (XI1. 493-496; 619-629.)
Poems of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The
(Oxford Univ. Press), London, 1931.
Preliminary Treatise on Method, A. ... General Introduction to the Encyclopaedia Metropolitan.
(1st edition not now extant.)
Ed. Alice D. Snyder, London, 1934.
Review of T. Clarteson's The History of the Abolition of the Slave Trade, London, 1808.
The Edinburgh Review, July 1808. 
(7ol. Xll. No. xxiv.)
Selections from Mr. Coleridge's Literary Correspondence with Friends and Men of Letters:- (5 letters)
BlacJcwood's Edinburgh Magazine.7ol.X. 
No, LV1. October 1821, reprinted 
partially in Miscellanies, etc., 1885.
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Specimens of the Table Talk of the Late Samuel Taylor Cole­ 
ridge .
London, 1836. 2 volumes. (Published 
as "The Table Talk and Omniana of 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge/' Bohn's 
Standard Library, 1884.)
Statesman's Manual, The........A Lay Sermon, Addressed to the
Higher Classes of Society.
London, 1816. (Bohn's Standard Library. 
Printed with Biographia Literaria. 
London, 1889.)
Complete Works. 7 volumes. New York, 1856, ( shedd.}
Coleridge on Logic and Learning, with Selections from the Un­ 
published Manuscripts.
Alice D. Snyder. New Haven, 1929.
II. Letters of Coleridge;-
Allsop, Thomas. Letters, Conversations and Recollec­ 
tions of S. T. Coleridge. London, 1836. 
2 vols. (3rd edit. London, 1864 - 1 vol.)
Bright, Henry A. "Unpublished Letters from Samuel Taylor
Coleridge to the Rev. John Prior Estlin." 
Miscellanies of the Philobiblon Society. 
Vol. XV. London, 1877-188*.
Coleridge, Ernest Hartley.
Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 
London and Boston, 1895. 2 volumes. 
Pages numbered consecutively. (American 
Edition Quoted.)
(Cottle, Joseph Early Recollections. London, 1837. 
( 2 volumes. Letters passim.
(
(Cottle, Joseph. Reminiscences of Samuel Taylor Cole­ 
ridge and Robert Southey. London,1847. 
Letters passim.
Greever, Garland MA Wiltshire Person and His Friends/1 -
The Correspondence of William Leslie 
Bowles, London, 1926.
Griggs Earl Leslie Unpublished Letters of Samuel Taylor 
' Coleridge. London, 1932. 2 volumes.
Knight William Memorials of Coleorton. Edinburgh, 
' 1887. 2 volumes.
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Prideaux, W,F, Letters, hitherto uncollected, by
Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Privately 
printed, 1913*
Stuart, Mary Letters of the Lake Poets.....Daniel
Stuart. London, 1889,
Towle, G, M. Some Unpublished Letters of Samuel
Taylor Coleridge. Lippincott's Maga­ 
zine, Xlll. June, 1874*
Turnbull, A. Biographia Epistolaris. London, 1911.
2 volumes.
III. Manuscripts;- (following Miss Snyder's System of Numbering.)
1. MSS Bl, B2, B3, B supplementary.
Three vellum-bound notebooks and supplementary 
loose leaves. Materials or finished sections of 
the unfinished Opus Maximum. Written by J.H.Green 
and Gillman, corrected by 5.T.C. In the possession 
of Reverend G. H. B. Coleridge, of Leatherhead, 
Surrey. Volumes marked in pencil by Charles Ward. 
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MS.B.2, Volume marked "Say Vol. 111." Watermark 
,1819. Pages numbered in pencil 1-162. Plus notes.
MS.B.3. Volume marked "Say Vol. 11," Watermark
1817. Pages numbered in pencil 1-283, Plus notes,
MS.B. Supplementary. Two sets of loose leaves. 38 
pages of manuscript. Unnumbered. Watermarks 1815, 
1820.
2. MS.C. Autograph Notebook. Entries run from November, 
1825. to March, 1832, Pages numbered 1-178 and 
additional notes at end of volume.
N.B« In view of the fact that Dr. Muirhead has 
omitted part of the title given to the notebook by 
Coleridge, in his description of the MS. in Coleridge 






Crudezze, Molecula, Nuclei, Visa, 
Audita, Cogitata, Cogitanda, of a Man of 
Letters friendless, because of No Faction:- 
repeatedly and in strong language inculpated 
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to see publication after publication; 
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On page 149, Coleridge calls the book,
Flycatcher
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Daybook for impounding Stray Thoughts. 
No.XIX.
3. British Museum: MS. Egerton 2801. Collection of 
miscellaneous autograph fragments.
4. British Museum: MSS. Egerton, 2825, 2826. Two volumes, 
on Logic. Abstracts and analysis published in Snyder: 
Coleridge on Logic and Learning, New Haven, 1929,
5. British Museum: Add. MSS. 27,901. 89 folios.
"The Gutch" Notebook. (1795-1798) - Autograph Memo­ 
randum Book. Printed in full in Archiv fur das 
Studium der neueren Sprachen und Litteraturen. 97, 
(1896) pp.333-372.
6. MS .A. ""The Bristol Notebook." Printed in Snyder: 
Coleridge on Logic and Learning. Appendix A.
7. MS.H. MS. in the Henry E. Huntingdon Library, San
Marino, California. Part of the Opus Maximum. Des­ 
cribed and sections printed in Muirhead, Cole"ridge 
as Philosopher. London, 1930.
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Ed. Derwent Coleridge.
2 volumes. London, 1853.
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Ed. Derwent Coleridge, London, 1853.
3. Critical Annotations by S. T. Coleridge.
Ed. William F. Taylor. Harrow, 1889.
4. S.T.C. Marginalia in Volumes of Logic.
Alice E, Snyder:- Coleridge on Logic 
and Learning. App.C. New Haven, 1929.
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6. Southey, Robert. Life of Wesley, with Notes by
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October, 1928.
4. Snyder, Alice D.
Coleridge on Bbhme.
Publ. Mod. Lang. Ass. of Amer.
7ol. XL7, #2. June, 1930.
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5. Snyder, Alice D, -
Coleridge's Reading of Mendelssohn's 
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Journal of English and Germanic 
Philology. Vol. XX7III, #4. 
October, 1929.
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of Peers on the Second Reading of the 
Bill for the Relief of His Majesty's 
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Mr. Mackintosh, the author of an Essay 
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Cosmologia Sacra. London, 1701.
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Leipzig, 1822.
Herder, J. G. -
Briefe das Studium der Theologie. 
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Herder, J. G. -
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Herder, J. G. -
Kalligone. Leipzig, 1800.
Jurieu, Peter -
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Majesty. London 1827. Vol. I. 
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Schubert, D.G.H. -
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Allgemeine Naturgeschichte etc. 
Erlangen, 1826.
Schubert, D.G.H. -
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